A Summary of Maria Dimitrova's "Sociality and Justice -Towards Social Phenomenology"

Content

Introduction

Setting Up the Framework

Ethics as First Philosophy

Rethinking Language

Ethico-political and Sociocultural Implications

Bibliography

Introduction

Philosopher Maria Dimitrova’s workSociality and Justice – Toward Social Phenomenologyderives its theoretical foundation from Levinas’ philosophy in order to rethink, critique, and reframe fundamental notions of sociality and justice that have historically been construed through a generalizing, typifying, and totalizing lens in Western/modern philosophy. The fundamental social relation, argues Dimitrova, contrary to conventional philosophies, is not between individual and society, but rather, between individual and the Other. Accordingly, the conceptual cornerstone of her argument isintersubjectivity. In conjunction with the examination of sociality and justice, key concepts and notions such as self, subject, other(ness), ethics, morality, universality, plurality, community, freedom, and language are problematized, reworked, and reframed by Dimitrova through a Levinasian lens, by introducing the theoretical tool of radical difference and alterity. The outcome of this intellectual endeavor leads to unconventional understandings of commonplace concepts and issues, offering insights into both personal/social and ethico-political paradigms, and advocating for a praxis of difference. Thus, we begin from the Other.

Nevertheless, it is imperative to emphasize that the statement “We begin from the Other” is nuanced, considering the theoretical scope of this work: We do not only begin from the Other, we begin from a distinct conception of the Other, as the Other is not regarded as a negativity, benchmark, or limitation, but appreciated in his/her otherness, asirreducible, asbeyond. We conceive the Other as a positivity and affirm him/her as such. This understanding establishes the complexity of Dimitrova’s theoretical framework, highlighting the appreciation of the Other as a positive force, and not reducing him to a mere reference point or obstacle.

In essence, Dimitrova’s work challenges prevailing philosophical paradigms by reconceptualizing the basic tenets of sociality and justice through the lens of intersubjectivity and radical difference. The Other is not my object, or even my equal: we do not have a symmetrical relationship. The Other is, simply put,higherthan me. I cannot categorize, typify, generalize the Other –the taxonomical tendencies are to be discarded. As Dimitrova puts it, “the constitution of togetherness as an interpersonal relation” precedes “its organization into a unity.”¹Accordingly, she states, “We begin at the premise that the individualin concretoenters into relations with other individuals, and only then is connectedin abstracto… and therefore, indirectly, to social institutions, community, society and humanity as a whole.”²

My responsibility for the Other is the determinant point, and one which I can never discard. Whilst Dimitrova proposes the structure of her framework of difference, in which she provides the movement between “I” to “Other”, and “sociality”, we ascertain the pillars of her understanding. Primary and primal sociality is restructured through a Levinasian understanding which exudes grace and vulnerability.

Setting Up the Framework

Contra Universalism, Pluralism, and Totalitarianism

Universality as a pivotal concept in modern theory, has been manifesting as “ex-territoriality and ex-temporality”³, as per Dimitrova’s argument. Often accompanied by civilization, it relies on power dynamics and empowerment, engaging in praxis of coercion, alienation, and generalization, leading to the disregard of difference. Dimitrova argues that universal standards perpetuate the repression and suppression of differences by applying uniform standards to everyone, regardless of their specific and idiosyncratic features. Universality preserves an unchallenged central authority that acts and decides in a self-evident manner, employing integration and pluralization as means of operation.

While the idea of pluralization has been utilized to counteract the totalitarian tendencies of the universalist state, Dimitrova observes that pluralism, despite ostensibly embracing the diversity ideal and seeking to encompass all ethnicities, cultures, and identities,remains within the universalist framework. As she articulates, “Pluralization opposes totalitarianism by presupposing it.”⁴The pluralist opposition falls short of effectively challenging totalitarian discourses, functioning as a “second, reflexive level of discourse”⁵rather than fundamentally undermining the universalist constructs. The value of diversity and pluralism lies in their opposition to unity, totalization, and their opposition to universality and identity –but while equality and recognition are important, they often accompany processes of homogenization, elimination, and neutralization of differences.

Drawing on Bauman’s insights, Dimitrova highlights the parallel procedures employed by globalization and localization. In the contemporary context, globalization constructs society as open, fluid, mobile, and protean, conceptualizing individuals as “identification-processes.”⁶The prefix “multi” is applied to ethnicities, cultures, races and more. Tension arises from the challenge of reconciling particularity and universality in both liberal and communitarian approaches. The negotiation revolves around finding methods to reconcile the specificities of groups and individuals within the overarching frameworks of particularity and universality. However, argues Dimitrova, the process of pluralization, while leading to the proliferation of identities and differences, lacks an exit point, and ultimately contributes to fragmentation and atomization⁷, serving dominant power structures that neutralize and appropriate different identities –differences become subsumed into sameness.

Dimitrova explicates the inherent dichotomy between liberalism, emphasizing free choice, and communitarianism, centering on interactive recognition. She proposes an alternative perspective, advocating for the identification of individuals and groups within a network of relations defined byresponsibilities, as opposed to categorizing them as fixed entities governed by constraining laws and concepts. The crux of the matter lies in the shared tendency of both communitarians and liberals to “define otherness in relation to the principle ... or through mutual commensurability ... the starting point is the law of identity, and after experiencing the peripetia of the play with otherness, there is a return to it.”⁸

Consequently, the focus here, is to avoid subjecting the Other to tyranny through universalization, homogenization, and depersonalization. Intersubjectivity, identified as the foundational element of all relations, establishes the initial and immediate social bond, expanding into a form of community through institutionalization. Relying on a reframed phenomenological stance (a social phenomenology), Dimitrova’s goal is “to show a new perspective in the phenomenological paradigm which does not focus on the self-reflection of the thinking subject, but on his sociality as a ‘responsibility of the Other.’”⁹The immediacy, primordiality, and constitutive aspect of the relation to the Other is founded on moralityas responsibility for the Otherwhich is the “deepest root of any human association.”¹⁰

Ethics as First Philosophy

Responsibility for the Other

Levinas, in adopting ethics as first philosophy, posits the Other above Being: His exploration traverses the confines of ontology, so that “ontology does not exhaust”¹¹this pursuit. Consequently, a confrontation with “the epic of being” becomes imperative, urging a transcendence that rescues the radical Other: “To reduce every philosophical effort to the error or errancy of onto-theo-logy is only one possible reading of the history of philosophy,” articulates Levinas¹², and provocatively inquires, “Is meaning always an event of being? To be—is this the significance of meaning? Should we say that humanity ... is reducible to ontology?”¹³

Levinas values Heidegger’s fundamental contributions, but in terms of human existence, he prioritizes the moral bond, defined byresponsibility for the Other. We should understand the humanism of Levinas in such a light. Unlike the Heideggerian “being-with-one-another”, our social aspect as humans does not depersonalize us: as Dimitrova notes, our social dimension fundamentally constitutes of “a care of one-for-the-other.”¹⁴Heidegger preserves Being over the relationship between me and the Other, and humans are put at the service of Being, whereas the meaning of human existence is, for Levinas, “care as a responsibility for the Other.”¹⁵In my encounter with the Other, I see him as a face, as the “invisible in the visible.”¹⁶As Dimitrova explains, “Responsibility for the Other means closeness: the proximity of the neighbor in the face-to-face relation where first the ‘human, too human’ is revealed –the vulnerability and fragility of individuals.”¹⁷

Dimitrova states that Levinas’ different interpretations of “subject” and “moral” comprises the novel aspect of his work. For Levinas, self is a moral subject. He breaks from Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Fichte due to his wholly new conception of subject and subjectness, wherein he avoids returning to the self, sameness, identity, substance or Absolute. Levinasian subject is responsible for both his and the Other’s time. I am also responsible for the Other’s death. For Levinas, human being is defined as being against death, contrary to Heidegger who defines him as being towards death. The phenomenon of my suffering, its futility, too, gains meaning to the extent that it is suffering for the Other. Heidegger also understood human existence as responsibility but to Being, whereas Levinas put the responsibility for the Other first. His notion of transcendence was very different, and denoted a true beyond, one that cannot be contained or embodied. His idea of “intelligibility” (as non-intentional consciousness) was related to humanness and “he was looking for meaning ‘beyond Being’ –a meaning that is not revealed in the terms of Being (existence) and one that precedes Being.”¹⁸With this “Otherwise than Being”, he was moving away from the modernist ego-centric, individualistic conception of subject and beyond, and focusing on a philosophy of difference which restored the value and trust in humanness, hence his (social) phenomenology of responsibility. I cannot escape the appeal of the Other –my every answer or indifference is a response, if I try and transfer my responsibility to another person this would be immoral. In my encounter with the Other as exteriority, I am no longer anonymous and even my inaction is an action, and I constantly question and criticize myself as a moral subject. As Dimitrova puts it, “To acquire meaning, morality needs a subject that can carry the weight of the world on his shoulders:subjectum… the spiral of endless penetration deeper into interiority as responsibility is provoked by the gravity of exteriority.”¹⁹

