Corruption is one of the most widespread political problems throughout the world. Decentralization, in contrast, is considered by many to be one of the most helpful ways to improve a country's economic performance. Nevertheless, only recently have scholars began to look at a possible linkage between the level of decentralization in a country and its level of corruption. Up to now, theoretical insights and empirical evidence in this emerging debate remain both rare and highly contested.
This paper aims at contributing to the debate in two ways. On the one hand through challenging and developing several arguments speaking for and against a possible causal relationship between decentralization and corruption; and on the other hand through testing the decentralization-corruption-hypothesis empirically using four different measurements of decentralization. Both parts aim at answering the following question: Is there a causal relationship between a country's level of decentralization and its level of corruption?
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Defining the key concepts
2.1.1. Defining decentralization
2.1.2. Defining corruption
2.2. Literature review
2.2.1. Lines of argumentation
2.2.2. Empirical results
3. Theory building
3.1. The accountability-argument
3.2. The competition-argument
4. Theory testing
4.1. Capturing the key concepts
4.1.1. Measuring corruption
4.1.2. Measuring decentralization
4.2. Empirical analysis
4.2.1. Procedure
4.2.2. Controls
4.2.3. Findings
5. Conclusion
Research Objective and Scope
The primary objective of this paper is to examine whether a causal relationship exists between a country's level of decentralization and its level of corruption. The study critically analyzes existing theoretical arguments and empirically tests the decentralization-corruption hypothesis using four distinct measurements of decentralization across a cross-country dataset.
- Theoretical debate on decentralization as a remedy for corruption
- Analysis of accountability and interjurisdictional competition frameworks
- Empirical evaluation using fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization indices
- Integration of socio-economic and socio-political control variables
- Comparison of bivariate versus multivariate correlation results
Excerpt from the Book
3.1. The accountability-argument
The issue of accountability seems to be the most crucial point within the whole decentralization-corruption-debate. Even if other factors have an impact on the level of corruption in a country, too, there is no denying that the effects that increased accountability can have on the level of corruption outweighs all of them (see Tambulasi and Kayuni 2007: 168). More controversial is the issue of whether it is true that there is a positive correlation between decentralization and accountability (as assumed for example by Lederman et al. 2005).
As Grant and Keohane (2005) put it, accountability “implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met” (Grant and Keohane 2005: 29).
Accountability can take many forms, internal and external accountability, vertical and horizontal accountability, non-democratic and democratic accountability and so forth (see Tambulasi and Kayuni 2007: 167). Within the decentralization-corruption-debate, however, the focus almost exclusively lies on horizontal accountability, sometimes also called downward accountability (see Vérón et al. 2006: 1928).
As jurisdictions get smaller, some argue (see e.g. Tommasi and Weinschelbaum 2007: 380), the ability of citizens to control their officials increases, resulting eventually in enhanced accountability. But what does it mean for a citizen to control an official? It is indeed easier to go to the official's bureau if you live closer to him, and if you want to follow him wherever he goes and observe all his steps, you can fulfill your task the easier the smaller the jurisdiction you live in is.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Outlines the research problem regarding the link between decentralization and corruption and defines the paper's two-fold methodological approach.
2. Theoretical background: Defines the core terminology and provides a literature review of existing arguments and empirical evidence surrounding the relationship between decentralized power and corruption.
3. Theory building: Explores the conceptual frameworks of the accountability-argument and the competition-argument as mechanisms affecting corruption levels.
4. Theory testing: Details the empirical methodology, including the measurement of variables and the presentation of regression findings through bivariate and multivariate analysis.
5. Conclusion: Summarizes the study's findings, highlighting the varying effects of different decentralization dimensions, and suggests directions for future research.
Keywords
Decentralization, Corruption, Accountability, Interjurisdictional Competition, Political Decentralization, Fiscal Decentralization, Administrative Decentralization, Cross-Country Analysis, Transparency International, Governance, Public Office, Empirical Analysis, Regression Model, Control Variables, Political Representation
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this research paper?
The paper investigates whether a country's degree of decentralization has a causal effect on its level of corruption, challenging common assumptions about this relationship.
What are the central themes discussed in the study?
The central themes include the definitions of decentralization and corruption, the role of accountability, the theory of interjurisdictional competition, and the empirical measurement of government effectiveness.
What is the primary research question?
The research asks: Is there a causal relationship between a country's level of decentralization and its level of corruption?
What scientific methodology is utilized?
The author uses a cross-country empirical analysis based on an ordinary least square model, incorporating multiple control variables such as GDP, education, and political indices.
What topics are covered in the main section?
The main body focuses on theoretical frameworks (accountability and competition), data description using the Corruption Perception Index, and an empirical evaluation of fiscal, administrative, and political decentralization.
Which keywords best characterize this work?
Key terms include decentralization, corruption, accountability, interjurisdictional competition, governance, and empirical cross-country analysis.
How does the author define political decentralization?
The author, following Aaron Schneider's definition, treats the existence of elections at lower levels of government (state or municipal) as the primary indicator for political decentralization.
Why did the author include a democracy dummy variable?
A democracy dummy was included to control for the possibility that the positive correlation found between political decentralization and corruption was actually influenced by a country's regime type.
What is the main conclusion regarding political decentralization?
The study concludes that, contrary to some expectations, political decentralization shows a clear positive correlation with higher levels of corruption in the analyzed dataset.
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- Eva Frischmann (Autor:in), 2010, Decentralization and Corruption, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/158591
