In Psychology, many theories and models use process charts resembling circuit diagrams of technical devices. In this account, human behaviour and experience appears to be the result of processes taking place in the ‘black box’ named cognition. In this context, “computationalism is the view that computation […] can offer an explanatory basis for cognition” (Davenport, 2008, p.1). The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) has developed on this foundation, attempting to reveal what is inside this ‘black box’. In contrast, human consciousness being a part of cognition (Harnad, 1994) seems to be beyond any scientific explanation. This essay will critically discuss the extent to which consciousness poses a problem for the CTM – regarding issues surrounding consciousness as an area of scientific study, the extent to which consciousness is explicable in computational terms, explanations of consciousness, and Dennett’s (1991) different account to consciousness. It will be argued that consciousness does pose a major problem for the CTM, especially when it is conceptualised as subjective experience. It will conclude that Cognitive Science should presently focus only on certain aspects of consciousness, called the easy problems.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM)
3. The Concept of Consciousness
4. The extent to which ‘consciousness’ poses a problem for the CTM
5. Access (A-consciousness) versus Phenomenal Consciousness (P-consciousness)
6. Computational Terms
7. Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
8. Emergence
9. Daniel Dennett’s Approach
10. Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This essay critically examines the fundamental tension between the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) and the subjective nature of human consciousness, questioning whether consciousness can be adequately explained through purely computational processes.
- The mechanical analogy of the mind as a computer and information processing system.
- The distinction between A-consciousness (access) and P-consciousness (phenomenal/subjective experience).
- The epistemological and explanatory challenges posed by qualia.
- Critiques of physicalism and the role of emergence in cognitive science.
- The functionalist perspective of Daniel Dennett versus biological naturalism.
Excerpt from the Book
The extent to which ‘consciousness’ poses a problem for the CTM
There is something about the conscious experience that is not covered by scientific descriptions. Nagel (1981) argued in his well-cited essay ‘What is it like to be a bat’ that – no matter how much we know about the physical brain (e.g. neuronal correlates) – it is not possible to make its experiences accessible. For example, even if it is known what exactly happens in a bat’s brain, when it is in pain – nobody will ever understand ‘what it is like’ for the bat to be in pain (Block, 1995). Apparently, there exist barriers of knowledge relating to scientific access to the subjective experience of consciousness. Nagel’s argument shows that consciousness poses a major problem for the CTM: firstly if consciousness belongs to cognition (Harnad, 1994), and secondly, if there is no conception of the subjective side of consciousness possible (Nagel, 1981), then consequently no theory in the world including the CTM can actually explain how the mind works. In spite of this, the latter is what the CTM attempts to do.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Presents the scope of the essay and defines the Computational Theory of Mind as a framework for understanding cognition.
2. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM): Details the foundational analogy of the mind as a computer, focusing on information processing and symbol manipulation.
3. The Concept of Consciousness: Discusses the inherent difficulty of defining consciousness and its various connotations in scientific literature.
4. The extent to which ‘consciousness’ poses a problem for the CTM: Evaluates the incompatibility between objective computational models and the subjective nature of human experience.
5. Access (A-consciousness) versus Phenomenal Consciousness (P-consciousness): Explains the distinction between functional cognitive accessibility and qualitative, subjective sensory experience.
6. Computational Terms: Clarifies the technical definitions of computation, syntax, and semantics within the context of information processing.
7. Materialism and the Explanatory Gap: Analyzes the limits of physicalist perspectives and the philosophical problems posed by subjective consciousness.
8. Emergence: Explores emergence as a potential middle ground for reconciling physicalist brain states with non-physical conscious properties.
9. Daniel Dennett’s Approach: Examines the functionalist view that consciousness can be understood as a virtual machine implementation within the brain.
10. Conclusion: Synthesizes the main findings, suggesting that Cognitive Science should focus on "easy" problems while acknowledging the complexity of subjective consciousness.
Keywords
Computational Theory of Mind, CTM, Consciousness, Cognition, Qualia, A-consciousness, P-consciousness, Physicalism, Dualism, Emergence, Daniel Dennett, Information Processing, Mental States, Subjective Experience, Cognitive Science
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this paper?
The paper examines whether the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) can successfully explain consciousness, or if consciousness presents an insurmountable problem for this computational framework.
What are the core themes addressed?
The themes include the mind-computer analogy, the nature of qualia, the explanatory gap, and various philosophical positions such as Materialism, Dualism, and Emergentism.
What is the central research question?
The study asks to what extent consciousness, particularly subjective experience, poses a challenge to the claim that the mind functions like a computer.
Which scientific methodology is utilized?
The work utilizes a theoretical and literature-based approach, synthesizing philosophical arguments and cognitive science models to analyze the consistency of the CTM.
What does the main body cover?
The main body covers the theoretical foundations of CTM, the problem of defining consciousness, the distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness, and critiques from thinkers like Nagel, Chalmers, and Searle.
Which keywords characterize the work?
The most important keywords are Computational Theory of Mind, consciousness, qualia, cognitive science, and physicalism.
How does the author define A-consciousness vs P-consciousness?
A-consciousness refers to the ability to form mental representations of mental states for reasoning and speech, whereas P-consciousness refers to the qualitative, subjective "what-it-is-like" character of feeling.
What is the significance of the "Chinese room" analogy by Searle?
Searle uses it to argue that a computer can simulate the syntax of a language without understanding the semantics, suggesting that biological minds have capabilities that computer programs lack.
What is Dennett’s perspective on consciousness?
Dennett views consciousness as a functional "virtual machine" and a collection of memes, arguing that it is entirely consistent with computational processes.
Why does the author suggest focusing on "easy" problems?
Following O’Hara & Scutt, the author suggests focusing on measurable aspects of consciousness because current scientific methods struggle to address the "hard" problems of subjective experience.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Dipl.-Psych. (Univ.) - B.Sc. (F.C. Hon.) in Psych. Sebastian A. Wagner (Autor:in), 2008, The Extent to which ‘Consciousness’ poses a problem for the Computational Theory of Mind, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/170543