Dimitrova raises a crucial question regarding the relation between subjectness, freedom, responsibility, and arbitrariness. She observes a friction between subjectness and universality, namely, how subjectness is defined via observing what is applicable to all and paradoxically, how this undermines the very meaning of subjectness. She specifies two possibilities before abandoning the universal framework: freedom as taking responsibility and freedom as arbitrariness (respectively, the beginning as the Other vs. the beginning as the “I”). I see in the face of the Other his mortality and the command to never abandon him: “the smooth surface of my skin is pierced, hurt by the Other without the latter even touching it … I cannot experience the world as if I see it from the outside in the capacity of an objective bystander”.²⁰The Other does not exist because I think, comprehend or identify him, “rather I turn to him”.²¹I do not perceive the Other against a familiar background, but rather my perception refers to the pure individual, and one properly accesses the otherness of the other in thou-saying. Beyond the confines of onto-theological imprisonment, Levinas presents an alternative paradigm marked by openness, nobility, and a profound respect for the Other.

My relationship with the Other commences with his (silent) appeal to me –accordingly, I respond with my actions to this appeal that establishes me as unique: Only I can respond to the Other’s appeal: Only I can respond to the Other’s appeal. The Other is not my self-reflection. I do not objectify him. My relationship with the Other is inequal, asymmetrical, nonreciprocal. The Third enters this dynamic as to transform the nature of this relation as a symmetrical and reciprocal one.²²

Every other relation, all forms of sociality, all social bonds, all ethico-political principles should be viewed from this lens of moral relation between me and the Other. Not only my sociality, my very “self” is constituted by my responsibility for the Other –to put it differently, my selflessness constitutes my very self. Regarding sociality, via my responsibility, the Other can become a self like me, the Third one.

Here, heteronomy is constitutive and identified as the Other’s appeal to me. As such, freedom as the self’s autonomy is demystified. We break from the Self-same schemes, Kantian and Hegelian understandings of self and community. Community is not a “universal substance-subject” or composition of multiplicities where the Other is respected according to abstract norms or ideals. Rather, the Other is whom I serve and have infinite responsibility because –I amfor the Other. We reframe the Other as transcendence: “He overflows absolutely every idea I can have for him”²³, states Dimitrova.

As per methodology, this work adopts a phenomenological approach, although not supporting a Husserlian understanding of the otherness of the Other, but a Levinasian one (and one that implies a wholly practical aspect), as here, the Other is a wholly separate being whom we encounter anddo not constitute. The primordial intersubjectivity exists as in the event of my meeting with the Other. Sociality as responsibility for the Other is, as Dimitrova notes, what Levinas defines as “phenomenology of sociality”, in which “the individual cannot be understood otherwise than by his relationship with the Other.”²⁴Levinasian philosophy traverses existential, ontological and phenomenological philosophies. The individual for Levinas does not rely on his freedom to choose himself or self-realization but due to his responsibility for the Other.

In the pure moral relation, I am the Other’s hostage, and my freedom lies in his hearing of the vocation as only I can answer the Other. As Dimitrova points out, it is only this way that freedom gathers meaning – it is not arbitrariness: “My freedom is then a vocation … My responsibility is my being chosen, my ‘birthright’—I am the first who can respond to the call of the Other in a given situation and I am thus unique and irreplaceable in it”.²⁵

When we look from the Levinasian lens, subjectivity is defined by relying on responsibility, as “subject-ness as taking the burden of responsibility for others … It is not just substantial unity or identity but it assumes otherness in all its weight.”²⁶Dimitrova mentions Levinas’ phrase here: “the-other-within-the-same” and points out that revelation exists due to human responsibility to the Other. The face of the Other reveals transcendence but is “weakness, vulnerability, being-towards-death of the Other and an appeal to me not to leave the other alone in his suffering … The face coincides with the ethical requirement.”²⁷The face is irreducible within the horizon of immanence, language, power-knowledge structures. It is primal and elicits a response from me unbounded by any such framework of language or knowledge. Dimitrova describes transcending as an “act of crossing the border”, in the sense that I traverse my egotistical mode of being to pay attention to the Other and care for him, as my primitive responsibility is what constitutes me as “me”. As such, Dimitrova, in a response-essay “Do We Have to Let Ourselves Be Doomed to Morality?”, explains,

I can reply to the appeal and transform distance into proximity and knowledge into morality. But this does not mean that in proximity I have the ability to situate him within the horizons of (my) world – the Other constantly withdraws himself. That is why the Other also has the meaning of exteriority, of Transcendence.²⁸

The spatial or topological nomenclature -proximity, distance, horizons, withdrawal- highlights transiency. Similarly, “height and beyond” of the Other, represent his realm, so to speak, and highlight the spiritual dimension of the Other. He moves away whilst I attempt to close the distance; he becomes (adopts the guise of, is obfuscated by) the Third. Dimitrova points out that responding to transcendence is the act of transcending of the world and being-in-the-world: “Transcending, as a going beyond, is an establishment of relationship with the exteriority and infinity.”²⁹Dimitrova emphasizes the Levinasian understanding of revelation as “an awakening to what is different” rather than “a form of given wisdom” and that “Otherness is alarming”.³⁰She explains that this awakening is “mortified”³¹as the subject returns to sameness. But with ethics as our framework, we eradicate the loop of sameness and leave our mortified position, we set sail to a different land. It is important how Dimitrova questions if we can understand transcendence without being stuck in our immanence. The way she treats this question demonstrates the importance of my alertness and restlessness –these qualities constitute me as a servant of the Other.

It is crucial to observe how the linguistic trap is avoided here: Only by understanding myself as the “responding and responsive one”³²I traverse the egotistical paradigm. My not responding to, not engaging with, staying indifferent to the Other arealways alreadyresponses, as I am bound within this ethical relationship. I’m chosen and burdened with responsibility for the Other and this carries the moral meaning.

In this framework, the “I” understands and experiences justice, sociality, and moral commitments established on “attention to the Other”, which is elevated above identification with groups, communities, above pre-conceptions and prejudices. My primal relation and devotion to the Other supersedes all, to the extent that, “moral commitment seems to be against the pursuit of survival… this primordial moral connectedness is, so to say, naked pure sociality”.³³It is difficult but a necessary and continuous task to preserve this pure sociality because of the ever-looming Third. The Third obfuscates the primordial alterity of the Other and deviates us from the command of morality. It also acts like a blueprint of comparison which is in itself a kind of violence because it leads us to standardize and fixate the Other within sameness, within a society composed of constrained, limited, restricted individuals. Justice, as an act of categorization and standardization is only possible by confining the Other asDas Man.

How important then, to observe how Levinas demystifies the notion of totality. Morality does not seek to confine or categorize the Other with external impositions. As Dimitrova explains, justice should be reframed beyond historicist perspective of wars, conflicts of superiority, or religious conceptions: “The first justice is allowing for the otherness of the Other to disturb me”.³⁴The orientation to the Other is posited as perpetually present, and as one approaches the Other, they inevitably encounter a withdrawal from direct accessibility, prompting an incessant reaching towards the Third.

We should discern the reformulation of existential-phenomenological philosophy, moving from an ego-centric melancholic negativity into a sensitive and selfless understanding of the Other. The self is the Other’s unique servant. Dimitrova emphasizes that “metaphysical”, “social”, “moral” are synonymous for Levinas. What we are engaging with is an ethico-onto-epistemology of difference. Levinas’ humanistic approach is understood as the responsibility for the fate of others. Considering how power-knowledge structures -as per a Foucauldian perspective- betray the ways subjectivity is constructed, the eternal value of Levinasian philosophy is rather clear. I am not merely a product of a historicist framework or a set of epistemes, butfor the Other. My subjectivity is an excess of all that deterministically and violently fix, form, and constitute me.

