Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Development of the problem of space junk (Problem Stream)
2.1 manifestation of Industries Interests in Lobbyism and Influencing of the Agenda Setting Process (Solution Stream)
3. Theoretical Perspective
4. Conclusion
Research Objectives and Key Themes
This paper examines the agenda-setting process regarding the European Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) decision between 2007 and 2014, testing the hypothesis that this policy was driven by an institutional bias toward economic liberalization and industrial interests rather than purely functional necessity.
- Analysis of the "multiple streams model" in the context of European space policy.
- Evaluation of industry lobbying, specifically the influence of the Airbus Group.
- Investigation into the relationship between space debris accumulation and political decision-making.
- Critique of the necessity of an independent European SST system versus existing US-provided data.
- Theoretical application of public, media, and political agendas to the European Space Council.
Excerpt from the Book
2. Development of the problem of space junk (Problem Stream)
ESA states that the most important sources of space junk are used rockets, and satellite bodies (ESA, 2013). Figure 1 describes a timeframe that starts in 1957 and ends in 2012. It can be recognised that the number of space debris increased almost proportional, until 2007. In 2007, the graph started to increase exponential. Interpreting this fact leads to the conclusion that the multiplicator of space debris grew. This did not happen because of the reason that more rockets launched to orbit, in 2007. The Department of Transportation Statistics keeps the books on Commercial Space Launches (USDOT, 2015) and the numbers of rocket launches to orbit did not increase between 1990 and 2014. In total 560 rockets started in this time period, including 163 European Rocket launches (USDOT, 2015). From 2007 to 2014, worldwide average is of 23 rocket launches per year. This number equals exactly the average rocket launches monitored in the full 24 years (USDOT, 2014). Therefore, the increase in space debris cannot be related to an increase in rocket launches. However, it could be that the rockets carried different loads. The evaluation of this requires technical expertise, I cannot provide. Therefore, the only explanation left is that space debris generates more space debris by collision. For the claim, this graph allows to demonstrate that the problem increased exponential in the last years. The danger of collusion increased and this could be one reason, why the agenda setting process was so fast, in 2012.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: The introduction outlines the growth of space debris, presents the emergence of the European SST decision, and introduces the central research focus regarding institutional economic bias.
2. Development of the problem of space junk (Problem Stream): This chapter analyzes data on space debris and commercial rocket launches to demonstrate the exponential growth of debris and its independence from launch frequency, suggesting other drivers for the SST decision.
2.1 manifestation of Industries Interests in Lobbyism and Influencing of the Agenda Setting Process (Solution Stream): This section explores how the Airbus Group influenced the European SST agenda through its "Space Police" initiative, linking it to potential industrial profit motives.
3. Theoretical Perspective: This chapter provides the analytical framework by defining public, media, and political agendas and applying Kingdon’s multiple streams model to the European space policy process.
4. Conclusion: The conclusion confirms that the SST decision was likely driven by an economic-liberalization bias and industrial lobbying rather than being an essential policy requirement.
Keywords
Agenda-setting, European Space Surveillance and Tracking, Space debris, Multiple streams model, Airbus Group, Economic liberalization, Institutional bias, European Space Council, Lobbying, Policy cycle, Commercial space use, Political agenda, European Union policy.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this research paper?
The paper investigates the political agenda-setting process that led to the 2014 decision by the European Union to establish an independent European Space Surveillance and Tracking (SST) system.
What are the primary thematic areas covered?
Key themes include the technical problem of space debris, the role of institutional bias toward economic liberalization, the influence of industrial lobbying by Airbus, and the application of political science frameworks like Kingdon’s multiple streams model.
What is the primary research question?
The research asks how the European SST decision reached the political agenda, specifically questioning if it was driven by objective necessity or by an institutional bias favoring industrial economic interests.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The author uses a qualitative case study approach, utilizing the "multiple streams model" (problem, solution, and politics streams) along with the concepts of "framing" and "venues" to reconstruct the policy-making process.
What does the main body of the text analyze?
The main body analyzes the correlation between rising space debris and investment interests, the specific involvement of the Airbus Group in promoting SST solutions, and the institutional role of the European Space Council.
Which keywords best characterize this work?
Primary keywords include Agenda-setting, European Space Surveillance and Tracking, Space debris, Airbus, Economic liberalization, and Institutional bias.
How does the author characterize the role of Airbus in this policy decision?
The author suggests that Airbus acted as a primary interest group, developing a "Space Police" blueprint that the EU adopted, thereby allowing the company to profit from a system that may not have been strictly necessary.
Does the author believe the European SST system was truly necessary?
The author argues that the European SST was likely not necessary, as reliable data was already being provided by existing US systems, and suggests that the decision was instead a move to support the commercial space market.
- Quote paper
- Jürgen Schmidt (Author), 2015, Reconstruction and Discussion of the Agenda-Setting Process of the European Space Surveillance and Tracking Decision, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/356895
