"People and their Bodies". Evaluation and Objections to Judith Thomson

Essay, 2017
9 Seiten, Note: 4.0

Philosophie - Praktische (Ethik, Ästhetik, Kultur, Natur, Recht, ...)

Leseprobe

In her essay, "People and their Bodies," Judith Thomson writes an evaluation of

several formulations of the psychological criterion for personality, explaining her

criticisms of each. The fundamental problem Thomson identifies that she believes

makes the psychological criterion weaker than a physical criterion is that she does not

believe the psychological criterion offers a clear ontological thesis of personhood, and

that this omission leads to several problems in clarifying the psychological view of

personal identity as well as puzzlingly counterintuitive implications. In this essay, I

will explain Thomson's central criticisms against what she refers to as Pure, Impure,

and Hybrid conceptions of psychological criteria for personal identity and proceed to

consider possible objections to her position that a proponent of a psychological view

might respond with. These objections will primarily be focused on how Thomson

chooses to characterize psychological criteria and her hastiness in drawing conclusions

with dramatic implications for the view.

Thomson begins her analysis of the psychological approach to personal identity

by means of several similar thought experiments in which a man, Brown, has his

psychology or brain somehow implanted in the body of a different man, Robinson,

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "Judith Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers." Judith

Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers. January 01, 1970. Accessed March 07,

2017. https://philpapers.org/rec/THOPAT-3. p. 205

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "Judith Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers." Judith

Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers. January 01, 1970. Accessed March 07,

2017. https://philpapers.org/rec/THOPAT-3. p. 207,209

under different conditions. By entertaining the thought of Brown's brain being

transplanted into Robinson's body, Thomson is able to consider two alternatives - one

where the brain retains the psychological properties of Brown and thus, the Robinson-

body displays the psychological characteristics of Brown; and one where the brain from

Brown's body is altered by drugs such that it resembles the Robinson's body original

brain. In these two cases, Thomson points out that we would be inclined to agree that

the first of the two apparently appears to preserve Brown's identity while the only

reason we would seem to have for the second case preserving Brown would be that the

brain originally came from Brown's body, the fact of which alone, Thomson points out,

does not appear determinative of identity if the psychology has the features of the

original Robinson.

On the basis of the distinction drawn between the two cases in which the

presence of psychological continuity seems to be factor determining whether or not we

say Brown has survived the procedure, Thomson clarifies two possible positions for the

advocate of a psychological criterion - the pure psychological criterion in which

reprogramming Robinson's brain with the psychology present in Brown's brain would

be sufficient for a transfer of identity, and the impure psychological criterion, in which only

the transfer of the fully physical brain of Brown as a carrier of his psychology would be

sufficient for transferring his identity into Robinson's body. Thomson explicitly chooses

to not consider as seriously the impure psychological criterion in her analysis of

psychological justification for personal identity on the basis that she cannot see why it

would be necessary for the same physical brain to generate the transported psychology.

She uses the example of a transplanted, brain-reprogramming liver from Brown as a

means of demonstrating the superfluousness of any particular transplanted part to the

psychological view.

In considering the Pure Psychological criterion in more depth, Thomson

proceeds to criticize that the view ultimately does not seem adequate to answering the

question of what a person's ontological status might be thought to be without some

kind of revision or clarification. She considers a possible answer from the Psychological

criterion proponent in the form of a Hybrid View of Personal Identity in which personal

identity is thought to be determined by psychological continuity, but that persons

nonetheless are their bodies ontologically. Thomson proceeds to consider several

problematic implications of this conclusion, namely the seeming inconsistency from

asserting that identity results from the possibility of psychologically continuous

duplicates in distinct physical bodies or what she claims to be the necessity of inter-

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "Judith Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers." Judith

Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers. January 01, 1970. Accessed March 07,

2017. https://philpapers.org/rec/THOPAT-3. p.206,207

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "Judith Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers." Judith

Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers. January 01, 1970. Accessed March 07,

2017. https://philpapers.org/rec/THOPAT-3. p.207

temporal metaphysical objects as an implausible conclusion for delineating persons

within this framework.

It is primarily in Thomson's limitation of what she believes to be a reasonable

view of a psychological criterion for personal identity that I believe a proponent of the

psychological criterion may find to be the most mistaken aspect of her critique. Firstly,

Thomson does not seem to at all recognize in her Brown thought experiment the

possibility that reprogramming the brain with the psychology once housed in a

different brain may lead to a qualitatively identical set of psychological characteristics,

but not a numerically identical set. Presuming that an essentially identical psychological

state can arise from wholly new matter appears to be a significant assumption that

Thomson does not explain. If numerical identity is not necessary, it is not clear why this

would be the case or at least why we should presume it. One could seemingly be

skeptical that the same numerical flow of consciousness could be transplanted by

information reprogramming alone. It's not clear at all how identity or my experience as

a person would be conserved when it seems as though it may be another conscious

experiencer who incidentally has my character, memories, and preferences due to an

information upload. The Impure Psychological Criterion appears sufficient in a way

that the Pure is not because it seems to ensure (assuming that all adequate brain and

neurological structures are successfully transplanted) that not only my outwardly

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "Judith Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers." Judith

Jarvis Thomson, People and their bodies - PhilPapers. January 01, 1970. Accessed March 07,

2017. https://philpapers.org/rec/THOPAT-3. p.209,210

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Titel: "People and their Bodies". Evaluation and Objections to Judith Thomson
Hochschule: Indiana University (College of Arts and Sciences - Philosophy Department)
Veranstaltung: PHIL-P300 Philosophical Writing Methods
Note: 4.0
Autor: Seth Carter (Autor)
Jahr: 2017
Seiten: 9
Katalognummer: V375565
ISBN (eBook): 9783668529731
ISBN (Buch): 9783668529748
Dateigröße: 430 KB
Sprache: Englisch
Schlagworte: Judith Thomson Philosophy Personal Identity Critique Duplicates Psychological Theory Physical Theory Hybridism Evaluation Objection
Preis (Buch): US$ 10,99
Preis (eBook): US$ 3,99

Arbeit zitieren: Seth Carter (Autor), 2017, "People and their Bodies". Evaluation and Objections to Judith Thomson, München, Page::Imprint:: GRINVerlagOHG, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/375565

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