How useful are avoidance/mitigation of incidents agreements such as the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in reducing the risks of conflict and building confidence in the Indo-Pacific waters?
The Indo-Pacific waters and, therein, the South China Sea (SCS) qualifies as the “center of gravity in global geopolitics”. Foremost due to its attributes as a disputed area of sovereignty/dominion, its rich flow/stock resources, and crucial sealines of communication for world trade. To peacefully manage SCS’s MARSAF and MARSEC , the literature suggests that over the past political/military leaders have built a profound framework of “Maritime Confidence-building Measures” (MCBM) to improve “awareness” and “governance” on a “strategic, operational and tactical” level. In particular, through the collaborative “security communities” concept (e.g., ASEAN, ADMM, ADMM Plus, WPNS, MMCA) and “legally binding and nonbinding instruments” (e.g., COLREG, UNCLOS, CUES).
In contrast, from 2010 to 2020, increased hegemonic Chinese military and grey zone activities as well as Vietnamese/Indonesian/Philippine/Thai (re)actions led to 73 deliberate ship rammings/ chasings/harassings among the parties. Between 2016 and 2018, China conducted 18 risky close-distance maneuvers toward U.S. naval vessels in the Pacific.
These numbers suggest a practical discrepancy, “compliance” shortfall, and “unsafe” behavior by the signatories (in particular by China), raising initial doubts about the utility of the MCBM framework to achieve its safety/security purposes.
To scope the essay to a workable set of SCS related research questions, it will examine to which extent the nonbinding CUES ('Independent Variable') did/will prove useful:
a) to increase MARSAF ('Antecedent Condition' on tactical and operational levels),
b) to (then) increase MARSEC ('Dependent Variable' on a strategic level)?
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE CONCEPTS OF MARSAF AND MARSEC
3. UTILITY ASSESSMENT OF CUES FOR MARSAF
3.1 Strengthening MARSAF on the operational and tactical levels
3.2 Failing MARSAF on the operational and tactical levels
3.3 Future Challenges
4. UTILITY ASSESSMENT OF CUES FOR MARSEC
4.1 Strengthening MARSEC on the political-strategic level
4.2 Failing MARSEC on the political-strategic level
4.3 Future Challenge
5. CONCLUSION
Objectives & Research Topics
This assignment evaluates the effectiveness of the nonbinding "Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea" (CUES) in reducing conflict risks and fostering confidence within Indo-Pacific waters, specifically focusing on its impact on Maritime Safety (MARSAF) and Maritime Security (MARSEC).
- The role of CUES as a confidence-building measure.
- Distinction between operational MARSAF and strategic MARSEC.
- Assessment of compliance versus strategic brinkmanship.
- Limitations of CUES regarding "grey zone" activities and public vessels.
- Potential for future expansion and institutional reinforcement.
Excerpt from the Book
3.1 Strengthening MARSAF on the operational and tactical levels
The “theory of success for CUES” lies on the “operational and tactical levels” to fulfill its purpose of maximizing MARSAF (Ong-Webb, Koh & Miranda, 2017, p. ii, WPNS, 2014).
Firstly, the code was signed in 2014 by 21 Chiefs of Navy within the multilateral maritime security community WPNS, which was beneficial to be recognized as a relevant promoter of the MCBM governance structure pertinent for managing MARSAF in the SCS (Bueger, 2015, Mortimer, 1996, USNI, 2014, Kraska, 2017). Based on a “bottom-up process”, the members managed to raise MARSAF awareness significantly by identifying common safety concerns and agreeing on a direct MCBM that built standards for naval vessels (incl. surfaced submarines) and aircraft (incl. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) to collectively deal with unexpected encounters at sea outside territorial waters (Bueger, 2015, YingHui, 2016, WPNS, 2014, Wilkinson, 2018, pp. 60, 83).
Secondly, in distinction to “alliances” and their “formal treaties” on a strategic level, the value added service of the code lies rather with the voluntary hands-on provisions for “lower and mid level security practitioners” on a tactical level (Bueger, 2015, p. 163). On the one hand, these are related to “safety procedures” to professionalize safe maneuvering, speeding, and distancing, which are also based on the expectation to “comply” with COLREG standards to bridge the potential safety gap into civil shipping (WPNS, 2014, p. 7). On the other hand, the provisions encompass “communications procedures” for radioing and signaling to eventually reduce the risks for the root cause of collisions on the individual and interpersonal level (WPNS, 2014, p. 3). In addition, it is noteworthy that from an interoperability point of view, the English CUES builds an inclusive and ambiguity-reducing “lingua franca” bridge between different nationalities (ECDGT, 2010, p. 25, Lim, 2016, Bloomberg, 2016).
