Heidegger does not ultimately provide a systematic theory of evil, and this absence is philosophically significant. Rather than defining evil as an essence, substance, or metaphysical principle, he explores the conditions under which destructive possibilities emerge within existence. Concepts such as Verfallenheit, Schuld, Aufruhr, Machenschaft, and Gestell describe different forms of deformation affecting freedom, disclosure, historical existence, and the relation to beings. Evil is therefore neither identical with negativity, violence, fallenness, nor technological domination. It appears instead as a possible deformation of structures that are not themselves evil. This approach also complicates responsibility: violence may exceed individual intention without becoming independent of human agency. Heidegger thus shifts the question from “What is evil?” to “How does evil become possible?” His philosophy does not resolve the problem but relocates it from essence to possibility, opening a post-Heideggerian inquiry into responsibility, destruction, and resistance.
- Quote paper
- Robert Tirvaudey (Author), 2026, The Insurrection of the Ground. An Essay on the Possibility of Evil in Heidegger, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/1775235