Rethinking Language

As Dimitrova demonstrates, language gathers new meaning within Levinasian theory. Above all, we understand language as “born by the appeal heard in the moral relation”.³⁵We should look beyond Heideggerian theory and recognize how Levinas aims to traverse monologism and logocentrism. As Dimitrova puts it, “He searches and finds the first meaning in the pre-original, an-arch(e)-ic call of the Other. Facing the Other is the beginning of every communication and any foundation of oppositions, rules, structures, constitutive for the language itself.”³⁶

Dimitrova contends that the entire philosophical discourse of the 20th century and contemporary philosophical production is heavily oriented on language and speech. Dimitrova observes that Levinas redirects our focus exclusively to the Other, ushering in an entirely distinct linguistic paradigm. In this paradigm, every instance of discourse is predicated on saying something for the Other, as the subject’s utterances are inspired by the Other. This paradigm deviates from conventional notions such as intentionality and thematization. Levinasian framework offers a way out of the linguistic fetish, and it is a viable response to it. We go beyond language as merely as “the said” –the said involves the historical justification of “I” as beginning. The primordial origin of communication is the Other, rather than “I” or language. I respond to the presence of Other. As Dimitrova explains, this comes before all other thematizations, implications or references: “before being said, the Word is saying … Words are addressed to someone else. Appealing to the addressee precedes and accompanies each sign and any meaning”.³⁷The Other is radically present.

Within conversation, I and the Other occupy a direct relation but the Third remains outside (he/she/it is a witness and occupies the position ofDas Man). The Third can be understood as a universalist imposition upon the humane communication between two parties. While the communication between I and the Other is different, the Third meddles and imposes a specifying and typifying universal agenda upon the dialogue between the two. From the position of the Third, speech is conveyed as an objective process, whereas it is a wholly different experience for me and the Other. Meaningfulness is a matter of the moral relation. We can never ignore the fact that speaking to the Other means recognizing his otherness, as he ever-withdraws himself from the immanence and the Third.

My dialogue with the Other is not a monologue. As much as Levinas respects Buber, he does not approve the Buberian approach. For Buber, I-You is an equal and reciprocal relationship, whereas one of the pillars of Levinasian perspective is that intersubjectivity is built on an unequal, asymmetrical, and non-reciprocal relationship between I and the Other. Levinas accords precedence to the command, exemplified by the imperative “Thou shalt not kill!” over narrative speech. He states that this commandment serves as the origin of language. Expanding on this, Dimitrova explicates how revelation achieves its revelatory status not through God rendering His infinity accessible, but rather through its revelation to the human reason. Consequently, humans transform revelation into articulate expression, rendering the word intelligible. The commandments, characterized as prescriptions, find practical application in human praxis. Diverse individuals attribute varied meanings to these commandments, and through communicative processes, mutual understanding emerges. As Dimitrova notes, the essence of speech is that it awakens responsibility. For Levinas, “every true word is a commandment.”³⁸Language, from a Levinasian stance, is an appeal before its articulation in the world. For Levinas, I encounter the Other’s expression in conversation –the face expresses itself, and in my conversation with the Other, I am educated and mentored. As Dimitrova puts it, “The true word is guiding and prescribing.”³⁹

With Levinas, we encounter a foundational and primordial conceptualization of language. With its primal, truthful, and liberating potential, one sees similarities with the Lacanian discourse of the analyst and Irigarayian feminine speech. Levinas characterizes language as the terrain where radical “difference is revealed.”⁴⁰In other words, Levinas introduces the notion ofspeech beyond speech, suggesting a nuanced and expansive understanding of linguistic expression. This is also apparent in the Levinasian difference between the saying and the said. Saying, writes Levinas, is the most passive passivity … inseparable from patience and pain, even if it can take refuge in the said, finding again in a wound the caress in which pain arises, and then the contact, and beyond it the knowing of a hardness or a softness, a heat or a cold, and then the thematization.⁴¹

Saying is the Word, an ethical openness. As Dimitrova explains, “The saying is positioning the One in relation to the Other prior to the establishment of a common space and the world.”⁴²We begin from a silent, non-verbal language, an inarticulation. Closeness, in this sense, is unintentional, free of “distance of knowledge and reflection.”⁴³Regarding this immediate primordial and essentially moral speech, Dimitrova states that “this is the establishment of proximity, which is no longerlogosbut a relation of non-in-difference to a neighbor.”⁴⁴

How apparent then, the insistence on the moral constituent of my primal relation with the Other, the inescapability of my indebtedness to him, and the sacredness of our bond.

Ethico-political and Sociocultural Implications

Justice, State, and Morality

The “tyranny of the universal”⁴⁵is pervasive within the framework of our socio-economic and political existence, wherein the state, wielding bureaucratic instruments, tends to categorize and homogenize individuals. The mechanisms of market exchange, consumption, and the pervasive climate of consumerism act as provocateurs, fostering selfishness and conflicting wills. Both the logics of scarcity and overconsumption reinforce the notion of individual isolation, compelling each person to safeguard their resources independently. Consequently, the Other, concealed behind social masks such as “the stranger”, “the widow”, or “the orphan”⁴⁶, is often perceived as an adversarial figure.

Despite the state offering protection and security, it simultaneously nurtures alienation and antagonisms. In response to this dynamic, Dimitrova explores the theory of a social contract, which posits that individuals, deemed rivals, must be reconciled under the established system. Drawing on Hobbes, Dimitrova highlights that the Hobbesian state emerges from the imperative to end a state of war considered as the natural condition. Essential to this conception is self-limitation, premised on the belief that if everyone restrains themselves, the antagonism stemming from willful rivalry can be controlled, leading individuals to act wisely guided by the “prudence of reason.”⁴⁷However, as Dimitrova elucidates, this form of self-constraint ultimately relies onself-interest, as the natural condition is inherently self-destructive, prompting a compromise in the pursuit of negotiated relations. Following Levinas, this understanding follows a cyclical pattern. Although a semblance of peace may be maintained temporarily, it remains contingent on the obedience to the sovereign authority (embodied by Leviathan, possessing absolute power), and peace cannot be sustained through mere prudence. Levinasian philosophy can transform such a perspective, underlining not mere altruism but the prioritization of the Other and the acknowledgment of his rights.

Dimitrova prompts a reconsideration of the nature of the state, asserting that state power and morality arenotinherently contradictory. On the other hand, she also raises concerns about the problematic nature of unrestrained state power, particularly in its relation to the idea of totality, which becomes more pronounced in the context of global or supranational unions. With the information and technology age, we are ever more connected but simultaneously have lost the immediacy and closeness of human-to-human communication. We are distant to one another, and we are anonymous (faceless). This distance between individuals could be partially overcome by creating “utopian” communities within which people establish closer bonds but as Dimitrova argues, this would be a temporary and localized response rather than a permanent solution to an intricate problem, as the structure of modern city constitutes the core of modernity. Moreover, political sphere functions upon pragmatic dynamics, shady deals and agreements, violence, and the state as a power-hungry machine, making it hegemonic, imperialist, and sometimes totalitarian. The authoritarian leanings of such a state constitute its citizens as alienated, insecure, and oppressed. As Dimitrova notes, Levinas is very critical towards totalitarian state and his view cannot be separated from his critique of totality. Levinas, contrary to pluralist and multiculturalist view, does not embrace the idea that totality should be eliminated, as within socio-political sphere, members of society should be brought together under umbrella values, concepts, and principles. Although totality is achieved through dialectical logic (as multiplicity being united in a synthesis), as Dimitrova argues, this process should include the crucial operation of self-reflection –we should be aware of the process and how to utilize reason for this end, as there is always the loomingdanger to misuseboth reason and the idea of totality. In the wrong hands that merely seek more power, every ideology or view of plurality can turn into oppression.

The important Levinasian step to take here is to plead for “restoring the rights of Exteriority.”⁴⁸Going beyond the constraints of totality, of Hegelian negation, or of pluralist and multiculturalist totalizing views, we should maintain the Other’s exteriority. Dimitrova writes: “Darkness in the sky over totality is torn and illuminated thanks to the light of the Face.”⁴⁹We should always remember that exteriority or infinity cannot be constrained within a whole or totality.

The state, regardless of it being liberal or totalitarian, regardless of its political leanings or ideology, carries the danger of turning totalitarian, thus open to decadence, degradation, and prone to lose its (humanitarian) values. It is crucial to remember that seeing “performs an act of violence”⁵⁰but this act cannot eliminate or destroy my subject, it just places him under my domination. Thus, I can utilize my tools and means to subjugate him in accordance with my own selfish interests. Dimitrova stresses the potency of knowledge as power, as it generates technologies that I can use and thus, enable me to violate the limits of the Other and to turn him into my subject.

