This essay serves as an analysis and critique of the ideas propounded by Judith Thomson in her seminal 1970 essay "People and their Bodies".
The essay begins with an overview of the central arguments and philosophical methods Thomson employs and proceed to explain several weaknesses both in the philosophical approach and the logical structure of her argumentation.
Inhaltsverzeichnis (Table of Contents)
- Evaluation and Objections to Judith Thomson in “People and their Bodies”
- Thomson's Criticisms of Psychological Criteria for Personal Identity
- Pure Psychological Criterion
- Impure Psychological Criterion
- Hybrid View of Personal Identity
- Objections to Thomson's Critique
- Numerical vs. Qualitative Identity
- The Role of the Physical Brain
Zielsetzung und Themenschwerpunkte (Objectives and Key Themes)
This essay examines Judith Thomson's criticisms of different formulations of the psychological criterion for personal identity, specifically focusing on her arguments against the "Pure," "Impure," and "Hybrid" views. The author explores potential objections to Thomson's analysis, arguing that she overlooks key aspects of the psychological view, particularly the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity.
- Psychological criteria for personal identity
- Thomson's critiques of "Pure," "Impure," and "Hybrid" psychological views
- The concept of numerical and qualitative identity
- The role of the physical brain in personal identity
- Objections to Thomson's limitations on the psychological perspective
Zusammenfassung der Kapitel (Chapter Summaries)
The essay begins by outlining Thomson's thought experiment involving a brain transplant from Brown to Robinson, which she uses to illustrate her criticisms of the psychological view. Thomson argues that the purely psychological criterion, which states that simply reprogramming Robinson's brain with Brown's psychology is sufficient for a transfer of identity, is inadequate. She further criticizes the "Impure" view, where the physical brain's transfer is necessary, claiming it lacks a compelling rationale. Thomson then considers the "Hybrid" view, which proposes that personal identity is determined by psychological continuity, but ontologically, persons are their bodies. She identifies several problematic implications of this view, including the potential for multiple duplicates and the implausibility of intertemporal metaphysical objects.
The author then presents objections to Thomson's critique, arguing that she fails to account for the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity. They posit that reprogramming the brain might produce a qualitatively identical psychology but not a numerically identical one. Additionally, they argue that Thomson's dismissal of the "Impure" view is hasty, as it provides a more robust account of the brain's role in maintaining identity. The author concludes by emphasizing that Thomson's limitations on the psychological criterion may be misguided, due to her overlooking key considerations regarding the relationship between psychology, the physical brain, and personal identity.
Schlüsselwörter (Keywords)
This essay focuses on the philosophical concept of personal identity, specifically exploring the strengths and weaknesses of the psychological criterion. Key terms include "psychological criteria," "personal identity," "numerical identity," "qualitative identity," "brain transplant," "Thomson's thought experiments," "pure," "impure," and "hybrid" views. The essay also examines the interplay between psychology, physical embodiment, and the ontological status of persons.
- Quote paper
- Seth Carter (Author), 2017, "People and their Bodies". Evaluation and Objections to Judith Thomson, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/375565
