The "Responsibility to Protect"-Doctrine (R2P) is not as much an obstacle to ending human suffering in war-torn countries as its detractors maintain. Originally conceived as a UN-sponsored attempt to provide the international community with a more efficient instrument for preventing or halting mass violence and human rights violations, it was hoped that R2P would overcome the controversies frequently associated with humanitarian interventions. Yet ever since its conception, R2P has likewise met with extensive criticism in regard to some of its key tenets. In particular it is argued that a potential military intervention in governments' internal affairs not only constitutes an encroachment upon state sovereignty, but also merely serves as a pretext of stronger states to impose their will upon weaker ones.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
Introduction
Analysis
R2P and Military Action
Prospects for Intervention
Humanitarian intervention as part of geostrategic concerns
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
The "Responsibility to Protect"-Doctrine (R2P) is not as much an obstacle to ending human suffering in war-torn countries as its detractors maintain. Originally conceived as a UN-sponsored attempt to provide the international community with a more efficient instrument for preventing or halting mass violence and human rights violations, it was hoped that R2P would overcome the controversies frequently associated with humanitarian interventions.1 Yet ever since its conception, R2P has likewise met with extensive criticism in regard to some of its key tenets.2 In particular it is argued that a potential military intervention in governments' internal affairs not only constitutes an encroachment upon state sovereignty,3 but also merely serves as a pretext of stronger states to impose their will upon weaker ones.4
In the context of western calls for foreign involvement in the ongoing Syrian civil war, R2P accordingly figures as a particularly delicate issue. Yet whereas international observers such as David Petrasek contend that R2P's failure to stop human suffering in Syria is primarily due to its "illusory military solutions",5 this essay will argue instead that R2P has been unsuccessful because the human tragedy presently unfolding in Syria is still not universally recognized as an incidence of wide-scale aggression which beyond humanitarian exigencies for intervention could ultimately also easily evolve into a threat to the international community as well. In other words, since humanitarian considerations are apparently unable to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict by virtue of their own inherent urgency and moral imperatives, an international consensus can effectively only be reached by placing greater rather than less emphasis on common strategic concerns as well, so that dialogue between international actors for ending atrocities in Syria must also reflect mutual interests in relation to the safety and well-being of all of them as opposed to only those of some.
In order to further outline that view, the essay will first critically engage R2P's reference to military action before thereafter discussing the over-all prospects for foreign intervention6 in Syria following a re-evaluation of the principles of non-interference and state sovereignty. Finally, it will seek to demonstrate the need for external interferences in states' domestic affairs to be more systematically related to the dangers of regional instabilities and transnational terrorism as a result of not protecting civilian populations from intra-state violence in a timely and expedient fashion.
Analysis
R2P and Military Action
The "Responsibility to Protect"-doctrine was established as a new international norm by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 that regards national sovereignty not as an inherent privilege of state actors, but rather as a fundamental duty to shield their citizens from any type of grave and murderous harm such as ethnic cleansing, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.7 It further stipulates that the international community has a responsibility to assist governments meet that duty, yet that it will typically only do so at their explicit request for helping them overcome internal disruptions, thereby essentially respecting their national sovereignty. In extreme cases, however, R2P also reserves for itself the right to interfere in states' domestic affairs even without prior consent of its leaders if the latter are not only deemed incapable to protect their own population, but especially if they themselves are the main originators of intra-state violence and aggression.8
It is in particular this third provision of R2P which has received substantial criticism over these past few years, notably over foreign military intervention outside the Security Council and the arguably adverse long-term effects of interference in states' domestic affairs on international peace and stability in general.9 In that regard, Petrasek is certainly right that non-sanctioned military action is likely to meet with profound reservations of many sovereign powers and that a genuine consensus on alleviating human suffering in conflict-ridden regions is the only universally efficient solution to such problems.10 After all, multilateral responses not only stand to generate greater international support, but they are also less likely to bring "the harmony and concord of the society of sovereign states into jeopardy."11 However, such concerns should nevertheless not be taken to suggest that seeking approval by the Security Council is invariably the most reliable way for stopping atrocities. While every effort to obtain consent on intervention should be pursued, one must not forget that in the meantime, people will continue to suffer under oppressive regimes even as political leaders are attempting to unanimously decide on the proper course of action for ending their suffering. Such agreements after all not only take time, but they are also hampered by the composition of the UN Security Council itself.12 No matter how severe intra-state confrontations may be, a common understanding on how to address them will arguably not materialize for as long as not all SC members attach equal urgency to the need of foreign intervention, let alone if they believe such methods to detract from their own national interest. Accordingly one should perhaps not too hastily dismiss the possibility of unauthorized action achieving at least some successes in abating humanitarian crises as Kardas reminds us. As long as it expresses "the collective will of at least a certain part of the society of states",13 it might nevertheless succeed in receiving a sufficient degree of legitimacy among the international community,14 notably since such multilateral operations hardly pose a risk to the over-all stability of the international order.15