Dimitrova, recognizing certain inconsistencies within the Levinasian framework concerning social and political order (in relation to his acknowledgment of competition and conflict as historical constants) undertakes the task of reformulating and reapplying Levinas’ moral framework. She posits her conceptualization of “the possibility of the existence of the state and political order as derived from moral responsibility”⁵¹, aiming to avoid the conceptual pitfall of viewing the state as an inherent evil by advocating for political redefinitions and reinterpretations. She contends that reason should be emancipated from its role as a tool for oppression and control. It is important to scrutinize the adopted definitions and understandings, questioning why political action is guided by self-interest, rivalry, and exploitation, instead of prioritizing “practical wisdom” rooted in morality. Through this lens, Dimitrova, employing Levinas’ foundational notions, presents a compelling example of how cul-de-sacs within the Levinasian framework can be reenvisioned and transformed into philosophical crossroads and productive moments.

We can capture the Other through ideas or established notions, within his assigned and adopted identities and communities but what we miss is “his autochthonous being.”⁵²Even if I kill or annihilate the Other, I can never do away with him in the moral sense, I just physically eliminate him with physical power. Dimitrova stresses that physical power, in the end, is subordinate to moral power. Within our society shaped by technological advancements, depersonalized communication makes us forget how we are all dependent to each other. Each face is both visible and invisible –even if I see the Other as a material being, he remains invisible –beyond my control. The ambiguous aspect of the face should not be forgotten, as it invites us to perform an act of violence and simultaneously forbids us to commit violence. Dimitrova draws our attention to this double quality of the face as both vulnerable in a physical manner and also as non-physical and metaphysical. “The meeting “face to face” is always, willy-nilly, a conversation.”⁵³

As such, Dimitrova questions the moral relation to the Other within the ontological-social phenomenological framework and asks a fundamental question: “Does morality not constitute the very nature of our existence, as opposed to the ‘natural condition’ in Hobbes?”⁵⁴Levinas underlines that “politics must be controlled by ethics”⁵⁵that takes the other into account. Dimitrova notes that Levinas does not see or level out dichotomies (good-evil, justice-injustice) as equals –one is there when the other is not, as such, injustice is the absence of justice, evil the absence of good, and violence is the negation of morality. We leave the loop; we aim towards highness, holiness, rather than go in circles.

We should bear in mind that Kantian understanding of freedom as autonomy -negative understanding of freedom as self-constraint- leads to the idea of a social contract, wherein we forget the face, as our social relations are organized through institutionalizations, regulations, and legislations. Hence, our basic moral ground is subjected to universality through the political sphere and its relevant dispositif –morality is understood as being acquired from the political order. Dimitrova argues for the opposite: the political being as acquired from the moral. Equality is problematic, in the sense that it is only realized by the existence of the Third, which amounts to the Hobbesian Leviathan.

Consequently, as Dimitrova deduces, we should “go beyond” the state. The shallowness of the liberal discourse is apparent, wherein I restrict my rights to obey laws that protect individual rights. Contrary to this mediated imposition, I’m eternally indebted to the Other and my responsibility sets the tone for all types of sociality and for the political route, regardless of ideology. Justice depicted as being blind to maintain impartiality is also problematic. This can amount to ignoring the particularity, uniqueness, and difference of the face. “Justice comes from love … Love must always watch over justice.”⁵⁶We should never forget that violence bears more violence –that is why we have the responsibility to never kill. The principle of justice amounts to relating the Other as face.

True justice is built on morality, and politics should serve morality, by constantly questioning its values, norms, and responsibilities. Within this framework, good policies can be built. Dimitrova notes that Levinas follows Kant with regard to the notion of eternal peace and also “thinks that violence is overcome only in peace … not as reconciliation … but as a messianic peace.”⁵⁷Dimitrova stresses that “Politics is agameof life and death, but morality is itself theseriousnessof life and death.”⁵⁸We have to rethink human as a social being in this sense –beyond the notion of “bare life” or bio-political approaches. Justice is found on constant (self) questioning and criticism, constant modifications of the state. With moral ground achieved, mere protection of individual rights can be seen as problematic as it leads to never ending antagonisms.

As Levinas says in an interview quoted by Dimitrova, my responsibility being infinite may not be agreeable but it is thegood: “What is very important … is the man who understands holiness as the ultimate value.”⁵⁹Dimitrova deems this value as the tool that we can utilize for justice and for setting universal codes, but she warns that this is not the “core” of our humanity. Surely, making the state more moral is very important but morality does not come from the state. Moral responsibility for the Other precedes all.

*

Dimitrova devotes a subchapter to examining the perspectives of Kant and Levinas concerning the categorical imperative, a significant aspect of their respective moral frameworks. It is essential to grasp how the Levinasian framework introduces a divergence and advances this theme in comparison to Kant. Levinas, situated within his societal milieu, observed a philosophical inclination towards the whole, totality, and universality, with a prioritization of freedom over responsibility. Consequently, he critically engaged with approaches that portrayed society as comprising “autonomous purposes”⁶⁰, an inclination seen from a Levinasian perspective as denigrating. Kantian humanism, from a Levinasian stance, falls short due to its indifference to otherness. Dimitrova emphasizes Levinas’ contextual engagement with a world marked by the horrors of Nazism and anti-Semitism. Within this context, she highlights Levinas’ insistence on elevating morality to a position of heightened responsibility for others. From a Levinasian viewpoint, violence begins with the depersonalization of the face.

Following Kantian understanding, one must follow the law regardless of his pleasure or displeasure whereas law must put individuals under universal regulations, through the ability of reason. From a Kantian stance, we are free to obey, and all people are respected as equals before the law; the action is done in accordance with duty to (for the sake of) the law.

It is not difficult to discern the limitations of this approach from a Levinasian lens. As Dimitrova points out, such a peace would still imply coercion and would only be temporary, as there would always be the threat of war due to breach of contract. The determinative Levinasian move here is placing the “Face” (the humane element) in front of Kant. I must traverse the limits of the “I”, and care for the Other and his survival. As Dimitrova notes, this “impulse towards the Other” is “beyond being”: “This is a breakthrough from the self-centeredness and self-sufficiency of the individual; it is the metaphysical (ethical) striving to respond to the Other.”⁶¹This is also a categorical imperative albeit a different, more encompassing one (“Thou shalt not kill!”). The face of the Other denotes an openness, exteriority, and infinity. Levinas does not agree with the Kantian stance regarding the “dignity of man as a rational and free being”, for him, dignity of man is tied to “his ability to overcome ‘existence-towards-death’, by devoting his efforts to the ‘existence-against-the-death-of-the-other.’”⁶²Vis-à-vis Kant, Levinas prioritizes the relation between the one and the Other rather than the one and the law. While for Kant, it is reason that leads the individual to act morally and morality is understood as autonomy, Levinas insists that heteronomy comes before autonomy, as the appeal of the Other.

The encounter with the face is holy, as I hear the commandment (imperative). We can ensure justice and freedom not merely by imperative –the typifying, totalizing framework falls short and is theoretically and practically barren –we have to introduce the otherness of the Other, the intersubjective aspect as foundation of sociality. The Other’s otherness must be recognized, responsibility precedes freedom, and justice should be reframed through morality.

Ricoeur is one of the more recent philosophers Dimitrova focuses on. He follows Kant in terms of his understanding of the capacity to judge (rationally applying a general rule whilst moving from particular to general and vice versa), stays in the framework of universality, particularity and the “ego-logical” framework, but he also brings the aspect of language and speech into process of judgement. Ricoeur, like Levinas, recognizes the role of the “Third”, and considers judgement (putting a singular case under general rules, moving from general knowledge to practical wisdom) to be a virtue. From a Levinasian stance, this understanding is problematic due to its apparent typifying and totalizing tendency, as for Levinas, generalizing in such a way is depersonalization, and virtue lies in my infinite responsibility for the Other. Ricoeur maintains that people and institutions always clash –hence the need for a Third as mediator. Judgement is done within speech which separates people from violence. Ricoeur states that freedom and equality of individuals are protected with formalism (to arrive at a balance), so that we can identify and typify cases; he protects the idea of “difference” viagame, which ascribes to the unexpected, unpredictable, and creative aspects of each case. Ricoeur also treats the concept of responsibility differently, as implying two processes: attributing an act to an individual (moving from general to individual), and secondly, deeming a person guilty (moving from individual to general). In the process of judgement, the universality of law is confirmed, and we arrive at a result not by considering the special characteristics of individuals but by the criteria of justice.

