This essay explores the role played by the European Commission. It examines whether the Commission can be seen as a policy entrepreneur which tries to push an idiosyncratic agenda or whether it acts as an agent of the member states, which ultimately control its scope for action.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Commission as an Agent of the Member States
2.1 Definitions
3. The Commission’s Executive Role
4. The Commission’s Administrative Role
5. The Commission as a Policy Entrepreneur
5.1 Definitions
5.2 The Commission’s Executive Role
5.3 The Commission’s Administrative Role
6. Conclusion
Research Objectives and Key Topics
This paper examines the institutional role of the European Commission by investigating whether it operates primarily as a constrained agent of member state governments or as an independent, proactive policy entrepreneur. It seeks to answer whether the Commission can successfully pursue its own idiosyncratic agenda despite the oversight and control mechanisms exerted by national governments.
- Principal-agent framework and member state control over the Commission.
- The concept and strategies of the Commission as a policy entrepreneur.
- Institutional constraints on the Commission’s executive and administrative roles.
- The influence of socialization and institutional identification on Commission officials.
- Empirical evidence of the Commission’s agenda-setting and heresthetical behaviors.
Excerpt from the Book
The Commission’s Executive Role
The Commission represents the EU’s executive branch. However, it faces considerable constraints created by the member states. For one, there is the possibility of major treaty changes. When treaties are supposed to be changed or amended, the European Council, representing the member states, is usually taken as the principal actor. Hence, Kassim and Menon point out that member states exercised their power at the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice conferences in order to reign in some of the Commission’s powers (Ibid: 131). This may be due to the fact that the Commission has less scope to apply its institutional advantages. In the day-to-day politics, the Commission can exercise more powers simply because it is more immersed in the ongoing processes. By contrast, during major treaty negotiations, member states will engage intensively with the process and will also expend energy in collecting knowledge and information. Therefore, member states are in a position to minimize agency loss vis-à-vis the Commission when treaty revisions are scheduled.
A second major factor which allows member states some measure of control over the Commission is the fact that the EU itself does not dispose of any tax raising powers. Therefore, member states are in the driver’s seat when it comes to budget issues. As outlined above, they exercised that power recently by cutting the EU budget for 2014. As a result, the Commission has to be careful not to overstep its bounds, or it will risk a loss of funds and a subsequent loss of flexibility and capacity to generate policies. This point is further underscored by the fact that member states recently agreed to cut the EU’s long term budget by three percent (BBC, 8 February 2013).
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Introduces the debate regarding the Commission's role as either a controlled agent or an independent actor, setting the stage for the analysis.
2. The Commission as an Agent of the Member States: Discusses the theoretical background of the principal-agent framework and how member states attempt to keep the Commission under control.
3. The Commission’s Executive Role: Analyzes the executive constraints faced by the Commission, including treaty negotiations, budget limitations, and the legitimacy gap.
4. The Commission’s Administrative Role: Explores how member states attempt to influence the Commission through the appointment of personnel and the socialization of staff.
5. The Commission as a Policy Entrepreneur: Investigates the Commission’s ability to act independently by using its technical expertise, alliance-building, and agenda-setting powers.
6. Conclusion: Summarizes the findings, concluding that while the Commission is not fully independent, it successfully manages to act as a policy entrepreneur in various areas.
Keywords
European Commission, Member States, Principal-Agent Framework, Policy Entrepreneur, European Union, Supranationalism, Intergovernmentalism, Agenda-Setting, Institutional Power, Treaty Negotiations, European Council, Bureaucracy, Policy Networks, Heresthetics, Administrative Role.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core argument of this research?
The paper argues that despite institutional constraints and oversight by member states, the European Commission possesses significant capacity to act as a policy entrepreneur, pursuing its own agenda through information advantages and strategic alliances.
Which theoretical framework is applied in this paper?
The paper utilizes the principal-agent framework to evaluate the relationship between the Commission (the agent) and the member states (the principals), while also discussing supranational perspectives.
How is the Commission’s "policy entrepreneur" role defined?
It is defined as the Commission's ability to identify gaps in existing frameworks, redefine problems, and use political skills to influence policy outcomes to meet its own idiosyncratic goals.
What primary methods are used to control the Commission?
Control methods identified include the power of the European Council in treaty revisions, budgetary restrictions, and the ability of member states to appoint Commissioners and influence administrative staff.
What is the importance of "heresthetics" in this context?
Heresthetics, involving coalition-building and issue-reframing, is used by the Commission to persuade member states to support initiatives, such as the Economic and Monetary Union, by presenting them as solutions to regain sovereignty.
What is the role of information and expertise in Commission power?
The Commission acts as a repository of technical knowledge, making it indispensable for other EU institutions, which allows it to influence the policy-formation process and maintain leverage.
How does the length of service impact Commission officials?
Research indicates that the longer officials stay within the Commission, the more likely they are to adopt a supranational identity and prioritize the institution's agenda over their national interests.
How has the financial crisis affected the Commission's influence?
The crisis led to a resurgence of member state control through the European Council, often marginalizing the Commission to technical implementation rather than high-level agenda-setting.
- Quote paper
- Tim Pfefferle (Author), 2013, The European Commission as Agent of its Pricipals or a Policy Entrepreneur, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/266929
