After the Bosnian genocide, Saudi aid swept into the country, reforming the Muslim institutions already in place, essentially Wahabifying the region. Workers in Saudi Arabia bring over Saudi culture, including the black face-veil and Wahabi thought into their home countries. Many mosques in the United States are funded by Saudi Arabia, as are many masjids in the world. Controlling Islamic websites and dominating the Sunni world, Muslims have fallen into more and more of a Saudized Islam.
The spread of Wahabism destroys Sufism, saint shrines, and tries to counter liberal Islam. By controlling the mass Islamic religious media through the internet and controlling the two holiest cities in Islam, Saudi Arabia has been able to command its place in society. Through oil and partnership with the United States in its secular state and through asserting its spiritual prowess in social media, Saudi Arabia has taken root in the modern psyche. This study looks at how Saudi Arabia affects the global Muslim world by funding Islamic institutes, Islamic websites, and media. Discovering whether or not the Saudi influence spreads extremism, religiosity, or creates a more cohesive Muslim community.
Table of contents
Introduction
Argument
Wahhabism, Salafism, and Saudi Brief
1979 the rise of Political Islam
Saudization on the Muslim World
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
It isn't a secret that the country of Saudi Arabia holds enormous influence in parts of the Muslim world. It is a region transforming itself from "puritan" Sunni Islam to holding concerts and encouraging beauty bloggers to visit. The crown prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is trying to transform his country into something representing more like a Westerners paradise, very much like Dubai built on the back of laborer's that border on indentured slavery. Part of the new "westernization" aspect of the country is to gain different modes of income for the state not dependent on oil and to deal with the unrest of the general public. A public who are demanding movie theaters, concerts, bowling alleys, and "fun" things. The country has created newer urban infrastructures, increased public-sector salaries, hired more civil servants and security personnel, etc. Alongside providing "good" for its citizens, the nation has imprisoned journalists, feminists, imams, other religious persons such as Shia, and anyone who goes against the state. The country has destroyed Yemen, along with the Obama administration, and supported Egypt's counterrevolution.
The Arab uprisings found a foothold in Saudi Arabia, demonstrations were held near the oil fields in its Eastern Province, in Riyadh, and around Jeddah. The Shia, political prisoners, and others were concerned with mismanagement, unemployment, women driving, and corruption. The country in 2011 claimed "there are no political prisoners in the kingdom,"19 even though many calculated there are around thirty thousand prisoners. The number of prisoners shrunk until the appeal of ISIS caught on around the world. Yet how the country figures out who is involved with "ISIS" is somewhat relaxed, as the state's school of thought is Wahhabism and Salafism, which in itself can promote an extreme interpretation of Islam. The problem with ISIS individuals is that they do not legitimize the Al-Saud family's power.
The Royal family's power is one of the most interesting ones in the modern world when it comes to families. A huge family consisting of members at the "lower" rung with barely any power or influence, to those in the inner circle. Women in the upper crest typically can get away with murder, sex, drugs, and alcohol; as well as appear in Western clothing and not in traditional clothes. The royals are not always safe, especially if members publicly embarrass the family like the Princess who was publicly executed in the 70s for running off with her lover. The country is not shy of its public executions, which may seem barbaric to the dainty Victorian West, who would instead do it in private, the executions are conducted in public to send a message to the general masses. The seventh-century caliph Mu'awaiyah was asked how he managed to rule for twenty years he replied, "I place a hair strand between myself and the people. If they pull it from their end, I would loosen it from mine so that the strand would not break. If they loosened it from their end, I would pull on it from mine."7
The Saud family does a beautiful job of keeping its power, even when it goes through "weak" points. MBS is a young man and the first grandson of the Royal family to rule; he is very much interested in a more "Westernization" of his country. Only time will tell on how the religious persons will handle the concerts and theaters, that include dancing, music, pictures, and etc. The King also diminished the power of the religious police, so they can no longer arrest persons. Which is a beautiful approach that not only helps the average Saudi but also helps MBS's programs go smoothly. The Al-Saud family does have a relationship with Wahabism, Salafism, and/or "puritan" Islam that was further established after 1979, when the Grand Mosque was attacked. The family formed stronger bonds with the ulema to help counter the urbanization and modernization that was happening overnight. It was also this time that the country, along with Pakistan, and the United States established the al-Qaeda to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. The country needed to establish itself as the religious authority in the Muslims world, to counter the Islamic awakening that was rippling throughout the Muslim world. It was around this time the country called itself "Sunni" and firmly started to demonize Shiism, to counter Iran. The family needed to legitimize its power in the Muslim world and the Western one.