As Dimitrova argues, this is problematic because of its formalist attitude and because it implies a “dispassionate dispensing of justice” where justice can lead to injustice, and also, “retribution cannot rely on rules only.”⁶³The role of ambiguity and indetermination is also found in Levinas, but it is not related to creativity as in Ricoeur, it is related to my eternal responsibility for the Other, and to my irredeemable guilt.

The pervasive sense of guilt and the perpetual delay in achieving justice for the Other are integral aspects of Levinasian approach. One isalways alreadyguilty, consistently tardy in demonstrating responsibility to the Other, and justice for the Other is inherently delayed.

With Lyotard, the important role of speech is maintained but another layer is introduced with the division of prescriptive and descriptive statements. Prescriptive statements, orders, requests etc. address the other in second person and demand action on his side. With the imperative statements, the interlocutor can agree or disagree with the content of the statement. Lyotard relates justice to prescriptions. Kantian categorical imperative is the beginning, the ground of subsequent statements, it is not something we infer. But with prescriptions we generate a condition of something that is not pre-given. For Kant, “freedom is nothing else but the pure reason itself, acting as a regulation in the practical domain.”⁶⁴Dimitrova’s critique here concerns the privileged position reason is given, as it alone sets the normative framework, and is self-referencing. As she points out, Lyotard grasps the Levinasian categorical imperative as being different to Kant’s. For Levinas, prescription has an obligatory position and does not depend on the individual’s choice, as my encounter with the Other is inescapable. I meet the face, the command, regardless of my personal desire or response. In Levinasian philosophy, the imperative, obligatory nature of the prescription is maintained but neither the command nor my obedience to it depends on autonomy. Levinas prioritizes the order rather than the norm. I’m hostage (a servant) to the (free) Other, the “illeity” looks at me from the face, as such, the ethico-political implication is that freedom is irrelevant, as my ground is my obligation to the Other.

*

In the concluding chapter, Dimitrova initiates an exploration by challenging the notion that morality is rendered null and void. She raises pertinent questions about the basis for considering morality as an impossibility and emphasizes the need to eliminate not morality itself but rather our conventional and misguided moral principles. Her discernment holds significance, encapsulating the essence of her approach. It is imperative not to conflate morality as an inherent, constitutive aspect of human nature with the moral principles that govern our politico-cultural norms and regulations. Thus, Dimitrova states,

Morality is supra-historical, supra-theoretical, supra-political, supra-ontological, i.e. metaphysical, but most concrete closeness in the communication with the Other, which is responsibility and care for that Other.Only from the height of its holinessit possible to make judgement about what is occurring in the fields of history and politics, of the state and institutions, of theory and practice and so on.⁶⁵

From a Levinasian perspective, morality is an intrinsic and inextricable component of human relationships, presenting an enduring presence that cannot be eliminated. Whether an individual chooses to respond, refrains from responding, or adopts an attitude of indifference toward the Other, he is always already immersed in a decisive moral bond that forms the basis of his relationship with the Other. Morality occupies a foundational status, resisting reduction to mere natural or social laws and norms; its significance surpasses the cumulative impact of these combined elements. As such, Dimitrova designates moral behavior as an inherent aspect of humanness, characterizing it as the “first scene”⁶⁶, following Levinas. This scene is characterized by an “an-arch-ic”⁶⁷nature, devoid of a discernible beginning, marking the inception of the plot—the encounter between characters—from which all subsequent relationships in the drama of human life unfold.

Historically, morality, framed as an “unwritten law” served as a cultural weapon to subjugate entire populations, enforcing a prescribed norm to render them docile. The advent of postmodernity questioned the established truths that were once deemed fixed, universal, and totalizing, thus leading to a relentless relativization, undermining, and questioning of morality. In ancient and pre-modern times, people adhered to prescriptions, and rulers, often considered “holy”, issued orders to their subjects. With secular power structures, a gap emerged between individual responsibilities and rules imposed by authority, legitimizing obedience. The abolition of the cult of the holy ruler shifted obedience from commands issued by a sovereign to the adherence to norms, establishing societal autonomy. Dimitrova illustrates this transformation by examining Ancient Greece, where legislations were deliberated, resolutions achieved through rhetoric, and laws derived from collective consensus. Bauman contends that modernity replaced this structure with a society of autonomous individuals, where individuals assumed responsibility for their actions rather than conforming to external prescriptions. Dimitrova characterizes the modern individual as one engaged in self-determination, constantly identifying himself through an ongoing process of self-creation. This process of individualization resulted in perceiving external interventions as forms of violence imposed on individual autonomy. Paradoxically, the norm of autonomy imposed on individuals creates a status of simultaneous independence and coercion, highlighting the complex and intricate relationship between freedom and coercion, as Bauman’s notion of our “obligation to choose”⁶⁸is emphasized.

Dimitrova then delves into an exploration of two predominant socio-political ideologies, liberalism and communitarianism, viewing them as fundamentally reliant on the notion of autonomy. Liberalism, according to Dimitrova, discards the universal value of “good” associated with the idea of law and prioritizes the innate human right to strive for survival, laying the groundwork for civilization. This agonistic view underlies all human accomplishments. Freedom, within this framework, is defined as the liberty to choose the means of survival and the right to ownership, leading to the establishment of institutions that regulate practices through laws voted on by individuals or their representatives, aiming to maintain social order. Within liberalism, individual freedom is emphasized, where the concept of free will plays a significant role in shaping social and moral obligations. Laws are constructed based on the idea of individual free will embedded within collective will. Dimitrova highlights the challenge of unanimity, where the common will must acknowledge the features of individual wills crucial for their alliance, leading to a compromise that tends toignore otherness. She identifies this compromise as contributing to the formation of a monolithic societal structure based on similarity and repetitiveness, both emblematic of universalist imposition, ultimately obscuring differences. Although unanimity serves as the core legitimizing principle of liberalism, Dimitrova notes that the majority principle, stipulating that all members of society must be represented, has gradually taken its place. This shift is important for efficient discourses, decision-making, and defense procedures. However, Dimitrova observes a recent trend where even the principle of majority representation is challenged, with liberal governments seemingly acting on behalf of minorities. She emphasizes that this replacement constitutes a significant criticism of liberal doctrine, as representatives ostensibly act on behalf of the entire group. Liberalist ideology envisions society as composed of free individuals subjected to common laws. Non-compliance is viewed as subversive, and power figures formulate rules on behalf of all citizens, functioning as agents of totality and universality. This structural framework limits individuals’ ability to exercise freedom, contradicting the very premise from which liberalism originated. Dimitrova highlights this paradoxical edifice and points at how, despite acknowledging differences within such systems, liberalism only tolerates them as long as they do not violate the rights of others protected by laws. Accordingly, she critiques liberalism for overlooking empirical differences between people and failing to reform its institutions accordingly.

It is important to note that competition is deemed the highest value above all others in liberalism (as such, selfishness and hypocrisy are rampant when this value is applied to governance and social relations). The transformation to neoliberalism is endowed with this idea of competition. This power for power’s sake view poisons the global structure as the dictum of “war of everyone against everyone” returns. Dimitrova refers to the Hobbesian character of this process, urgently pointing out the “new barbarism” that is being born globally.⁶⁹With this, Dimitrova turns to John Rawls as a contrasting figure to Hobbes and the liberal doctrine and elaborates on Rawls’ neo-liberal theory of justice as fairness. As she argues, the revival of liberalism is not merely a matter of theory, as we witness its impact within our praxis and everyday life, as the neo-liberal paradigm increasingly posits new problems globally.

Dimitrova points out that the communitarian approach was proposed as an opposition to the liberalist framework. Here, democracy is demystified and understood as a mode of governance and a way of life rather than a procedure. Here, Dimitrova refers to Michael Sandel, who critiques the liberalist approach of prioritizing the legal instead of the good. For both liberals and communitarians, conceptions of justice are linked to our associations. Dimitrova states, “If justice precedes good … we must keep away from the particular conditions of our experience -as unencumbered individuals according to the interpretation of Rawls, who believes this is the only way we will not be tools of the very goals we pursue.”⁷⁰Individual as “self-organizing principle of valid claims” (Sandel) is the self-defining subject of the Enlightenment. It follows that contrary to the unencumbered self, individuals within society are already embedded within a network of moral obligations. Sandel points out how we grow distant to one another as to free ourselves from our responsibilities towards one another.

