In this paper, I will reject the Kantian claim that animals’ behaviour can’t be morally assessed. On the contrary, I will show how animals’ behaviour can indeed be morally assessed, even if we can’t ascribe a sort of human-like normative morality to them, since they don’t use language and thus have no concept of morality.
Before stating my argument, I want to avoid any misunderstanding by specifying some central notions, i.e. “humans”, “animals” and “moral sensitivities”.
The reader will often be confronted with the terms “humans” and “animals”. Here I want to clarify that a mental division between us, as human animals, and animals, as non-human animals should be avoided. Such a separation usually leads to an overestimation and the assessment of humans being the only ones capable of morality on earth, mainly because of their advanced minds and intellect. Therefore, when considering the problem of moral assessment to animals, an imaginary hierarchical classification should be avoided in order to see what the essence of morality lies in, namely an innate moral sensitivity which humans share with some (or many) animals.
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
2. KEY ARGUMENT
3. THE KANTIAN APPROACH ON ANIMALS’ MORALITY
4. WHY ANIMALS’ BEHAVIOUR IS MORALLY ASSESSABLE
5. CONCLUSION
Objectives and Topics
This paper aims to challenge the Kantian assertion that animal behavior lies outside the realm of moral assessment. By critically examining the requirements of rationality and language-based normativity, the author proposes an alternative framework centered on "moral sensitivities," arguing that the capacity for feeling is sufficient for moral agency.
- The rejection of the Kantian anthropocentric view on morality.
- Defining "moral sensitivities" as the foundation of natural morality.
- The relationship between self-consciousness and moral behavior in animals.
- Ethological evidence illustrating moral behavior in chimpanzees, wolves, and choughs.
- The distinction between conceptual/normative morality and inherent moral sensitivities.
Excerpt from the Book
4. WHY ANIMALS’ BEHAVIOUR IS MORALLY ASSESSABLE
What is missing in the Kantian approach of morality is an emphasis on what gives the concept the moral content and the possibility to act from whatever it is gives the concept the moral content. What makes a behaviour morally good or morally bad? Is it really the having-of-and-applying-a-concept-of-morality which decides whether one’s actions can be morally assessed or not? Let us look at an act which is morally assessable as good, say, returning to a burning building several times to safe helpless junior (humans or animals) and getting burned oneself during that procedure (Korsgaard 2018: 12). Does is matter for assessing this behaviour morally and therefore as a morally good one, to know if the acting agent was an animal or a human? Isn’t it the act itself, the showing of compassion and the undertaking of responsibility in a requiring situation which makes the act being a morally good one? Does one even have to be capable of grasping or having a normative concept (of morality) to act according to such? Suppose the agent in the above example was a cat: We can’t know if the cat acts out of “Kantian moral motivations”, i.e. rational judgements about duties of a mother, or if its act arises from a cat-inherent instinct to save its kittens, whatever there will come.
Chapter Summary
1. INTRODUCTION: The author introduces the central thesis that animal behavior can be morally assessed by rejecting the Kantian claim that morality requires human-like language and normative reasoning.
2. KEY ARGUMENT: This chapter outlines the syllogistic argument that if a being is capable of acting on moral sensitivities, its behavior is morally assessable, which some animals demonstrate.
3. THE KANTIAN APPROACH ON ANIMALS’ MORALITY: An analysis of Kant’s perspective, which ties moral agency to self-consciousness, rational judgment, and the capacity for normative language.
4. WHY ANIMALS’ BEHAVIOUR IS MORALLY ASSESSABLE: The author justifies the premises that moral sensitivities are a sufficient requirement for moral assessment, supported by ethological observations.
5. CONCLUSION: The final chapter synthesizes the arguments, reaffirming that morality is composed of both conceptual and sensitive pillars, the latter of which enables animals to act morally.
Keywords
Morality, Kantian Ethics, Moral Sensitivities, Animal Behavior, Self-Consciousness, Ethology, Normative Morality, Natural Morality, Altruism, Egoism, Moral Agency, Empathy, Reciprocity, Compassion, Rationality.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary objective of this paper?
The paper aims to refute the Kantian view that animals lack the capacity for moral behavior by arguing that moral sensitivities provide a sufficient basis for moral assessment.
What are "moral sensitivities" according to the author?
Moral sensitivities are defined as feelings—categorized under pleasure and pain, or altruistic and egoistic motivations—that guide an organism's behavior toward what is good or bad.
Why does the author argue that Kant's view is limited?
The author argues that Kant overemphasizes language and conceptual reasoning, ignoring that moral acts can be driven by inherent capacities for feeling and sympathy.
What scientific method is employed in this research?
The research utilizes a philosophical analysis of ethical frameworks (Kantianism) combined with an evaluation of ethological research findings regarding animal behavior.
What is the core distinction between human and animal morality in this text?
While both humans and animals may possess moral sensitivities, the author suggests humans add a layer of reciprocal agreement and conceptual understanding to their actions.
Which animal examples are used to support the argument?
The author cites chimpanzees grieving, wolves maintaining social structure and protecting cubs, and the cheating behavior of white-winged choughs.
How does the author define self-consciousness in the context of animals?
The author argues that self-consciousness is not exclusively human-like rational judgment but includes the ability to distinguish between oneself and the minds of others, as evidenced by certain animal behaviors.
Does the author claim animals are fully rational moral agents?
No, the author clarifies that animals are not "animale rationale" in the Aristotelian or Kantian sense, but possess a "natural morality" that remains morally assessable.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Julia Held (Autor:in), 2019, On Animals' Morality, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/464960
