Indonesia offers an interesting case in order to study the bargaining power of women within households. The country of Indonesia was created due to the Dutch colonial rule and consists of over 13,000 islands offering a wide range of ethnic variety with the largest ethnic groups being Javanese (41%), Sundanese (15%) and Maudareses (4%); still leaving another 41% belonging to other ethnic groups (The PRS Group, 2011). Furthermore while Indonesia is the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, they only make up 86% of the total population; other larger religious groups are Catholics, Protestants, Hindus and Buddhists (The PRS Group, 2011). This variety will offer different possibilities in order to investigate the role Indonesian women play in household decision making. In this context Amartya Sen’s cooperative conflict model will be assessed.
Households produce Z-goods, which are household resources, in order to gain utility leading to economies of scale which means that larger households can achieve the same level of Z-goods as a smaller household while needing less time and money (Himmelweit & Santos, 2008). In order to produce Z-goods most efficiently members of the household specialise, whereas the husband usually specialises in paid work while the wife specialises in unpaid work; however the specialisation becomes critical in case of an end of the household due to death, divorce or separation and suddenly the household is lacking either the person taking care of the household or the one earning money (Himmelweit & Santos, 2008). Yet the specialisation may also not be equally distributed between different members of the household and the welfare of all members may depend on one or more member’s caring preferences (Himmelweit & Santos, 2008).
Therefore this report will first explore the influence of caring preferences among household members. Afterwards two unitary models, Samuelson’s approach considering a household as a black-box and Becker’s rotten kid approach will be described. These models do not consider household members who do not have equal bargaining power and therefore Sen’s cooperative conflict model will be investigated. In order to assess his model the book “Schleier Sarong Minirock” by Berninghausen, Kerstan and Soeprapto-Jansen (2009) will be used in order to getting an idea of how women live in Java, Bali, Lombok and Aceh and how norms of society influence their life.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Literature Review
Method
Description and Discussion of evidence
Conclusion
Research Objectives and Themes
The primary objective of this project is to investigate the bargaining power and decision-making role of Indonesian women within households. Utilizing Amartya Sen’s cooperative-conflict model, the study assesses how sociocultural norms, economic factors, and gender roles influence the distribution of welfare and power between partners.
- Application of Amartya Sen’s cooperative-conflict model to the Indonesian household context.
- Analysis of the influence of kinship norms and social perceptions on female autonomy.
- Examination of the division between paid and unpaid labor and its impact on household power.
- Evaluation of regional disparities in gender equality across Indonesia.
- Assessment of the role of literacy and education in empowering women.
Excerpt from the Book
Literature Review
In order to understand the problems women encounter within households it is necessary to first look at the matter of caring. On the one hand people can care about another person which means that utility of one person affects the utility of another person which can be written as U = U(u,v) while u = u(z1,z2,...); where self-regarding utility of a person depends on the consumption of Z-goods, z1, z2 etc that they consume themselves and therefore the utility function U includes self-regarding utiltiy u and another person’s utility (Himmelweit & Santos, 2010). Ibu Mati worked hard not only to give her children enough food but also to provide them with better education which will in turn guarantee her support in old age (Berninghausen, Kerstan & Soeprapto-Jansen, 2009). Therefore her children’s increased utility v will eventually also increase her utility u (figure 1).
On the other hand people care for another person which means that a person that cannot function unaided is looked after (Himmelweit & Santos, 2010). For example when Ibu Mati cooks rice for her children who would otherwise not get anything to eat. Women often have a lower education or worse paid jobs and therefore lower opportunity cost that reinforces the social norm that women should be the ones doing unpaid work which Becker explains in his analysis of the benefits of specialisation that women have a comparative advantag in unpaid work and therefore the only efficient solution is that men specialise in paid work while the woman does all the unpaid work and also helps out with paid work (Himmelweit & Santos, 2010; Himmelweit & Stone, 2010).
Summary of Chapters
Introduction: This chapter provides an overview of the ethnic and religious diversity in Indonesia and sets the stage for using Amartya Sen’s cooperative-conflict model to study household decision-making.
Literature Review: This section explores economic models of the household—including unitary models and bargaining models—and defines key concepts such as caring preferences, well-being, and bargaining power.
Method: This chapter outlines the approach of using secondary data, including unstructured interviews and findings from the Indonesian Family Life Survey, to assess women's autonomy and social arrangements.
Description and Discussion of evidence: This section synthesizes empirical data to illustrate how social norms, economic disparities, and division of labor lead to unequal bargaining positions for women.
Conclusion: This chapter summarizes the findings, emphasizing that unitary models fail to account for internal household conflicts and that bargaining power is heavily influenced by societal perceptions and gendered roles.
Keywords
Indonesia, Household Decision Making, Amartya Sen, Cooperative-Conflict Model, Bargaining Power, Gender Roles, Unpaid Work, Autonomy, Kinship Norms, Well-being, Literacy, Inequality, Social Arrangements, Economic Empowerment, Labor Market.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the central focus of this research paper?
The paper examines the role of Indonesian women in household decision-making by applying Amartya Sen’s cooperative-conflict model to analyze the power dynamics within the family unit.
Which theoretical models are compared in this study?
The study evaluates traditional unitary models (Samuelson’s black-box approach and Becker’s rotten kid theorem) against collective bargaining models that account for internal power inequalities.
What is the primary research goal?
The goal is to understand how internal household conflicts, social norms, and gendered divisions of labor impact the bargaining power of women in Indonesia.
What methodology does the author employ?
The author conducts a secondary data project, utilizing qualitative insights from unstructured interviews and quantitative data from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) and the Global Gender Gap Report.
What topics are covered in the main section of the paper?
The main sections cover the theory of caring preferences, the influence of regional kinship norms, the divide between paid and unpaid labor, and the impact of education and literacy on empowerment.
Which terms best characterize this work?
The work is characterized by terms such as bargaining power, gender equality, household autonomy, and the socio-economic context of Indonesia.
How do kinship norms affect women's autonomy in Indonesia?
Kinship norms—whether uxorilocal, patrilocal, or ambilocal—dictate lineage and resource control, which directly shapes a woman's ability to participate in financial and household decision-making.
What role does the "shariah law" play in the findings?
In regions where shariah law is practiced, such as Aceh, the study finds stricter constraints on women's mobility, decision-making rights, and financial independence compared to other regions like Java or Bali.
What are the limitations of this project?
The author notes that the research is limited by the scope of the available data, which was collected in varying contexts, potentially affecting the precision of the analysis regarding internal household decision-making processes.
- Quote paper
- Angela Kuhnert (Author), 2012, What role do Indonesian women play in household decision making? An assessment of Amartya Sen’s cooperative-conflict model, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/280168