Dimitrova offers a reminder that our interactions with the Other play a constitutive role in shaping our individual identities, going beyond mere cooperation. The unencumbered Self, as observed by Dimitrova, seems to be approaching a self-fulfilling prophecy, transitioning from a liberal illusion to a tangible reality.⁷¹She emphasizes that within the intricate web of societal dependencies, not necessarily organized by our own volition, our autonomy and potency diminish. Consequently, it is imperative to scrutinize the communitarian approach within this framework.

It can be easily discerned how Dimitrova’s analysis elucidates the current landscape of our neo-liberal predicament, as a manifestation of crises on multiple fronts: moral, economic, environmental, and political. This predicament poses a formidable challenge to our fundamental constructs of selfhood, bodily existence, social relationships, productivity and more; as established social and economic structures disintegrate, and notions of labor, identity, gender, etc. face with the unrestrained onslaught of information and technology. Late global capitalism, in its pursuit of assimilating every novel element, grapples with the emergence of new predicaments that individuals and societies are ill-equipped to navigate.

In accordance with Dimitrova’s conclusive argument, an existential-phenomenological perspective leads to a deduction that does not favor either liberalism or communitarianism, asserting that neither the universal nor the individual serves as the foundational basis for morality. Drawing from the lessons of Levinasian philosophy, it is emphasized that morality is not an inherent essence owned or sustained by individuals; rather, morality is demonstrated through actions directed towards the Other. The criterion for morality lies in the labor undertaken for the Other and the care extended to him.

*

The Other is a singularity. It is a uniqueness in the sense that he is Other before any associations and identifications –beyond his status, behavior or features. The Other as otherness, prescribes and commands to me in his singularity. The norm typifies us as “ourselves”, as in third person. Here, via the insight of the urgency of the singularity of the face, Dimitrova highlights a new meaning of Kantian autonomy. Kantian imperative puts the individual as a “beginning and end”, as a circular subjectivity and this perspective cannot be reconciled with a Levinasian insight, which simply surpasses it as amoralexcess.

The intervention of the Third, with its measures, serves as a deterrent against potential harm to the Other. Within this context, justice emerges as a significant category, and functions to reinstate the rights of the affected party, structuring established institutions, rules, and regulations deemed “objective.” Dimitrova delves into the dual nature of social connections, characterized by the interpersonal and the institutional. She discerns a tension stemming from the interaction between these two strata.

From Dimitrova’s approach, this conundrum can only be left behind and lasting peace reached by abandoning our selfishness through our asymmetrical relation to the Other: one always already prioritizes the Other. The nobility of this perspective is clear when we think about how a subject in the modern sense never willingly leaves a libidinal position (i.e. egotism and/or selfishness).

It can be said that one as a moral being is “response-able” towards the Other. The notion of justice can be understood in this light. Maintaining justice is not merely a matter of recognizing the way of the social order; above all, we begin by recognizing our responsibility towards the Other. A crucial point is, as Dimitrova explains, justice is not an elevated or sublated form of morality. Justice is not a utopia or a matter of postponement; it is immediate and determines our present, encountered via the face.

*

Dimitrova introduces two prominent figures representing neo-liberal and communitarian perspectives on justice, namely John Rawls and Alex Honneth. Rawls approaches the concept of justice as a neutral and political idea, detached from philosophical and metaphysical considerations. However, his political conception of “justice as fairness” incorporates a moral dimension, as per Dimitrova’s argument, within the context of a unified system of social cooperation embedded in a modern democratic constitutional regime. Dimitrova engages with this moral aspect, as cooperation among groups manifests their solidarity through actions, and institutions contribute to the generation of moral standards. In contemporary democratic societies, the adoption, interpretation, and application of “justice as fairness” occur intuitively, guided by specific traditions. As a result, there is a “partial consensus” encompassing different or contradictory views and doctrines. Despite Rawls’s deliberate effort to avoid the metaphysical dimension of morality by relying on concepts such as honesty and tolerance, Dimitrova contends that the metaphysical aspect is inherently embedded in the very understanding of moral categories.

Rawls discerns a conflict between the tradition of John Locke (as perpetrator of freedoms) and of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (as perpetrator of equality and values) and considers these conflicting views as the fundamental conflict between liberals and communitarians. Believing he found the key idea that would unify equality and freedom, he offers these principles of justice: “Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all” and “Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: a) They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; b) They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society.”⁷²Rawls considers this scheme as a ground for political consent as it can be tested on institutions of the societies in order to understand if they are functioning consistently within the framework of the social cooperation and according to the citizens’ interests and positions. He favors the relatedness and cooperation of people, thus abandoning the understanding of a given, a priori moral code. People should have necessary information about the conditions of society to retain political justice, coercive ways should be abandoned, and citizens should have the status of equal and free individuals.

One of the criticisms directed towards Rawls by Dimitrova concerns the notion of “veil of ignorance.” Rawls suggests that in order to build the pact of public understanding and to establish a ground of equality among people, there should be a “veil of ignorance” that inhibits the parties to form preconceived ideas about their place in society, class, features etc. Dimitrova observes that this approach robs people of their humanness and conceives them as transcendental subjects: “it is very interesting then what they would be debating and facing when making a rational choice. Are these ‘fully cooperating members of society’ indeed?”⁷³

Following Dimitrova’s critique, the notion of transcendental subject is harmful rhetoric and takes us back to the presupposed, a priori conceptions of subject, justice, and sociality. “The veil of ignorance” maxim throws us into an inhumane sphere of thought. It is important to discern the criticism here, as the subject of this liberal approach is someone devoid of values, features, and orientations and he is free to choose values. It is also problematic in respect of proper distribution of justice. As Dimitrova points out, the very principles of individuals and groups come into question, as we cannot be sure according to which principle or value one adopts. Dimitrova asks:

institutions created for whom? Used in the name of whom? In whose interest? Whom do they favour and who do they ignore? The simplest answer is ‘to benefit all!’ However, it is impossible due to the inevitable constraints of the whole’s resources and the continuous challenge of their distribution.⁷⁴

To answer these questions, Dimitrova acknowledges that the most vulnerable and weakest members of society should be favored as to benefit from services, resources, and social mechanisms; however, this also complicates the picture, when we remember that our foundational value is the uniqueness and otherness of the Other and our responsibility to the face. With the ever looming Third, there are complications in the process of implementing justice. Conceiving the society as a total of self-interested individuals who follow their own desires and advantages, we also risk proper institutions being built, as we cannot establish moral social relations and institutions on such values.

Dimitrova emphasizes that neutralization and tolerance cannot ensure morality or solidarity, as in Rawls’ approach the Other is reduced to the Third. Dimitrova points out that the issue is the way individuals and groups are defined as “autonomous”, “noumenal” self-interested. For Rawls, individuals choose their goals autonomously and rely on a presupposed social agreement. But how would such a faceless, “human-less” relation and social agreement serve anyone?

Rawls’ view of tolerance suggests that everyone has the right to pursue their goals on the condition that they recognize the right of others who also have the same rights and freedoms, and the institutions ensure security of this process. Dimitrova’s critique here is that the Rawlsian definition of the Other and of societal norms are negative and conceived as limitations. They are “prohibitions” instead of responsibilities “as a source of positive motivation”⁷⁵In Rawls concept of cooperation, we can discern universalization and totalization as driving principles that ignore the otherness of the Other. While it is understandable to aim for symmetrical and reciprocal relations through fair terms of cooperation, the role of mediation, as well as profit, risks impeding these relations. Also, in this understanding of cooperation, individuals and groups are seen as “teleologically determined.”⁷⁶Rawls discerns authoritarian state power as the only alternative to his notion of tolerance, but Dimitrova explains that the principle of tolerance cannot act as foundation of a policy of differences as well as a humanistic theoretical framework, as it undermines the possibility of real social cooperation.⁷⁷

Dimitrova then focuses on Axel Honneth, as a proponent of the communitarian notion of justice. Honneth also builds on constitutional democracy and underlines accelerated individualization as a determining process with positive and negative connotations. He argues that the sense of community and communal values have been undermined within this epoch and individuals seek to be more autonomous and focus on personal achievements. Honneth is focused on the “intersubjective conditions of human socialization”⁷⁸, specifying certain aspects of the recognition that the modern person needs, such as “emotional support and care”, “respect”, and “social assessment.”⁷⁹These aspects must be satisfied for the modern person to experience justice, and the failure to meet them is experienced as injustice. As Dimitrova explains, Honneth is more focused on forms of non-recognition (racism, sexism, etc.) as people and groups seek certain rights, and this discourse rests on the Hegelian negation of negation, a process aiming for a determining positive result for both disadvantaged and vulnerable members of society and society as a whole. Dimitrova points out that within this process negation is the resource for development and negation of negation arrives at a synthesis, thus totality -as “human community”- is the defining concept of the human actions. According to Honneth’s argument, forms of non-recognition lead to some people being marginalized and this further causes them to feel inadequate within their societies. Even though they seek for recognition, this leads to challenging the conventional order of society. For Honneth, conflicting parties reach a truce or reconciliation through mutual recognition –this is not a matter of oppressing one party or establishing a domination over one party. Thus, the important aspect of this reconciliation is social solidarity and mutual recognition.

