Policy-switching are situations which results from shifts in the behavior of executives. More specifically, it means that executives once in office changed their previously campaign promise and make other key policy decisions for which they have not been elected. In this context, Samuels and Shugart (2010) tried to analyze the question, which impact does fusion or separation of powers has on policymaking and representation (cf. Samuels/Shugart 2010: 218). Both authors stated that policy-switches are about four times as common under a pure presidential system than under a parliamentary system (cf. ib.: 221). They came to the conclusion that parties or the leaders of the parties switch under separation of powers, especially in situations with close presidential election and minority government (cf. ib.: 248).
The main goal of this paper is to analyze if Samuels and Shugart are right when they claim that policy-switches are more common under a presidential system because of special conditions which favors the president to change his or her behavior and violate their mandate by betraying their stated campaign commitments. To evaluate their argument, the country Ecuador has been selected, which is a country with a presidential system and there were four policy-switches in the years 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2002. Therefore, the central question of this paper is, whether Ecuador is a case that fits very well in Samuels and Shugarts argument about policy switching or not.
I suspected that situations with close presidential elections and minority legislative were the main causes for the policy-switches in Ecuador. And, secondly, I assumed that all Ecuadorian policy-switches were the only option because the promised measures were impracticable under extremely worst economic conditions. All Ecuadorian policy-switches were compared according to institutional, partisan and economic factors. Finally, I come to the conclusion that Samuels and Shugart are partly right in their argumentation about the impact of separation of powers on policy-switches, because the result of this paper shows that the combination of institutional, partisan and economic factors had an obvious influence on the four presidential policy-switches in Ecuador.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 The relation between presidential systems and policy-switching
1.2 Structure of the course paper
2 ,Policy-switching‘ – the approach from Samuels and Shugart
2.1 Their understanding of the policy-switching’ concept
2.2 The impact of separation of powers on policy-switches
2.3 Their empirical approach with regard to presidential systems
3 Ecuador’s economic development and executive
3.1. Ecuador’s political and economic development from 1979 to 2002
3.2 Ecuadorian presidents and their institutional environment
4 Evaluating Samuels and Shugarts arguments about policy-switching
4.1 Four policy-switches in Ecuador and their background
4.2 Causes for the Ecuadorian policy-switches
4.3 Fits Ecuador very well in Samuels and Shugarts argumentation or not?
5 Conclusion and outlook
Research Objectives and Themes
This course paper aims to evaluate the theory proposed by Samuels and Shugart regarding "policy-switching" in presidential systems, specifically testing whether their hypothesis holds true when applied to the case of Ecuador between 1979 and 2002. The research investigates whether institutional factors, such as the separation of powers and legislative status, or economic conditions are the primary drivers behind a president's decision to deviate from their campaign promises.
- The concept of policy-switching as defined by Samuels and Shugart.
- The impact of institutional constraints and separation of powers on executive decision-making.
- Political and economic development in Ecuador from 1979 to 2002.
- Comparative analysis of four specific Ecuadorian presidential policy-switches.
- The influence of economic factors alongside institutional and partisan variables.
Excerpt from the Book
1.1 The relation between presidential systems and policy-switching
Policy-switching are situations which results from shifts in the behavior of executives. More specifically, it means that executives once in office changed their previously campaign promise and make other key policy decisions for which they have not been elected. In this context, Samuels and Shugart (2010) tried to analyze the question, which impact does fusion or separation of powers has on policymaking and representation (cf. Samuels/Shugart 2010: 218). Both authors stated that policy-switches are about four times as common under a pure presidential system than under a parliamentary system (cf. ib.: 221). They came to the conclusion that parties or the leaders of the parties switch under separation of powers, especially in situations with close presidential election and minority government (cf. ib.: 248).
The main goal of this paper is to analyze if Samuels and Shugart are right when they claim that policy-switches are more common under a presidential system because of special conditions which favors the president to change his or her behavior and violate their mandate by betraying their stated campaign commitments. To evaluate their argument, the country Ecuador has been selected, which is a country with a presidential system and there were four policy-switches in the years 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2002. Therefore, the central question of this paper is, whether Ecuador is a case that fits very well in Samuels and Shugarts argument about policy switching or not.
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: This chapter defines the concept of policy-switching and outlines the research goal, which is to test Samuels and Shugart’s theory using the case of Ecuador.
2 ,Policy-switching‘ – the approach from Samuels and Shugart: This chapter details the theoretical framework, focusing on how separation of powers and electoral conditions influence mandate consistency and executive behavior.
3 Ecuador’s economic development and executive: This chapter provides an overview of Ecuador’s political instability, economic crises, and the institutional environment surrounding the presidency since 1979.
4 Evaluating Samuels and Shugarts arguments about policy-switching: This chapter presents the empirical core, analyzing four specific cases of policy-switching in Ecuador and evaluating if they align with the authors' theoretical predictions.
5 Conclusion and outlook: This chapter summarizes the findings, concluding that while institutional factors are relevant, economic crises also play a significant, often overlooked role in explaining policy-switching in Ecuador.
Keywords
Policy-switching, Presidential systems, Ecuador, Separation of powers, Mandate consistency, Executive behavior, Legislative status, Political economy, Coalition formation, Party system, Institutional reforms, Economic crisis, Campaign promises, Democratization, Latin American politics.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the fundamental focus of this paper?
The paper evaluates the theory of "policy-switching" developed by Samuels and Shugart, which posits that executives in presidential systems are prone to abandoning campaign promises due to institutional incentives.
What are the core thematic fields addressed?
The work covers political science theories regarding democratic representation, the impact of separation of powers, and the political and economic history of Ecuador.
What is the primary research question?
The central question is whether Ecuador serves as a valid case study that confirms Samuels and Shugart's argument that policy-switches are more frequent in presidential systems under specific conditions like close elections and minority governments.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The paper uses a single-case study approach, conducting an empirical analysis of four specific instances of policy-switching in Ecuador and comparing these against institutional, partisan, and economic factors.
What topics are covered in the main body?
The main body reviews the theoretical framework of Samuels and Shugart, provides a background on Ecuador's economic and political institutional evolution, and conducts a comparative analysis of four policy-switches (1988, 1992, 1996, 2002).
Which keywords characterize the work?
Key terms include policy-switching, presidential systems, mandate consistency, separation of powers, and economic crisis.
How does the author categorize the Ecuadorian political system?
The author identifies the Ecuadorian system as an unstable democracy characterized by a fragmented party system, weak representation, and high cabinet volatility.
What role does economic reality play in the author's conclusion?
The author concludes that contrary to Samuels and Shugart's exclusion of economic variables, the combination of economic crises and institutional factors had an undeniable influence on policy-switches in Ecuador.
- Arbeit zitieren
- M.A. Politikwissenschaft Anja Kegel (Autor:in), 2012, ‚Policy switching‘ – Evaluating Samuels and Shugarts argument about policy switching in presidential systems for the case Ecuador, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/204064