It seems whoever goes to Saudi Arabia for religious purposes leaves one of three ways, disenchanted with Islam, not effected, or completely changing to a Wahhabi or Salafi view of Islam bringing these views with them to their home countries. Not only is it travelers to the land that bring back their newly founded faith or "cool" Islam, but the country also funds mosques, Universities, and Imam training in other countries bent on the Saudi version of Islam. This "Saudization" of the Muslim world effects Muslims both negatively and positively as it can spread extremism. It is not the teaching that causes extremism per se, nor the people bring back Saudi ideas to their home country, but the interpretation and application of the persons who are becoming "Saudized." Whether or not the Al-Saud family is purposely spreading their version of Islam to legitimize their power. So as not to be questioned by Muslims or to plant seeds of disruption in other nations to legitimize its power further and create destabilized Muslim regions incapable of challenging the Al-Saud's claim of Mecca and Medina is to be explored in this paper.
Argument
After the Bosnian genocide, Saudi aid swept into the country, reforming the Muslim institutions already in place, essentially Wahabifying the region. Workers in Saudi Arabia bring over Saudi culture, including the black face-veil and Wahabi thought into their home countries. Many mosques in the United States are funded by Saudi Arabia, as are many masjids in the world. Controlling Islamic websites and dominating the Sunni world, Muslims have fallen into more and more of a Saudized Islam. The spread of Wahabism destroys Sufism, saint shrines, and tries to counter liberal Islam. By controlling the mass Islamic religious media through the internet and controlling the two holiest cities in Islam, Saudi Arabia has been able to command its place in society. Through oil and partnership with the United States in its secular state and through asserting its spiritual prowess in social media, Saudi Arabia has taken root in the modern psyche. This study looks at how Saudi Arabia affects the global Muslim world by funding Islamic institutes, Islamic websites, and media. Discovering whether or not the Saudi influence spreads extremism, religiosity, or creates a more cohesive Muslim community.
Wahhabism, Salafism, and Saudi Brief
Wahhabism and Salafism are some of the most feared vocab words for Western society, besides words like Jihad and Sharia. Wahhabism is the puritanical form of Sunni Islam, mainly practiced in Saudi Arabia and parts of Qatar. The name is derived from the founder Muhammad bin Abd al Wahab who lived in the 18th century. Wahab’s movement was meant to reverse the decline of Muslim morality. He saw many Islamic practices as idolatrous, including shrine culture. Wahab encouraged a return to “pure” and orthodox ways of Islam. Muhammad bin Saud made allegiances with Muhammad bin Abd Al Wahab, and together the two Muhammads began to unify the Arabian Peninsula. These close political ties and relationships remained in the al-Saud family today. Al-Wahab called for his fellow Arabs to go back to the “golden age” of Islam, where Muslims faithfully followed Muhammad and his companions, more particularly, he wanted people to follow his interpretation of the Quran.11 Wahhabis see themselves as Muttaqun or pious ones and al abrar or the devout believers of monotheism, believing that the founder saw the fresh vision of tawhid. They strictly interpret Islam with strict morals against the mixing of the sexes, allowing other faiths to comingle, playing music, dancing, colors, etc.
