The European Union has always been alleged of institutional democratic deficit with the claim that the main institutions of the Union suffer from democratic accountability. The debate on democratic deficit in the EU led to the Spitzenkandidaten system in 2014 in which European political parties nominated candidates for the president of the European Commission. The nomination of the candidates for the position of president of the Commission is considered as one of the important ways to make the institution accountable to EU voters through their representatives in the European Parliament. This paper examines the extent at which the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten influences voting behavior of the EU citizens in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, especially in the Member States of the two leading candidates nominated by the two major or largest, in terms of number of MEPs, European political parties in the EP. On the other hand, the paper critiques the claim on democratic deficit which largely borders on lack of accountability in the institutional framework of the EU in relation to decision making by adopting a teleological interpretation of the Treaties.
The aim of this paper is in three folds, first, to analyze the result of the 2014 parliamentary election turnout (with special attention on the countries of the two leading candidates proposed by the political parties for the president of the Commission) with the introduction of Spitzenkandidaten. Second, to examine representation and accountability among the three main decision making EU institutions with respect to Treaties' provisions in other to provide answers to the questions bordering on democratic unaccountability raised in many studies. And third, to adopt the intertwined responsibilities and competences enshrined in the foundation of the Union (i.e. the Treaties) to explain the reason for multiple and sometimes, overlapping agenda-setting processes in the European Union.
Then, I will conclude that the democratic deficit claim in the European Union is a myth as the EU is constructed in such a way that allows for checks and balances amongst the main decision-making institutions which make them accountable to one another with the extensive powers of National Parliaments of Member States, as well as EU citizens, to exercise control over the European Commission, European Parliament and the Council.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Partyism of the European Commission: a case of power grabs?
Parliamentarization or Personalization?
Representation and Accountability
The European Commission and Accountability
The European Parliament and Accountability
Who Checks the European Council?
The Council of the European Union under Public Scrutiny
Agenda Setting and Policy Making Arena in the EU
Conclusion
Research Objectives and Themes
The primary objective of this paper is to critically assess the claim of a "democratic deficit" within the European Union, specifically by analyzing the efficacy of the 2014 Spitzenkandidaten system in enhancing voter participation and institutional accountability. The research seeks to determine whether the introduction of party-nominated candidates for the European Commission presidency successfully bridged the gap between EU citizens and the supranational decision-making process, or if the persistent issues of low electoral turnout and institutional distance are symptomatic of more fundamental political structures.
- The impact of the Spitzenkandidaten system on 2014 European parliamentary election turnout.
- An examination of institutional representation and accountability mechanisms across the Commission, Parliament, and Council.
- Analysis of agenda-setting processes and inter-institutional power dynamics within the EU.
- Critique of the democratic deficit narrative through a teleological interpretation of the EU Treaties.
- Evaluation of the role of National Parliaments in holding EU institutions accountable.
Excerpt from the Book
Partyism of the European Commission: a case of power grabs?
The selection of the candidate for the president of the Commission took a new dimension in the 2014 European parliamentary elections as European parties played a major role in putting forward, candidates for the job. The candidates, therefore, participated in the parliamentary electoral campaigns in the EU. Until 2014, the candidate for the post of president of the Commission was nominated by the European Council and elected on the floor of the European Parliament by the MEPs in accordance with Art.17 (7) TEU.
The wording of Art.17 (7) is ambiguous and thus, creates the basis for different interpretation (Gonzalez-Orus, 2014:84; Christiansen, 2016:994). However, despite laying claims to the ambiguous nature of Art.17 (7) TEU, the objective of the article does not lead to vacillation over who has the prerogative to propose a candidate for president of the Commission to the European Parliament for election by the MEPs. Hix (2008) proposes a different form of nomination of candidates for the leadership position of the Commission leading to a de facto change in treaty provision that allows “a majority in the European Parliament to nominate, and the European Council to then approve by qualified majority” (Fabbrini, 2013). The delegated function under contestation in Art.17 (7) is clear both in object and purpose. The relevant article stresses and puts certain obligations on the European Council in proposing a candidate for president of the Commission such as, holding appropriate consultation; acting by qualified majority; taking the elections of the European Parliament into account when nominating a candidate.
