Meta-ethics, the study of the ontological foundations of ethics, is one of the big topics for moral and political philosophy. In this essay I argue that conventional constructivism (conventionalism) is the most compelling meta-ethical view for the purposes of political theory. First, (i) I determine what the purposes of political theory are. Then, (ii) I define logical validity and the ability to accommodate pluralism as requirements that a meta-ethical view must fulfil to be compelling for the purposes of political theory. Since conventional constructivism is a cognitivist, minimal realist and non-objectivist view, I show that a) cognitivism is logically valid, b) minimal realism is reasonably preferable to error theory and c) full-blown realism, opposed to non-objectivism, doesn’t fulfil the requirement of validity. I provide examples which illustrate that this applies also to virtual reality (“VR”). Based on a)–c), I argue that d) non-objectivist conventional constructivism fulfils both the validity and the pluralism requirement for a meta-ethical view to be compelling for the purposes of political theory. I support this with what I call the wake-up argument.
Table of Contents
1. The purposes of political theory
2. Requirements for a compelling meta-ethical view for the purposes of political theory
2.1 Cognitivism is logically valid
2.2 Minimal realism is reasonably preferable to error theory
2.3 Full-blown realism, opposed to non-objectivism, doesn’t fulfil the requirement of validity
2.4 Non-objectivist conventional constructivism fulfils the validity and the pluralism requirement
3. Conclusion
Research Objectives and Core Themes
The primary objective of this essay is to argue that conventional constructivism is the most compelling meta-ethical framework for the purposes of analytic political theory, particularly when considering the challenges posed by virtual reality (VR) environments.
- Analysis of the purposes of contemporary analytic political theory.
- Evaluation of meta-ethical requirements: logical validity and the accommodation of pluralism.
- Examination of cognitivism, minimal realism, and full-blown realism within a moral-philosophical context.
- Development of the "wake-up argument" to demonstrate how constructivism addresses moral pluralism.
- Application of meta-ethical principles to the emerging field of the political philosophy of virtual reality.
Excerpt from the Book
Non-objectivist conventional constructivism fulfils the validity and the pluralism requirement
Constructivism, a sort of non-objectivism, provides a non-mysterious, logically valid, account of conceiving moral facts by saying that moral facts are facts that we as individuals, or as a society, or as humanity, or as rational beings construct explicitly ourselves (Joyce 2015). The moral facts are constituted, according to constructivism, by what agents would agree to in an idealized process of rational deliberation, choice, or agreement (Bagnoli 2017). In conventionalism, a form of constructivism, this idealized process of constituting moral facts is not constrained by universal features of practical reason (I do not deny that there are certain minimally universal patterns of human cognition), but by (social) conventions that (can) differ between groups within specific traditions (Wong 2008, 265). Since the truth of moral claims is relative to specific groups or practices, conventionalist constructivism is thus a form of relativism (Harman 1975, 3).
Critics of conventional constructivism could argue that if moral facts are just facts that you or your community have somehow constructed, then it is hard to interpret disagreements across different communities as genuine disagreements. Conventional constructivists could counter that, indeed, there is a disagreement between communities, namely a disagreement regarding which moral beliefs communities with despairing moral beliefs should agree on as standard for their interactions. Due to certain minimally universal patterns of human cognition, different communities can end up constructing similar moral beliefs. Furthermore, if we consider that law, for example, is socially constructed, the idea that there is such a thing as morality or normativity which doesn’t involve any act of human construction seems implausible. Having hereby proven that conventional constructivism fulfils the requirement of validity, consider now the wake-up argument as a proof that it also fulfils the requirement of pluralism.
Summary of Chapters
1. The purposes of political theory: This chapter defines the scope of analytic political theory as addressing normative and evaluative questions regarding society while emphasizing systematic rigour and the importance of reason.
2. Requirements for a compelling meta-ethical view for the purposes of political theory: This section establishes that a viable meta-ethical view must satisfy both a validity requirement and a pluralism requirement.
2.1 Cognitivism is logically valid: This subsection defends cognitivism against potential challenges, arguing that moral claims are truth-apt and that moral reasoning follows logical patterns similar to empirical reasoning.
2.2 Minimal realism is reasonably preferable to error theory: This part rejects error theory in favor of minimal realism by applying Davidson’s principle of charity, suggesting that interpreting all moral discourse as systematically mistaken is uncharitable.
2.3 Full-blown realism, opposed to non-objectivism, doesn’t fulfil the requirement of validity: This section critiques naturalistic and non-naturalistic realism, arguing they fail to overcome the logical gap between "is" and "ought" or the problem of causal interaction.
2.4 Non-objectivist conventional constructivism fulfils the validity and the pluralism requirement: This chapter posits that conventional constructivism accounts for moral facts as social constructs and introduces the "wake-up argument" to demonstrate its ability to navigate diverse moral environments.
3. Conclusion: The final chapter summarizes the arguments, concluding that conventional constructivism provides a necessary starting point for developing a political philosophy of virtual reality.
Keywords
Meta-ethics, Political theory, Conventional constructivism, Analytic political philosophy, Cognitivism, Moral realism, Error theory, Logical validity, Moral pluralism, Virtual reality, Social construction, Frege-Geach Problem, Normativity, Personhood, Wake-up argument.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this academic work?
The work investigates which meta-ethical view is most compelling for the purposes of analytic political theory, specifically proposing conventional constructivism as the most suitable framework.
What are the primary themes discussed in the essay?
The central themes include the nature of moral claims, the debate between cognitivism and error theory, the limits of moral realism, and the construction of moral norms within both real-world and virtual environments.
What is the author's primary research goal?
The goal is to demonstrate that conventional constructivism meets the essential requirements of logical validity and the ability to accommodate moral pluralism, thereby establishing a foundation for the political philosophy of virtual reality.
Which methodology does the author employ?
The author uses a method of analytical political philosophy, which emphasizes clarity, systematic rigor, and the logical evaluation of philosophical doctrines against specific requirements.
What topics are covered in the main body of the text?
The main body examines the validity of cognitivism, the preference for minimal realism over error theory, the failures of full-blown realism, and the efficacy of conventional constructivism in explaining moral diversity.
Which keywords best characterize this research?
Key terms include meta-ethics, conventional constructivism, logical validity, moral pluralism, virtual reality, and analytic political philosophy.
What is the "wake-up argument" introduced by the author?
It is a thought experiment involving a character named Sally, who moves from a virtual reality environment to the real world, designed to demonstrate that moral beliefs are often constructed relative to specific environments and traditions.
How does the author address the challenge of virtual reality in morality?
The author argues that moral reasoning remains consistent in virtual reality as it does in the real world, and that constructivism provides a flexible framework to handle the evolving moral landscapes created by new technologies.
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- David Schneider (Autor:in), 2018, Which, if any, meta-ethical view do you find most compelling for the purposes of political theory?, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/417210