Wahhabis are not the only ones throughout Islamic history who held puritanical views of Islam. They were one of the first to hold much sway and produce large amounts of terrorist activities, however. They, the Wahhabis, hold the view that they follow the Islamic scholar Ahmad ibn Hanbal, the founder of the Hanbali school. “Wahhabism is not a fifth Madh-hab as some ignorant and prejudice people claim.”21 Hanabli school is one of the four schools of jurisprudence in Islam, named after the founder Ahmad ibn Hanbal of 855. While the school takes on more of a puritanical viewpoint in modern times and very much anti-Sufism, it wasn’t always against Sufism. Sufism and Hanbali school shared an intimate relationship, even having a close relationship with the Sufi martyr Hallaj. Hanbalis were also Sufi’s themselves, such as ibn Taymiyyah. Ibn Taymiyyah, ironically, is believed to have influenced modern Salafism and Wahhabism.8
For some Muslims Abd al-Wahhab was a spy or puppet for the British secret service. Wahhabism was seen as the creation of the Orientalist monster; there is no evidence to support this. Others have compared them to the Kharijities, and others argue that “Wahhabis have seriously distorted fundamental teachings of Islam.”21 Some Muslims cry out that the Wahhabis have “brainwashed our Sunni brothers and sisters, destroyed the very fabric of our pure beliefs and polluted our Mosques with their twisted doctrines.” Ulema from University in Cairo have denounced Wahhabism and called it “a satanic faith which has led to division, debate, dishonesty, and mistrust of Muslims.”21 This perception of Wahhabism can be felt among Westerners as well, who claim it leads to extremism and terrorism. Just googling the word, Wahhabi brings up article titles claiming terrorism, evil, devil, etc. Wahhabism does spread puritanical beliefs and where it crops up extremist cells are not too far behind.
While it is easier to blame the sect, we know Saudis themselves aren’t running around with AK-47s shooting civilians on their vacation outside of the Gulf State. It is more likely that the people who become more puritanical become frustrated in a society that does not hold up to their ideas. These same individuals also eventually realize that Saudi Arabia itself is not “pure” Wahhabi. The truth to the manner is that the concept of extremism is far more complex, and this paper does not try explaining why someone may try to take the extreme measure of their beliefs by killing innocent persons. Writers have praised the movements “involvement in charitable works and its provision of educational and worship institutions for Muslims throughout the world.”21
In 1802 there was an annexation of the two cities, Mecca and Medina, that put to the end of Ottoman custodianship of the two holy places. The Ottoman infrastructure and architecture were destroyed later by Saudis. The Ottoman ruler of Egypt Muhammad Ali Pasha sent a military force to Arabia. The Egyptians demolished the first Saudi state in 1818. The Second Saudi Amirate fell because of strife within the clan and the rival Al Rashid amirate, who were allies of the Ottomans in central Arabia. The Al Rashid took over Riyadh (city) and exiled the Al- Saud clan. The ruler ‘Abd al-Aziz (1876-1953) restored the power of the Saudi Clan in Najd reign in 1902 to 1912. In 1925 al-Aziz marched towards Mecca and Jeddah.12 Faisal Al-Duwish criticized the king “for his lack of religious fervor and especially for his dealings with the British.” In the 1927 treaty, he believed that the kind “sold himself to the English (qad ba’a nafsahu li-l-ingliz).”11,12
Saudi Arabia was founded on September 16, 1932 and was meant to convince tribes of the supremacy of the family12. At this point in history, the Saudi family was not concerned at legitimizing their Islamic power over the two Holy cities. Al-Aziz made contracts with the Aramco oil company, the United States, in which the company could come in and take oil while urbanizing the area around it. Then they must leave in the 70s. With the country finally able to profit from its natural money flow, the Saudi family began to see modernization and the troubles of “progression” on their soil. In 1974 around one-fourth of the population were Bedouin, and today nearly 80% of Saudis live in urban centers. The society is young, with almost 30% of their population below fifteen. The fertility rate has dropped, as expected, with the increase of education in women and urbanization of the people, from seven children per household to three as of 2013.11,12
The country is religiously diverse, despite the stance on Wahhabism. Importantly there is a sizeable Shia minority group in the eastern province in the cities of Najran and Medina. These Shia are a part of the “Twelvers” in Medina, and those in Najran are mostly Ismailis, who believe in a metaphorical interpretation of sacred texts. There are also Sufi communities in the Hejaz and Najd that have survived Wahhabism. Yet those people who remain Sufi often meet privately or outside the country to express their ideas. The crackdown on nonpure Sunni Islam began to foster in the 1970s, as Saudi Arabia faced a few critical markers that could damage the house of Saudi. First, the kingdom got control of its oil revenues, and the 70s saw the increase of urbanization at an incredibly fast rate. Second Arab nationalism and the conflict with Israel produced pressure on the kingdom to crack down on those who could interfere with the Royal family. Thirdly the 1979 revolution of Iran and the siege of the Grand Mosque.