Chapter Summary
Introduction: Outlines the historical context of the "democratic deficit" perception and introduces the research focus on the 2014 parliamentary elections and the Spitzenkandidaten system.
Partyism of the European Commission: a case of power grabs?: Examines the legal and political dimensions of candidate selection under Art. 17(7) TEU and the shift toward party-based nominations.
Parliamentarization or Personalization?: Argues that the 2014 process was more a 'personalization' of the Commission rather than a genuine 'parliamentarization' of the institution.
Representation and Accountability: Analyzes the dual role of EU institutions in representing both the Union and its Member States, and the resulting challenges for accountability.
The European Commission and Accountability: Investigates the existing checks and balances surrounding the Commission, including the EP's motion of censure and the role of National Parliaments.
The European Parliament and Accountability: Discusses the legislative and budgetary control functions of the EP and how it holds other institutions accountable.
Who Checks the European Council?: Evaluates the limited oversight mechanisms for the European Council regarding its agenda-setting and policy-framing activities.
The Council of the European Union under Public Scrutiny: Reviews the accountability of national ministers representing Member States within the Council framework.
Agenda Setting and Policy Making Arena in the EU: Explores how various EU institutions contribute to agenda setting and the complexity of the inter-institutional policy-making arena.
Conclusion: Summarizes the findings, asserting that the democratic deficit claim is largely a myth given the existing system of institutional checks and balances.
Keywords
democratic deficit, Spitzenkandidaten, European Commission, Parliamentarization, accountability, EU Treaties, agenda setting, European Parliament, European Council, voting behavior, institutional legitimacy, policy making, electoral turnout, subsidiarity, national parliaments.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core argument of this work regarding the European Union?
The author argues that the frequently cited "democratic deficit" in the European Union is a myth. The study contends that the EU possesses a robust, albeit unique, system of checks and balances that ensures institutional accountability, contrary to the narrative that it lacks democratic legitimacy.
Which key topics does the research cover?
The work covers the institutional framework of the EU, the introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten system in 2014, the relationship between voter turnout and party nominations, and the mechanisms of accountability for the Commission, Parliament, and Council.
What is the primary goal of this paper?
The goal is to analyze the effectiveness of the 2014 Spitzenkandidaten initiative and to examine whether the current treaty-based structure of the EU provides sufficient accountability and representation for its citizens.
Which methodology is employed in this research?
The paper employs a critical analysis of EU Treaty provisions (legal interpretation) and reviews empirical data regarding parliamentary election turnouts, particularly focusing on the electoral performance in Luxembourg and Germany.
What aspects of the EU decision-making process are explored?
The work explores how agenda-setting is distributed among the main EU institutions and how these actors interact within the "policy-making arena," often involving inter-institutional negotiations and trilogues.
Which keywords best characterize this study?
The study is characterized by terms such as democratic deficit, Spitzenkandidaten, institutional accountability, Parliamentarization, and EU decision-making processes.
How does the author define the personalization of the Commission?
The author suggests that the 2014 candidate selection was more about the "personalization" of the Commission rather than true "parliamentarization," as candidates were largely chosen for their professional pedigree rather than their broad electoral or party-based appeal.
What is the author's stance on the future of the Spitzenkandidaten system?
The author notes that while the system was introduced to increase legitimacy, it has not significantly boosted voter turnout. The author warns that without clearer majorities and better connections to the electorate, the system may create future conflicts regarding institutional legitimacy.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Sesan Adeolu Odunuga (Autor:in), 2018, Democratic Deficit Claim in the EU. A Myth?, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/426994
