No area seems to be of more importance in the field of foreign policy and diplomatic history today than the so called Middle East. The continuing clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian suicide bombers, the difficult challenge of stabilizing a newly elected government in Iraq and the growing tension between Iran and the international community concerning the issue of nuclear power are just a few examples which illustrate the urgency to look at origins of these conflicts. As an example for this essay, I have chosen the case of Iran. I will focus on the very beginning of the involvement of the United States in the Middle East, and I will demonstrate what kind of issues and perceptions played an essential role in the determination of U.S. policy towards Iran.
Although I do not attempt to find causes for the current situation, some of the factors I will identify in this essay might also serve as an explanation for the current conflict with Iran. Yet, this is not my primary intention and further research and empirical data will be required to investigate connections to the contemporary situation with Iran.
However, I will argue that the way US policymakers viewed their Iranian counterparts did not change fundamentally for many decades at least regarding the country of Iran if not more countries in the Middle East. I downplay this aspect because a lot more research is needed to support this argument and it would extend beyond the scope of this essay. Mostly the dealings with Iran and its premier Muhammad Musaddiq in the early 1950s at the time of the Anglo-Iranian oil crises will be of relevance.
The essence of my argument is that even though strategic thinking and the fear of a communist takeover of Iran played a role in negotiating with Iran, the reason why Musaddiq was toppled by the CIA and the British MI-6 was because Western diplomats had a so called “orientalist” mindset and perceived him as too weak and irrational as to fight off Soviet attacks and propaganda which could have led to an eventual takeover of Iran by Soviet forces. In order to pre-empt that, the United States and Britain collaborated to bring down Musaddiq and install a shah regime that would, on the one hand be more favourable to Western oil interests, and on the other hand more resistant regarding possible Soviet invasion efforts.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Sources
3. The United States, Britain and Iran: An Overview
4. Short Biography of Muhammad Musaddiq
5. The Concept of Orientalism and American Orientalism
6. Perception, Misperception and Orientalism
7. The Limits of Misperception
8. The Characterization of Musaddiq in recent Literature
9. Conclusion
10. Bibliography
Research Objective and Key Themes
This essay investigates how American policy towards Iran in the early 1950s was significantly influenced by "orientalist" perceptions and fears of communism, specifically regarding the diplomatic dealings with Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq during the Anglo-Iranian oil crises.
- The role of "orientalist" mindsets in shaping Western diplomatic perceptions of Iranian leadership.
- The impact of Cold War strategic fears and the perceived threat of Soviet influence in Iran.
- Analysis of the divergence between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations regarding their approach to Musaddiq.
- How cultural stereotypes and misperceptions of Musaddiq's behavior rationalized the decision to remove him from power.
- The counter-perspectives provided by recent literature that re-evaluate Musaddiq's political motives and legacy.
Excerpt from the Book
6. Perception, Misperception, and Orientalism
In order to resolve the oil crises between Great Britain and Iran multiple U.S. diplomats went to Iran as a “neutral” mediator to negotiate with Musaddiq. Their experiences and descriptions of their meetings with the Iranian premier are the bulwark of my argument. Although president Harry Truman and his staff originally intended to work with Musaddiq and sent many ambassadors on missions to Iran with the hope to reach a settlement it became obvious to the administration that it would be very difficult to agree on the terms of such a settlement. Historians debate the issue whether or not the fact that Eisenhower became president in 1953 had any impact on the decision to remove Musaddiq from office with the use of covert operations. It is a discussion over the question of continuity or change of foreign policy towards Iran from the Truman to the Eisenhower administration.
No matter which direction this debate will take, what can be said with certainty is that it was during Eisenhower’s term in office that Musaddiq was ousted. Maybe Truman would have been forced to decide the way Eisenhower did. Yet it is interesting to see a development of the characterization of Musaddiq by U.S. diplomats. They began to describe him with a clear sense of incertitude since Musaddiq had just been elected prime minister and the State Department was hopeful to be able to resolve the oil crises with him. Their reservations are echoed in personifications such as “violent nationalist and an unknown quantity.” Secretary of State under Harry Truman Dean Acheson described his optimism regarding the prospect of negotiations with Musaddiq in his biography Present at the Creation where he considered him an honest anti-Russian who might give the United States a chance to channel nationalism against Communism.
