While crime is not considered something that is abstinent from the business world, it is also seldom realized as its own economy. The following paper will present an economic approach to crime in the modern area. The sphere of cybercrime, in particular the case of Botnets is going to be used to analyze a rational choice approach to economics in crime.
In doing so, the basic model of rational choice economics in crime is presented. Then the case of Botnets is introduced and used to illustrate supporting and opposing arguments for the model. The paper will conclude that cybercrime – especially the case of botnets – is driven by rational choice and thus the idea of economic efficiency. The benefit of this conclusion results in the possibility of counter-measures to disrupt these criminal markets and lower profitability.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. Background
A. The Model of Economics of Cybercrime.
B. Botnets – a prime example for cybercriminal activity
III. Supporting Arguments
A. Existing underground market
B. Benefits are calculable
C. Reported Cases of extortion in the study by Segura & Lahuerta
IV. Opposing Arguments
A. Punishment as a deterrence
B. Origin of Cybercrime based in activism
V. Conclusion
Objectives & Core Themes
This paper aims to apply the rational choice model of economics to the field of cybercrime, specifically focusing on the operation of botnets to demonstrate that such criminal activity is driven by economic efficiency rather than mere malice.
- Rational choice theory applied to criminal behavior
- Economic analysis of cybercrime markets
- Operation and monetization of botnets
- Cost-benefit dynamics in illegal activities
- Effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent in digital markets
Excerpt from the Book
A. The Model of Economics of Cybercrime.
A criminal act is considered any behavior that deviates from societal norms, crosses the boundaries of ethical and lawful behavior, and is sanctioned by a governmental authority. As such criminal behavior is often associated with the aspect of punishment, fines, and imprisonment. Any association to economics and business is often limited to crime happening in a certain business environment. However, it is argued that crime in itself can be considered a market and thus bound to economic principles.
The here presented model is based upon the assumption that within the “crime market” any individual player is motivated by the rational maximization of utility (Eide et alt., 2006). This assumption is based upon the principle of rational choice, meaning that an individual acts rationally to maximize expected utility and that this utility is “a positive function of income” (ibid). This leads to a very simplistic economic model: Any endeavor that has a greater income than zero after subtraction of costs is profitable (Segura & Lahuerta, 2010). It is a simple ocst-benefit principle (Li et alteri, 2006). This model transfers the rational choice assumptions to criminal activity.
Thus, a criminal will commit a criminal act “if the expected utility is positive, and he will not if it is negative” (Eide et alteri, 2006). In this scenario however the deterrence through sanctions and punishments have to be factored in as “negative variables” (ibid).
Summary of Chapters
I. Introduction: This chapter outlines the paper's intent to apply rational choice economics to cybercrime and asserts that such crimes are market-driven.
II. Background: This section presents the theoretical foundation of rational choice in crime and introduces botnets as a specific case study of internet-based criminal industries.
III. Supporting Arguments: This chapter argues that botnets are economically motivated, evidenced by underground rental markets, calculable cost-benefit ratios, and documented cases of extortion.
IV. Opposing Arguments: This section explores limitations to the economic model, specifically regarding whether punishment acts as a sufficient deterrent and the historical role of political activism in cybercrime.
V. Conclusion: The summary affirms that cybercrime operates within a rational economic system and suggests that understanding these incentives allows for the development of better defensive measures.
Keywords
Cybercrime, Botnets, Rational Choice, Economics of Crime, DDoS Attacks, Underground Market, Cost-Benefit Principle, Extortion, Utility Maximization, Deterrence, Marginal Benefits, Marginal Costs, Criminal Market, Digital Economy, Profitability.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this paper?
The paper explores the economic nature of cybercrime, arguing that it functions as a rational market driven by profit rather than solely by non-economic motivations.
What are the core topics discussed?
The core themes include the rational choice model, the operation of botnets, the existence of criminal underground markets, and the cost-benefit analysis of illegal activities.
What is the main goal of the research?
The goal is to demonstrate that cybercrime follows standard economic principles, which in turn helps in identifying potential countermeasures to disrupt criminal profitability.
Which scientific approach is utilized?
The author utilizes a rational choice model from microeconomics, applying it to criminal behavior to assess whether actors perform a cost-benefit analysis before committing offenses.
What is covered in the main body?
The main body covers the theoretical model of crime, the mechanics of botnets and DDoS attacks, supporting evidence from underground market studies, and an evaluation of deterrence factors like punishment.
What are the essential keywords?
Key terms include Cybercrime, Botnets, Rational Choice, Cost-Benefit Principle, and Economic Efficiency.
How do botnets generate profit for attackers?
Attackers monetize botnets by renting them out on underground markets or by using them to launch DDoS attacks to extort money from targets like gambling websites.
Is punishment an effective deterrent according to the paper?
The paper suggests that the effectiveness of punishment is limited by factors such as the individual's rate of discount, risk aversion, and the time gap between the crime and the sanction.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Jan Alexander Linxweiler (Autor:in), 2016, Botnets. Economics of Cybercrime, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/342128
