In order to establish a strong democracy, Barber thinks, an institutional framework has to be created. The institutions have the purpose to give people the opportunity to become engaged citizens, an opportunity that is not yet provided for, that is not provided for in a liberal democracy. Barber says, that “strong democracy must offer a systematic program of institutional reforms rather than a piecemeal package of particularistic, unrelated modifications” (p. 263). Therefore the twelve points of his strong democratic program have to be seen as one unitary complex. “The potency of the reforms offered here”, Barber continues “lies almost entirely in their capacity for mutual reenforcement when implemented in concert” (p. 264). Thus, one cannot discuss certain individual points of the agenda without taking the others into account, as well. That is why I will discuss three points that are closely related to each other and not that closely related to the others 9 points. Nevertheless it will be necessary to take a look at the left out points at the end of the discussion to see if they entail provisions that re-enforce or support the ones our focus is laid on. My strategy is the following: In the fist part of the essay I will describe the three points of the agenda I want to discuss. The institutions I want to discuss are the Neighborhood Assemblies, the Civic Communications Cooperative and t a Civic Videotext Service. In the second part I will discuss and criticize them, focusing on the question of the practical possibility of their realization. Therefore I will at first lay down a theoretical foundation that is alternative to Barbers. I will explain the prisoner’s dilemma and the free rider effect. And I will show which obstacles they place on the strong democratic program and how the strong democratic program deals with these problems. I will then show that, given this new focus, the three points of the Strong Democratic agenda are not likely to succeed. They are not likely to succeed even if the other points of the program are taken into account.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Description of the Neighborhood Assemblies
3. Description of the Civic Communications Cooperative
4. Description of a Civic Videotext Service
5. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
6. The Free-Rider Effect
7. Practical critique and Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
The essay examines the feasibility of Benjamin Barber’s "Strong Democracy" program, specifically evaluating whether its proposed institutional framework can effectively foster citizen participation. The author investigates whether the mechanisms intended to increase engagement—such as Neighborhood Assemblies and new telecommunication technologies—can overcome inherent obstacles related to collective action and individual rational choice.
- Institutional requirements for "Strong Democracy"
- Barber's proposed Neighborhood Assemblies
- Impact of telecommunication on civic participation
- Application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Free-Rider Effect
- Economic and structural limitations of the proposed program
Excerpt from the Book
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Barbers strongest argument for the creation of neighborhood assemblies and the supporting institutions is that people will participate when they feel that they have the power to make a change. Neighborhood assemblies give people the feeling that they can make a change because it is only a small group they participate in. But the size of the group not only makes people participate, it also makes them act rationally as a group. This way Barber solves a problem he mentions only on the side. He solves the problem of collective action, the prisoner’s dilemma.
Different scholars have realized that individually rational acts can become collectively irrational acts. This is most obvious in very large groups. For example when a reform of the health care system is discussed it often happens that everybody believes that health care institutions have to be supported but at the same time no one wants to pay for it. And in the end nothing happens. This problem is called prisoner’s dilemma. In the prisoner’s dilemma the situation is formally reduced to two participants, called players. Every player has two alternatives for acting. He can cooperated or defectate. In my health care example to cooperate would mean that each citizen pays a part of the cost of the improvement of the health care system. The prisoner’s dilemma shows that the players will expect a higher payoff if they choose to defectate. To defectate is the dominant strategy for each player. But eventually this results in a payoff that is not the best one the players could get. They would get the best payoff if they would cooperate. To cooperate is collectively rational. But since it is individually rational not to cooperate the participants act collectively irrational.
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: Outlines the goal of analyzing Barber's Strong Democratic program and sets the strategy to evaluate it through the lenses of the prisoner’s dilemma and the free-rider effect.
Description of the Neighborhood Assemblies: Describes the proposed neighborhood assemblies as forums for deliberation, local accountability, and community decision-making intended to serve as civic educational institutions.
Description of the Civic Communications Cooperative: Details the proposed cooperative organization designed to manage new telecommunication technologies to ensure they promote democratic discourse and prevent elite manipulation.
Description of a Civic Videotext Service: Explains the necessity of a nationwide, interactive information service to provide citizens with the knowledge required for responsible and informed democratic choice.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma: Introduces the theoretical conflict between individual rational choice and collective benefit, suggesting that Barber’s assemblies attempt to mitigate this by reducing group size.
The Free-Rider Effect: Discusses the phenomenon where individuals avoid contributing to a collective good, arguing that this remains a major obstacle to the success of Barber's program despite the proposed institutional changes.
Practical critique and Conclusion: Concludes that the Strong Democratic program is likely to fail due to high costs, circular argumentation regarding participation, and the continued prevalence of individual rational choice over collective action.
Keywords
Strong Democracy, Benjamin Barber, Neighborhood Assemblies, Civic Communications Cooperative, Civic Videotext Service, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Free-Rider Effect, Collective Action, Political Participation, Civic Education, Rational Choice, Democracy, Institutional Reform, Citizenry
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the fundamental focus of this paper?
The paper evaluates the feasibility of Benjamin Barber’s "Strong Democracy" program, focusing on whether its proposed institutional reforms can actually increase citizen engagement and participation.
What are the primary thematic areas covered?
The main themes include Barber's institutional agenda—specifically Neighborhood Assemblies and communication technologies—and the application of social science theories like the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Free-Rider Effect.
What is the core research question?
The research asks if Barber's proposed institutions are practical and whether they can successfully overcome the natural tendencies of individuals to act in their own self-interest rather than for the collective good.
Which scientific methods does the author utilize?
The author employs a critical analysis of political theory, utilizing formal game theory concepts such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Free-Rider Effect, and the logic of collective action as defined by scholars like Mancur Olson and Russell Hardin.
What topics are discussed in the main body?
The main body breaks down the description of Barber's institutions, introduces the theoretical framework of rational choice, and critiques the proposed program's ability to achieve its objectives in practice.
Which keywords best characterize the document?
Key terms include Strong Democracy, Neighborhood Assemblies, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Free-Rider Effect, Collective Action, and political participation.
Why does the author consider Barber's argument for participation to be circular?
The author argues that Barber suggests people will participate because they understand the value of freedom derived from participation, but they can only gain that understanding if they have already begun participating.
How do the Neighborhood Assemblies interact with the proposed telecommunication services?
The assemblies are designed for local face-to-face deliberation, while the Civic Communications Cooperative and Videotext services are intended to extend this deliberation to regional and national scales to prevent parochialism.
Does the author believe the proposed institutions are cost-effective?
No, the author concludes that the entire Strong Democratic program would be extremely expensive, increasing bureaucracy and placing significant burdens on the government and individual citizens.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Sebastian Wolf (Autor:in), 2004, Obstacles to Strong Democracy - Prisoner's Dilemma and Free Rider Effect, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/40512