Chapter Summaries
1. Introduction: Outlines the research focus on how orientalist perceptions and communist fears shaped U.S. policy toward Iran during the early 1950s.
2. Sources: Discusses the primary and secondary documents used, acknowledging the limitations and controversies surrounding the declassification of FRUS records.
3. The United States, Britain and Iran: An Overview: Provides a historical background of the U.S.-Iranian relationship, emphasizing the strategic importance of Iranian oil and Cold War geopolitical anxieties.
4. Short Biography of Muhammad Musaddiq: Traces Musaddiq's early life, political development, and the origins of his anti-colonial stance.
5. The Concept of Orientalism and American Orientalism: Explores the theoretical framework of Orientalism, particularly as described by Edward Said, and its application to U.S. foreign policy.
6. Perception, Misperception and Orientalism: Analyzes how Western diplomats perceived and pathologized Musaddiq's behavior, leading to a breakdown in diplomatic negotiations.
7. The Limits of Misperception: Critically evaluates the orientalist perspective, noting that real geopolitical interests and Iranian domestic agendas also played crucial roles.
8. The Characterization of Musaddiq in recent Literature: Reviews contemporary scholarly works that challenge traditional Western narratives about Musaddiq's competence and intentions.
9. Conclusion: Summarizes findings, arguing that while orientalist stereotypes facilitated the decision to remove Musaddiq, strategic interests were also a constant factor.
10. Bibliography: Lists the academic primary and secondary sources utilized in the research.
Keywords
Orientalism, Muhammad Musaddiq, US Foreign Policy, Iran, Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, Cold War, Communism, Diplomacy, Misperception, Decolonization, Eisenhower Administration, Truman Administration, Nationalism, Middle East, Geopolitics.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the central focus of this academic work?
The work examines how the U.S. government perceived and engaged with Iran during the early 1950s, arguing that these interactions were filtered through orientalist stereotypes that ultimately shaped the decision to facilitate the removal of Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq.
What are the key thematic areas discussed?
The essay covers the origins of U.S. involvement in Iran, the influence of the Cold War and anti-communist fears, the theoretical application of Orientalism to foreign policy, and the shifting portrayals of Musaddiq in diplomatic cables versus modern historical literature.
What is the primary research question?
The paper asks how specific issues and cultural perceptions held by American policymakers played an essential role in the determination and formulation of U.S. policy toward Iran during the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The research relies on a historical-analytical approach, utilizing primary sources such as the "Foreign Relations of the United States" (FRUS) documents and secondary biographical and historical monographs to construct an argument about diplomatic perceptions.
What topics are addressed in the main body?
The main body covers the historical context of U.S.-Iranian relations, a biographical overview of Musaddiq, the definition and application of Orientalism, an in-depth look at diplomatic perceptions of Musaddiq's behavior, and a critique of these perspectives using more recent scholarly literature.
Which keywords define this research?
The work is primarily defined by terms such as Orientalism, Musaddiq, US Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, and the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis.
How did diplomats interpret Musaddiq’s work habits?
Western diplomats frequently perceived Musaddiq’s choice to conduct meetings from his bed while wearing pajamas as evidence of irrationality, effeminacy, and instability, rather than as a symbolic act or a result of his health issues.
Why does the author argue that "interests" also mattered?
The author acknowledges that while Orientalism set the frame for policy, "politics is not just about perceptions but also interests," noting that real geopolitical concerns regarding oil and Soviet expansionism were constant, non-negotiable factors for the United States.
How does the recent literature differ from the contemporary perception of Musaddiq?
Recent literature moves away from the 1950s portrayals of Musaddiq as an "irrational fanatic," instead framing him as a shrewd nationalist and a principled statesman who was simply pursuing Iranian sovereignty, often criticizing Western historians for lacking sufficient knowledge of Persian sources.
- Quote paper
- Michael Schmid (Author), 2006, First steps in the middle east - how concerns about communism and orientalist perceptions shaped U.S. policy towards Iran in the 1950s, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/72827