InThe Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, Honneth, contrary to Hobbesian understanding of struggle as the fundamental aspect of social life, specifies “dialogue” as the determining feature of social life and puts value in intersubjective relationships. The idea of freedom is conceived as a social phenomenon, as we are not to act according to individualistic motives; our freedoms rely on the freedoms of other members of society. As Dimitrova points out, the communitarian idea of justice is thus values sociality as solidarity, equality, and mutuality rather than focusing on individualistic benefits or distribution of goods as tools for ensuring freedom of people. The concept of “good” reflects the “common good” –it is not a given norm that is fixed for once and all, rather understood in a processual logic and achieves legitimacy obtained through institutionalization of interactions and rights. Honneth’s approach to the matter of equality is based on the idea that individual autonomy as moral principle should be protected, and freedom of individuals are protected by the law. Here, complying with ethical values of society and accepting them willfully ensure the freedom of action and interaction. Regarding justice, Honneth underlines the idea of social spheres of communication. The state protects and takes the necessary measures for the “binding mutuality” of our relations with others.

Dimitrova argues that this conception of justice “loses its character of a distributive theory”⁸⁰and remains a normative communicative theory as the state that guarantees mutuality and fairness. For Honneth, the important task is to extend the law as to guarantee the relations of mutual recognition. Accordingly, Dimitrova asks how the state should intervene to protect rights, and if the state should commit to their material provision. She deduces that from Honneth’s stance, obligations of the state keep increasing and expectations expanding, and the question of responsibility gains importance as it is absent in this framework. For Honneth, relations of recognition should be conceived as more or less stable models of communication and presuppose the validity of moral norms. The relations of recognition as binding reciprocities are self-explanatory and habitual –thus, the main task of his theory of justice is to ensure equal opportunities for participation in the constitutive relations of recognition.

At this point, Dimitrova’s stance once again differs: in order to be recognized by others we should first question ourselves as to behave in a responsible manner and aim to participate in other people’s lives becausewe care for them, not because we seek recognition from them, due to the asymmetrical nature of ethics. As Dimitrova explains, seeking recognition is not ethical –one should always put the Other first. Honneth’s approach tells us that in the name of solidarity we should support others in their self-realization process. However, as Dimitrova observes, this understanding of solidarity eventually relates to my self-realization rather than the Other.

Dimitrova’s concluding remarks underscore the transformative impact of understanding sociality and justice through a Levinasian lens, challenging the inherent logic of our civilization’s values. Dimitrova contends that modern secular governments, grounded in principles of rights, autonomy, and equality, have not fully realized these ideals. The challenging conditions of late modernity and capitalism have fostered a mentality resembling “a war of everybody against everyone.”⁸¹Justice, as a concept, becomes elusive in the face of escalating selfishness and egoistic claims, reinforcing alienation and undermining solidarity. Postmodernity led to critical examinations of the foundational values of modernity, endorsing diversity, plurality, and criticizing universalism and the dictates of omnipotent structures. Nevertheless, Dimitrova notes that morality, responsibility, and the otherness of the Other remain problematic both in theory and practice. This is a kind of authority of the “whole” –the individuals lose their value as “faces”: the dehumanizing aspect of this process is clear. The Other as radical difference does not appear in this theoretical and sociopolitical constellation. The selfsame logic persists. In certain theoretical instances, the acknowledgment or attribution of difference to the Other becomes evident, yet this recognition is neglected by the confines of my personal paradigm as the ego. Consequently, the Other remains imprisoned within the structure I build for him, failing to transcend or depart from this framework. This process reflects a self-centric totalization and universality that I assert.

As a philosopher deeply attuned to the nuances of difference, Levinas eloquently acknowledges the Other in its alterity, perceiving the Other as an infinite entity with a transcendent dimension. His ethical stance involves a commitment to care for and serve the Other. Within the realms of communication, conversation, and dialogue, my responsibility towards the Other is boundless, as the mere presence and silent appeal of the Other are foundational to any relational dynamic. Despite the potential variety in my responses—ranging from engagement to non-response or even indifference—all actions inherently bear the quality of a response due to an inescapable responsibility towards the Other. This responsibility, intrinsic to my subjectivity, transcends mere desire or its absence, constituting the very essence of my being, as articulated by Dimitrova in the context of “the non-intentional internalizing of the challenge made by the alterity of the Other which awakens my conscience and my responsibility.”⁸²

While laws, regulations, and the safeguarding of rights are undeniably crucial components of justice, it is imperative to recognize that the pursuit of justice often involves resorting to violent measures, inhumane practices, and political strategies. Dimitrova underscores that genuine peace is fundamentally “the meeting with the Other”, emphasizing the need to advocate for the care and rights of the Other, grounded in an infinite responsibility that cannot evade the Other’s continual appeal and presence. This relational priority precedes all other considerations. Dimitrova emphasizes the significance of understanding the Other by acknowledging his corporality and uniqueness, challenging the limitations of categories and classifications in explicating morality.

When the Other is perceived as embedded within an all-encompassing totality or as part of the whole, his uniqueness becomes obscured, and justice is denied, leading to a mortification of the Other. True justice, as Dimitrova asserts, unfolds as a process that is perpetually exposed to the risk of transforming into terror over the Other. To ensure justice, it is imperative to recognize and embrace the otherness of the Other. The achievement of peace and justice is contingent upon relating to the Other as a face, and the primacy of the Other should be upheld for goodness to prevail. Dimitrova concludes her work by underscoring the processual and infinite nature of the relationship with the Other —a fluid ethico-onto-epistemology⁸³that is never fixed or completed but persists infinitely, always holding the subject responsible.

To conclude, we should articulate that Levinasian philosophy transcends the pitfalls of repetition and sameness. It maintains a deliberate distance from philosophies grounded in reduction and totalization, wherein the yearning for the Other assumes the character of sacred humanism, eschewing violent and destructive manifestations. This perspective proves to be not only fertile but also profound.

In contrast to prevailing cultural trends characterized by a cult of self, sterile identity politics, contrived antagonisms, careerist avarice, and the harsh dynamics of late capitalism, Levinasian philosophy emerges as an instructive guide. Its lens, scope, and layers resist facile consumption, continually offering valuable insights and perspectives. In an era dominated by fleeting trends and superficial ideologies, the enduring relevance of Levinasian philosophy becomes evident, as demonstrated in an astute manner in Dimitrova’s work.

***

Bibliography

Dimitrova, Maria.Sociality and Justice - Toward Social Phenomenology, Ibidem, Kindle, 2016.

“Do We Have to Let Ourselves be Doomed to Morality?”,In Levinas’ Trace, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011

Latour, Bruno and Serres, Michel.Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time: Michel Serres with Bruno Latour, University of Michigan Press, 1995

Levinas, Emanuel.God, Death, and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press, 2001.

Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis, XanEdu Publishing, 1998.

Rawls, John.Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Kelly (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Žižek, Slavoj.The Courage of Hopelessness: Chronicles of a Year of Acting Dangerously, Allen Lane, 2017.

[...]

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¹Maria Dimitrova,Sociality and Justice - Toward Social Phenomenology(Ibidem, Kindle, 2016), 22

²ibid.

³ibid., 8

⁴ibid., 9

⁵ibid.