1979 the rise of Political Islam
1979 was an excellent year for the Saudi kingdom and for the world itself. In 1979 the Iranian revolution took place, which placed the Saudis in a complicated position. Saudi Arabia already emphasized its distinct identity as a role model of Islam; the revolution of Iran pus the Saudis in a complicated situation. The revolution pushed aside Persian nationality and promoted an Islamic universalism and showed the first successful "true" Islamic regime. Saudi Arabia was not founded on Islam alone; it used its ties with Al-Wahab and tribalism to assert dominance. The Islamic Republic portrayed Iran as a revolutionary, anti-imperialist, and the legitimate leader of the Muslim umma. The Saudi’s viewed their vision as the unifying force for solidarity among all Muslims. The Iranian revolution could threaten the peace in the Eastern Provinces in Saudi Arabia, where the oil comes from. This would also allow for the Saudis to question the legitimization of the Ruling family. Khomeini argued that “Muslims must become a single hand. They must become a united hand, remain united, become one; they must not think themselves separate from us.”5 The Republic had a foreign policy that appealed to Arabs and Muslims, such as emphasizing the commitment to the Palestinian cause. They presented themselves as the leaders of Islam in the Middle East and took up the mantle that the Arab nationalism seemed to fail at in the 60s.
Pan-Islamism was a political ideology that wanted the Unity of Muslims under one state or caliphate or as an international organization. Saudi Arabia did not participate in the vast majority of twentieth-century Islamic trends, such as the ideology laid down by Jamal al-Din Afghani, who championed Pan-Islamism. The lack of contributing to these trends was one of these reasons for Saudis cohesiveness of Islam. The reformers of the 19th and 20th centuries had little impact in the Gulf. While Afghani was read in the Gulf region, it didn’t have such a grand impression as it did in the rest of the world. The nation-state and economic development became more critical to Muslim thinkers than ideology reform; these new ideas did make an impact on Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabi was unique because the dynasty claimed Islam at its root and then founded satisfactory political and economic development.14
Islam was reexamined, at least by the Sunnis, and Islamic doctrine and rethinking of Islam as modernism already happened, by the Wahhabis. There was no need to challenge Islam because it was already being challenged in the State by Wahabi doctrine, the official declaration of the Royal Family. To legitimatize themselves further in the Muslim community, the Saudis point out the failures of governing ideologies in Baathist Syria and Iraq, Nasirist Egypt, and Ataturkist Turkey, that failed to accomplish the goals these movements set out to fix. Saudis point out that their Islamic justice as the bases for a “legitimate social and political order”14. The Islamic revivalist theory (Wahabism) and the political regime of the Saud family, was successfully established on its third try.
Turki al-Faisal Al Saud offered his perspective on the risks that Iran posed onto the kingdom of Saudi Arabi: “Saudi Arabia is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, and the Birthplace of Islam, and as such it is the eminent leader of the wider Muslim world. Iran portrays itself as the leader not just of the minority Shiite World, but of all Muslim revolutionaries interested in standing up to the West.”5 The danger was seen as more significant as Iran further tried to discredit the Saudi version of Islam, “Iran’s biggest struggle is with Saudi Arabia, not with the United States. Iran wants to challenge the Saudi version of Islam, that is, the division of politics and religion”.5 Pan-Islamism, more importantly, challenged the monarchy of the Saudi family.
On November 28, 1979, the Shia staged protests, which Saudi Arabia claimed Iran helped stage. Khomeini’s speeches inspired Shia clerics. Shia were (and are) treated as second-class citizens who had little to no power in their rejoin of the country. The Shia made up the majority of oil workers, but there were no Shia foremen; there were no Shia diplomats, no pilots, and none on the air force. Shia had to teach Sunni history and beliefs in their schools; teachers could not become headteachers or become deputy heads to their local schools. Local zoning laws prevent the Shia from building basements or dens so they couldn’t “use them as secret husyniys for subversive worship and for their alleged sexual congresses.”11 The Shia had to pretend that they weren’t Shia, which furthered the stereotype by Saudis, who denounced Shia as crafty and sly. There were also numerous rumors that the Shia were spawns of the devil, plotting to take over the world, greedy, and stealing babies to become Shia clerics.