Thirdly, again stressing a root cause lens for accidents (here: wrongful identification of others’ intentions), the CUES offers at least “very limited” “assurance measures” to reduce misinterpretation/-calculation (WPNS, 2014, p. 8, Chauvin, 2011, Nong, 2017, Odgaard & Lund, 2020, p. 7).
Summary of Chapters
1. INTRODUCTION: Outlines the geopolitical significance of the Indo-Pacific/South China Sea and introduces the research objective of evaluating CUES against MARSAF and MARSEC variables.
2. THE CONCEPTS OF MARSAF AND MARSEC: Establishes definitions for Maritime Safety and Maritime Security using established academic literature to frame the essay's analysis.
3. UTILITY ASSESSMENT OF CUES FOR MARSAF: Analyzes the tactical and operational impact of CUES, contrasting its successful implementation in exercises with failures in real-world intimidation scenarios.
3.1 Strengthening MARSAF on the operational and tactical levels: Details how the CUES structure and communication procedures support standard safety protocols among naval forces.
3.2 Failing MARSAF on the operational and tactical levels: Discusses the scope limitations of CUES, particularly regarding the exclusion of coast guard/public vessels and submerged submarines.
3.3 Future Challenges: Examines obstacles to future CUES efficacy, including political interference and the difficulty of expanding the code to non-traditional vessels.
4. UTILITY ASSESSMENT OF CUES FOR MARSEC: Evaluates the high-level strategic influence of CUES and how it affects regional maritime security confidence.
4.1 Strengthening MARSEC on the political-strategic level: Explores how CUES-related momentum influenced subsequent strategic agreements and confidence-building measures.
4.2 Failing MARSEC on the political-strategic level: Argues that CUES lacks the political clout to override deeply ingrained strategic competition or address grey-zone warfare.
4.3 Future Challenge: Discusses the risk of CUES becoming obsolete if it remains a "process-only" tool and the stalled progress within the "Code of Conduct" negotiations.
5. CONCLUSION: Synthesizes the findings, confirming that while CUES has tactical value under controlled conditions, its strategic impact is minimal due to political brinkmanship.
Keywords
CUES, South China Sea, Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, Indo-Pacific, Confidence-building Measures, Brinkmanship, Naval Operations, Geopolitics, Grey Zone Operations, WPNS, International Maritime Law.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this paper?
This paper examines the utility of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in reducing conflict risks and enhancing maritime safety and security in the Indo-Pacific theater.
What are the central thematic fields?
The work centers on maritime safety (MARSAF) at the operational level and maritime security (MARSEC) at the political-strategic level, specifically within the context of the South China Sea disputes.
What is the primary goal of the research?
The goal is to determine if CUES acts as an effective independent variable in strengthening MARSAF and, subsequently, increasing the confidence level for regional MARSEC.
Which scientific methods were used?
The author uses a qualitative analysis approach, applying conceptual frameworks like the "COM-B system" and the "strategic corporal" concept to evaluate compliance and behavior change in a real-world military context.
What topics are covered in the main section?
The main section assesses the effectiveness of CUES on two levels: tactical/operational (strengthening vs. failing MARSAF) and political/strategic (strengthening vs. failing MARSEC), while also addressing future expansion challenges.
Which keywords define the core of the study?
Key terms include CUES, South China Sea, MARSAF, MARSEC, confidence-building measures, and naval brinkmanship.
How does the paper differentiate between MARSAF and MARSEC?
MARSAF is defined as the prevention of hazards caused by maritime accidents on a tactical level, whereas MARSEC concerns the broader strategic security of national population and assets against intentional threats.
Why does the author conclude that the impact of CUES is limited?
The author argues that while CUES works during structured exercises, it is frequently overruled by deliberate political brinkmanship and lacks the scope to cover grey-zone actors like coast guards or maritime militias.
What role does China play in the analysis?
China is highlighted as a primary actor whose "grey zone" activities and territorial enforcement strategies often conflict with the provisions of the code, demonstrating the limitations of voluntary, non-binding agreements.
- Arbeit zitieren
- Dr. phil. Mathias Jahn (Autor:in), 2022, How useful are avoidance/ mitigation of incidents agreements such as the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES)?, München, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/1291683