⁶ibid., 10

⁷This stance in Dimitrova’s work is in proximity to Michel Serres’ pursuit of a fragile synthesis rather than fragmentation. Serres, in conversation with Bruno Latour stated: “the philosophy of fragments is hyperdefensive; it is the result of hypercriticism, of polemics, of battle and hatred” (Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time: Michel Serres with Bruno Latour, University of Michigan Press, 1995, p. 129).

⁸Dimitrova,Sociality and Justice, 16

⁹ibid., 27

¹⁰ibid., 29

¹¹Levinas,God, Death, and Time, p. 59

¹²ibid.

¹³ibid., 58

¹⁴Dimitrova,Sociality and Justice, 58

¹⁵Dimitrova,Sociality and Justice, 59

¹⁶ibid., 64

¹⁷ibid., 55

¹⁸ibid., 81

¹⁹ibid., 85

²⁰ibid., 135

²¹ibid., 136

²²Constructing the Other within the Lacanian Symbolic order, so to speak.

²³ibid., 20.

²⁴ibid., 47

²⁵ibid. 139

²⁶ibid., p. 125-126

²⁷ibid., 126

²⁸ibid., 19

²⁹ibid., 127

³⁰ibid.

³¹ibid.

³²ibid., 129

³³ibid., 143

³⁴ibid., 144

³⁵ibid., 131

³⁶ibid.

³⁷ibid., 131

³⁸ibid., 100

³⁹ibid., 103

⁴⁰ibid., 112

⁴¹Emmanuel Levinas,Otherwise than Being, 50

⁴²ibid., 107

⁴³ibid.,118

⁴⁴ibid., 116

⁴⁵ibid., 149

⁴⁶ibid.

⁴⁷ibid., 150

⁴⁸ibid., 154

⁴⁹ibid.

⁵⁰ibid., 156

⁵¹ibid., 155

⁵²ibid., 157

⁵³ibid., 159.

⁵⁴ibid., 158

⁵⁵ibid., 161

⁵⁶ibid., 167

⁵⁷ibid., 169

⁵⁸ibid.

⁵⁹ibid., 172

⁶⁰ibid., 173

⁶¹ibid., 177

⁶²ibid., 178

⁶³ibid., 189-90

⁶⁴ibid., 198

⁶⁵ibid., 209

⁶⁶ibid., 210

⁶⁷ibid.

⁶⁸ibid., 213

⁶⁹ibid., 215

⁷⁰ibid., 218

⁷¹ibid., 217

⁷²John Rawls, E. Kelly (ed.), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001, 42–43.

⁷³Dimitrova,Sociality and Justice, 225

⁷⁴ibid., 227

⁷⁵ibid., 231

⁷⁶ibid., 233

⁷⁷Dimitrova’s line of criticism with regard to this aspect of Rawlsian outlook aligns with Slavoj Žižek and Jean-Pierre Dupuy, as they also observe the constituent negativity in Rawls’ model. Dupuy notes that in this scheme, social inequality is tolerated if it also benefits people at the bottom of the social ladder, and if they are stemmed from natural (contingent) inequalities rather than inherited hierarchies. Accordingly, Žižek observes that Rawlsian model would create a “wild explosion of ressentiment” within society: “I would know that my lower status is fully ‘justified’, and I would thus be deprived of the ploy of excusing my failure as the result of social injustice. Rawls proposes a terrifying model of a society in which hierarchy is directly legitimized in natural properties” (Žižek,Courage of Hopelessness, p. 49).

⁷⁸ibid., 235

⁷⁹ibid., 234

⁸⁰ibid., 237

⁸¹ibid., 243

⁸²ibid.

Frequently asked questions

What is the central argument of Maria Dimitrova's "Sociality and Justice – Toward Social Phenomenology"?

Dimitrova's work, rooted in Levinas' philosophy, rethinks sociality and justice, arguing that the fundamental social relation is between individuals and the Other, not individuals and society. Intersubjectivity, radical difference, and alterity are key concepts.

How does Dimitrova define the Other, and why is this important?

Dimitrova conceives the Other as irreducible, beyond limitation, and possessing a positive force. This contrasts with philosophies that view the Other as a negativity or benchmark. The Other is higher than "I" and cannot be taxonomized. Responsibility for the Other is the determinant point of relating.

What are Dimitrova's critiques of universalism and pluralism?

Dimitrova argues that universalism represses difference by applying uniform standards, while pluralism, though seemingly embracing diversity, remains within the universalist framework, ultimately fragmenting and atomizing identities and not fundamentally undermining universal constructs.

How does Dimitrova frame ethics, drawing from Levinas?

Dimitrova, following Levinas, prioritizes ethics as first philosophy, placing the Other above Being. The moral bond is defined by responsibility for the Other, which is the deepest root of any human association. The Other is not an object or even an equal, the Other is "higher" than me.

What does Levinas mean by "responsibility for the Other"?

Responsibility for the Other implies closeness, revealing the vulnerability and fragility of individuals. The self is a moral subject responsible for both his and the Other's time, even the Other's death. This responsibility is inescapable.

How does Dimitrova address the relationship between subjectness, freedom, responsibility, and arbitrariness?

Dimitrova explores the friction between subjectness and universality, presenting freedom as either taking responsibility (beginning with the Other) or arbitrariness (beginning with the "I"). In encountering the Other, the command to never abandon him, my every answer or indifference is a response.

How is language understood within Dimitrova's framework?

Language is understood as "born by the appeal heard in the moral relation," going beyond Heideggerian theory to traverse monologism and logocentrism. Discourse is predicated on saying something for the Other, inspired by the Other. The origin of communication is the Other, not "I" or language. A true word is guiding and prescribing, awakening responsibility.

What are the ethico-political and sociocultural implications of Dimitrova's work?

The state, wielding bureaucratic power, tends to categorize and homogenize, fostering alienation. State power and morality are not inherently contradictory, but unrestrained state power is problematic. We should always remember that exteriority or infinity cannot be constrained within a whole or totality. Politics must be controlled by ethics, and the rights of Exteriority should be restored.

How does Dimitrova view the relationship between justice, state, and morality?

Justice should be reframed beyond historicist perspectives, allowing the otherness of the Other to disturb me. Politics must be controlled by ethics, and we must move beyond the state, acknowledging that political is acquired from the moral, not the other way around. True justice is built on morality and constant self-questioning.

How does Dimitrova address the Kantian perspective on morality in contrast to Levinas?

Dimitrova emphasizes that Levinas's framework diverges from Kant's. Levinas, witnessing the horrors of Nazism, insists on elevating morality to a position of heightened responsibility for others. Violence starts with the depersonalization of the face. The one and the Other are more important than one and the law.

How do liberalism and communitarianism relate to autonomy, according to Dimitrova?

Both liberalism and communitarianism rely on the notion of autonomy. Liberalism prioritizes individual freedom and competition, while communitarianism emphasizes community values and the common good. However, the lack of importance given to the otherness of the Other make either of these theoreticals framework for politics problematic.

How does Dimitrova analyze John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness?

Dimitrova finds Rawls view of tolerance as a “prohibition” instead of responsibilities “as a source of positive motivation” ⁷⁵. He also reduces the Other to the Third by aiming for symmetrical and reciprocal relations through fair terms of cooperation. Rawls conceives society as a total of self-interested individuals following desires that cannot enable a proper institution as a moral social relation.

How does Dimitrova analyze Axel Honneth's theory of justice?

Dimitrova observes that Honneth neglects the ethical relation of the Other as being asymmetric, which differs from the communitarian notion of justice. Honneth understands one’s responsibility as participation with the Other because of social relations. The asymmetrical nature of the ethical relation, as described in a Levinasian approach, suggests that people prioritize the Other as a moral matter which differs from Honneth’s suggestion that in solidarity, people care for the Other because of their self-realization.

What is Dimitrova's conclusion about morality and responsibility?

Dimitrova concludes that morality is inherent in human relationships, demonstrated through actions toward the Other. The criterion for morality is the labor and care extended to the Other. She advocates for caring for the rights of the Other, grounded in an infinite responsibility that cannot evade the Other's appeal and presence.

Details

• Hochschule: Sofia University St. Klimment Ohridski
• Veranstaltung: social philosophy
• Note: 1,0
• Autor: Ilgin Yildiz (Autor:in)
• Erscheinungsjahr: 2024
• Seiten: 32
• Katalognummer: V1443322
• ISBN (eBook): 9783963551963
• ISBN (Buch): 9783963551970
• Sprache: Englisch
• Schlagworte: social philosophy emmanuel levinas maria dimitrova social phenomenology sociality justice