In the 1970s a young preacher known as Sheikh Hassan Al-Saffar started to raise consciousness in the Qateef. Al-Saffar took inspiration from Karbala and praised Husayn’s resistance to discrimination and the economic plight of the people. As the Sunnis were getting wealthy from the oil, the actual Shia workers were not. The Sheikh organized secret groups known as the Islamic Revolution Organization (IRO) who produced literature about their complaints: “When the people look at the squandering of the national wealth, while every area in which they live is deprived, miserable, and suffering, is it not natural for them to behave in a revolutionary way, and for them to practice violence, and to persist in fighting for their rights and the protection of their wealth from the betrayal of the criminal Al-Saud?”11
The Shia also were claimed to have Khomeini posters, evidence of their loyalty to Iran. The National Guardsmen took to action against the Shia, who already saw them as enemies of the states. Around seventeen people were killed in the five-day riots, two hundred were arrested, the Saudi British Bank was plundered, etc. Radio Tehran did send out messages to the Shia Saudis to rise against their “oppressive” regime. Khomeini did not like the Saudi claim upon the two holiest places in Islam, ayatollah supporters smuggled in posters and were said to say “Fhad, the Israeli Shah.”11 Iran and Saudi continued their standoff throughout the decades, still calling shots at each other.
Salafism is a term that refers to the ideology for Muslims to revert to the traditions of the Salaf (the first three generations of Muslims), which they consider as pure. They reject Islamic scholars after these generations and the right school of thoughts like the Malki and Hanafi schools. Some Salafis do not believe in dealing with politics, some do, and the third considers themselves jihadists. It is not a modern phenomenon and can’t entirely be attributed to the Wahhabi movement, as the action can predate Al-Wahhab. We can say that Salafism may have influenced Wahhab, and those who took siege on the Grand mosque considered themselves Salafis. Salafis do not use the term Wahhabi, as they do not follow (some) Al-Wahhab doctrine. Both groups have different jurisprudence fiqh; Wahhabism generally relies on the Hanbali school of fiqh, and Salafism relies on independent reasoning.8
The doctrine is dominated by anti-tawlid and has non-schoolist or la madhhabiyya theology that was proposed by the Yemeni scholar Muhammad al-Shawkani. An Albanian scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani influenced the modern idea of la madhhabiyya, by rejecting the Sunni Muslim idea that one should automatically turn to a madhhab for fiqh rulings. Al-Albani also encouraged the renewal of ijtihad via critical re-re-evaluation of hadith corpus.8 Also believed many hadiths were unsound and produced rulings away from the Wahhabi school of thought. Yet, Al-Albani was Wahhabi in creed and was a good opponent of Saudi adversaries; thus, was hired a job at the Islamic University of Medina. Al-Albani becomes an essential figure for British Salafism.
In the 70s, a man named Juhayman al-Otaybi started to gather groupies or devotees. Juhayman joined the group Al-Jamaa Al-Salafiya Al-Muhtasiba, “The Salafi Group That Commands Right and Forbids Wrong”, the group was active in Medina. Created in 1965 and called for people to destroy pictures, especially portraits of the king. Juhayman argued that photo IDs were proof enough the Saudi royal family was kafirs. Then the man began to have vision or dreams starting around 1978. The dreams revealed that the Mahdi was one of his followers, Mohammad Abdullah Al-Qahtani. Al-Qahtani’s sister began to see her brother in the Grand Mosque of Mecca in her dreams, Juhayman proceeded to marry her.11
Followers were encouraged to go out in the desert and do target practice. The men set their eyes on the basements and study rooms below the Grand Mosque. These rooms had long hallways, and the rooms become the headquarters of the extremists. Bribing the Bin Laden company to look the other way as the men drove trucks into the underground tunnels and stockpiling the rooms with supplies and weapons. The men walked into the sanctuary with their weapons, pretending to be mourners. Muslims will often wrap their dead in shrouds11, and people who die in Mecca are lucky to walk their dead in the holy of holies for the funeral prayer. The men covered their weapons under these shrouds on a stretcher pretending to be mourners at five in the morning. Police officers and an imam were killed for resisting the men who took over the mosque.
