In the summer of 1991, Yugoslavia was on fire. Two of the Yugoslav republics – Slovenia and Croatia – had held referendums on independence from Belgrade. In December 1990 and May 1991, the great majority in both states voted for independence. Since August 1991, Germany supported the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia actively. Finally, on the 23rd of December 1991, the German foreign minister Genscher announced Germany´s recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states. A long debate about what became known as “recognition policy” followed. Germany´s unilateral recognition was widely criticized as the most profound mistake of German foreign policy since 1945 or – as Horsley put it – “a deadly sin of German foreign policy”. The criticism not only came from the German political left, who accused the Kohl government of a retardation to a Bismarckian Machtpolitik. Even Germany´s closest allies in Europe criticized Germany harshly. The French foreign minister Dumas warned Genscher that a unilateral recognition by Germany “will set Europe back twenty years”. Uncertainties about Germany´s future role in Europe may partly explain the critizism. France and Great Britain were unsure whether Germany would continue its policy of self-restraint or if it would implement a more unilateralist policy, especially towards its new neighbours in the east. Unsurprisingly, only one year after reunification, the question of recognition was perceived as a paradigmatic case of a “new German foreign policy”. Was it the beginning of unilateralist power politics, a mere muscle play or just a diplomatic mistake? It has since become obvious that the unilateral recognition was not the beginning of a “new German foreign policy”. Germany kept on the multilateral track. Today, more than a decade later, Germany is still a driving force behind the integration and enlargement of the EU. Nevertheless, the reasons why Germany acted the way it did, remain unclear. It is not difficult to understand the defection of Germany from multilateral cooperation in December - this is easily explained by a spiral of mistrust between Germany, France and Great Britain. [...]
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Neorealist and Pluralist Approaches to Explain Recognition Policy
2.1 Neorealist Arguments
2.2 Pluralist Arguments
3 A Constructivist Perspective of Recognition Policy
3.1 Theoretical Framework
3.2 Norms and Myths in the Discurse on Recognition Policy
4 Summary
5 Literature
Research Objectives and Themes
This work aims to explain Germany's controversial decision to unilaterally recognize Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states in 1991, moving beyond traditional realist and pluralist frameworks to offer a constructivist interpretation of foreign policy behavior.
- Analysis of German foreign policy during the Yugoslav crisis
- Critique of neorealist and pluralist explanations for foreign policy shifts
- Application of constructivist theory regarding norms and discursive spaces
- Investigation into the role of "myths" as cognitive maps for political legitimation
- Examination of the discursive shift toward the norm of self-determination
Excerpt from the Book
3.1 Theoretical Framework
Why did approaches focusing on the national interest or interest groups in Germany fail to explain Germany´s support for independence of Croatia and Slovenia? To answer this question, it is helpful to highlight an important methodological restriction of realist and pluralist theories: Both are based on a strategic term of action. The behaviour of actors in the international arena is assumed to be the result of rational decision-making: Actors do have “material” interests, know their interests and try to realize them in a rational way. Within this picture of a “homo oeconomicus”, cognitive factors like misperceptions, world views or ideology have at most the status of intervening variables. The case of recognition policy shows the limits of these theories.
In contrast to these approaches I argue that an analysis of foreign policy norms and the employment of myths can explain Germany´s foreign policy a better way. Germany acted the way it did because within the discurse over the break-up of Yugoslavia, the issue of recognition was positively perceived as a matter of self-determination. This interpretation prevailed over alternative norms like sovereignty, stability or multilateralism. This is due to the employment of the myth of reunification as a successful case of self-determination policy. This hypothesis is developed in the following.
Unlike realist or pluralist approaches, constructivist theory denies the existence of “material interests”. Rather than assuming that interests can be “discovered” by selfish, rational actors, constructivism stresses a process of social interaction that leads to a set of norms that an actor may call his “interests”. Norms do have a regulative impact, because they define “appropriate“ behaviour. In consequence, the behaviour of a state is guided by a “logic of appropriateness” and not by a “logic of consequentiality”. Therefore, in order to understand a foreign policy of a certain state, it is crucial to know its foreign policy norms. As the plural already suggests, there is not a single norm, but a set of norms that influences foreign policy.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: This chapter introduces the context of the Yugoslav crisis and Germany's controversial unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, framing the central research question.
2 Neorealist and Pluralist Approaches to Explain Recognition Policy: The author evaluates existing international relations theories, arguing that interest-based or pressure-group arguments are insufficient to explain Germany's diplomatic shift.
3 A Constructivist Perspective of Recognition Policy: This core chapter introduces constructivism as a superior analytical tool, focusing on norms, discursive spaces, and the powerful use of historical myths to legitimize policy.
4 Summary: The final chapter synthesizes the findings, confirming that the myth of reunification helped frame recognition as a legitimate application of self-determination, while identifying areas for future research.
5 Literature: A comprehensive bibliography listing the scholarly sources used to support the theoretical and empirical arguments of the publication.
Keywords
Constructivism, German Foreign Policy, Yugoslav War, Unilateral Recognition, Norms, Myths, Self-determination, Multilateralism, Sovereignty, Discurse Analysis, Reunification, International Relations, Balkanisation, Political Legitimation
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the central focus of this publication?
The book examines the motivations behind Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, arguing that traditional interest-based theories fail to fully explain this foreign policy decision.
Which theoretical approach does the author employ?
The author utilizes a constructivist framework, focusing on how norms and the strategic use of historical myths construct the "appropriateness" of specific foreign policy actions.
What is the primary research question?
The work asks why Germany supported the independence of Croatia and Slovenia so strongly, even against the resistance of its closest European allies, and how this policy was legitimized internally.
Which methodology is used to conduct the research?
The study applies discourse analysis to protocols of the German parliament from 1991 to identify how different political actors utilized specific myths to shift the discourse in favor of recognition.
What is the role of "myths" in the author's argument?
Myths are defined as systems of human understanding that evoke historical memories; the author demonstrates how these were used as "cognitive maps" to recruit political support and construct policy meaning.
What are the key themes addressed in the main body of the work?
The work covers the critique of realist and pluralist theories, the discursive competition between norms like stability and self-determination, and the empirical analysis of how myths evolved during the crisis.
How did the discourse on recognition change between February and September 1991?
Initially dominated by concerns over stability and the "Balkanisation" of the region, the discourse shifted toward the principle of self-determination, specifically catalyzed by the myth of German reunification.
Does the author argue that the German recognition policy was a justified act?
No, the author explicitly states that explaining the discursive link does not imply justification, noting that the policy of self-determination had serious problems given the differing historical contexts of other European nations.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Ansgar Baums (Autor:in), 2001, German Foreign Policy and the Outbreak of the Yugoslav War, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/38740