The news about the siege was closed off for surrounding people, both foreign and native. The government realized that these men were well known among the clerical side of Saudi. “They [the religious sheikhs] knew them all well,” says Prince Turki. “The so-called ‘Mahdi’ had been a pupil.”11 The government was in a predicament; it is considered wrong to kill inside the sacred space according to sunnah. If they acted against the group of men right away, then they could risk creating a rift between them and the ulema. Outside Muslims would criticize the Saudis for killing in the holy area. The Saudi soldiers and royal family were reluctant to shoot the attackers, even though they had hostages. The soldiers needed a fatwa from the religious clergy, not an order from the Royal family. It took a while for the Royal family to get a fatwa from the religious clerics, who kept insisting that the jihadist could turn around and repent. Many of these men were in jail for being “troublemakers” by Prince Nayef’s secret police but were released by the Sheikh Bin Baz.
The jihadist took two weeks to be weeded out of the mosque, and eventually relied upon French special forces and obnoxious gas. It proved challenging to weed out the group from the latticework of tunnels, and the family had to rely on the age-old tactic of smoking the group out or have them die of affixation. The Saudi family needed control in their country after the aftermath of 1979. Religious clerics also needed to reassert themselves in society after the embarrassing incident. The country started to become more religious, and Saudis saw the influence of both the secret police and religious police rise. The actions since WWII have been both religious attitudes, and the need to conserve the Royal family’s power, 1979, threatens both. Saudi later would team up with Pakistan and America to combat the Soviets in Afghanistan, effectively creating the Taliban. The Royal family would then send men who were picked up for extremist ideology and send them off to fight, instead of having them remain in the country. Saudi Arabia has always been against Soviet influence because the country opposes any kind of atheism, it also most likely was following the lingo-franca of its brother the United States.
The attack in 1979 blind sighted the Royal Family and also increased the tension between them and the ulema. It brought forth a Saudi identity crisis and also affected the country's relationship with religion and government action. In the early 2000s, a group of girls was killed in school fire because they were prevented from leaving the school by the religious police. The girls could have survived the tragic deaths by going into the streets, but the police thought it was “immoral” for uncovered girls to be on the street and without a male chaperone. The Saudi Royal family was livid, and so were the families of the girls. The 80s saw Saudi Arabia increase of religiosity among the youth and further control of the Wahhabi clerics upon the lives of women and the average citizen. This religious response was partially one that stemmed from 1979 but also the sudden modernization/urbanization of the country. Schools began to teach more Sunni doctrine and rewrote history to their point of view. Fatwas were issued that restricted women from driving, traveling abroad, etc.; all who were later lifted in the 2010s.
Saudization on the Muslim World
The term “Saudizaiton” means the influence of Saudi Arabia upon the Muslim world. It could be taken as either negative or positive, depending on what one does with said influence. Farah Pandith calls this term “Gulfiniation,”17 but this term means that the entire Gulf is influencing the Muslims. While Muslims who do go and live in places like Dubai or Bahrain more often go for work purposes or tourist reasons and not for religion. Saudi Arabi is unique because it does hold the keys to the two holy spots of Islam. Saudi Arabia is also home to the Prophet Muhammad and all his companions, Muslims go to Saudi Arabia not only for work but for Religious tourism. People visiting become “fanatics,” as some claim, or more religious as they live longer in the region. While some people become less religious as they realize, the average Saudi doesn’t follow strict Wahhabi or Salafi guidelines, having Paris syndrome.
This zealous fever can be seen in another Holy place, Jerusalem. Jerusalem syndrome is a mental phenomenon that a person creates religiously themed obsessive ideas, delusions, or other psychosis type experience. This syndrome affects Jews, Christians, and Muslims who are on a pilgrimage or are a tourist to the ancient city. A common trait is a person who seems reasonable, or no evidence of psychopathology becomes psychotic after arriving in Jerusalem. It is quite possible those who travel to Saudi Arabia for religious purposes or to work, might end up experiencing their version of Jerusalem syndrome. Can Saudization also include “Saudi Syndrome,” a combination of both Paris and Jerusalem syndrome, as one explanation to why peoples convert to the puritanical viewpoints of Wahabism? Yes, as it may not be at the fault of the Saudis or its Royal Family as it is a symptom that might explain why some “normal” people adapt Wahabi customs or go further and join extremists after being influenced. Human beings may read literature on or offline, by Saudi clerics become hyper-focused on the message and adapt puritanical religious practices. They are experiencing psychiatric symptoms such as acute delusional states, hallucinations, feelings of persecution, derealization, depersonalization, anxiety, dizziness, sweating and etc. Yet this doesn’t fully explain the influence of Saudi’s version of Islam on the rest of the Muslim community.
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