A second line of criticism directed against R2P not only challenges intervention outside the Security Council as such, but in particular the use of force as a measure of last resort. In that context, the very idea of military action is often seen as fundamentally inadequate and even counter-productive to reaching an international consensus on protecting civilian populations to begin with.16 However, although Petrasek has a point that R2P will require rethinking if human rights violations are to be prevented, it does nevertheless not follow from that observation that the primary reason why R2P failed to build an international consensus on Syria was mainly due to its "illusory military solutions",17 or, put differently, that the mere possibility of military operations has been chiefly responsible for Russia and China's opposition to other measures against the Syrian government.18
Admittedly, Russia and China are traditionally overly wary of external interferences in states' territorial jurisdiction.19 Above all the recent experience in Libya appears to have reinforced their concerns over R2P, given that NATO's armed intervention was widely perceived by them to having only worsened the humanitarian situation there instead of improving it.20 On that note, however, two important qualifications are in order. For one, it is perfectly legitimate to question the results of NATO's mission in Libya and to allege that regime change rather than humanitarian considerations alone informed the former's approach to that conflict.21 Importantly, however, Libya in particular was a case in which no genuine amelioration of the population's situation was de facto possible without some form of regime change, if only because those in power were after all responsible for their suffering in the first place.22 Secondly, what practical alternative did there actually exist for ending atrocities at that point? Peaceful dialogue had clearly failed to reduce violence and aggression within the country,23 and apart from NATO, no other international actors were willing to actively contribute their share to alleviating human suffering. Military approaches to intra-state aggression are certainly anything but ideal solutions, so that a peaceful and political settlement is always preferable. Yet despite its many shortcomings, the military intervention in Libya at least attempted to relieve civilian populations of their agony even if some of the ensuing actions arguably added to the latter as well.24 The only other option would have been to simply trust that eventually everything would have worked out fine even without foreign involvement, knowing that such a procedure would, however, only further have prolonged human suffering and violence.
Ultimately, it is rather widespread reluctance to question the legitimacy of established regimes by identifying them as the true sources of popular unrest and civilian distress¾and not merely the supposedly adverse effects resulting from a military execution of R2P¾which forms the actual impediment to an international consensus on Syria. From this perspective, it is simply unreasonable to assume that without the threat of armed intervention, Russia and China would more likely accept other UN measures (financial sanctions, referral to the International Criminal Court) for stopping the killing in Syria.25 The truth is that Russia and China are not only opposed to any resolutions that might lead to a forceful enactment of R2P; rather they appear unwilling to support any truly comprehensive measures against the Assad regime as a matter of principle. Such reluctance is after all evidenced by their rejection of several UN resolutions urging the Syrian government to moderate the use of force against its own civilian population,26 thus essentially confirming their apparent disinclination to place humanitarian considerations over the purported legitimacy of the Assad regime.
That R2P's inclusion of military force is not per se opposed by Russia and China is also substantiated by the fact that they did not always block UN resolutions invoking R2P ¾provided that they did not impinge on their own national interests or run counter to their axiomatic adherence to the principles of 'state sovereignty' and 'non-interference in internal affairs'.27 In particular, both countries seem to have been fine with limited military action so long as it was not aimed at ruling governments themselves or challenged their claim to national sovereignty. Accordingly, Russia and China approved interventions in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and Libya for varying reasons not primarily related to humanitarian concerns, for instance to strengthen internationally recognized President Alassane Ouattara (Côte d'Ivoire) or to contain the threat of national subversion by terrorist networks (Mali).28 In contrast, China initially opposed an intervention in Libya, but ultimately only refrained from doing so in order to preserve its relationship with several Arab countries supporting it.29 In all these incidences, it were distinctly national concerns which mainly informed their reasoning, not any categorical opposition to military operations in general. Hence the argument that without R2P's threat of military action, Russia and China might endorse less radical steps against the Assad regime is essentially unfounded, if only because, at least in Russia's case, its stability is still viewed of great strategic importance to it.30
Altogether, R2P's provisions regarding military force outside the Security Council are therefore but one aspect of Russian and Chinese aversion to a more active role of the UN in Syria, though certainly not the main one. Consequently, these provisions alone cannot effectively account for why the doctrine has thus far failed to resolve the precarious situation in Syria. If R2P has been unsuccessful, it is rather because it has not given nearly enough attention to the potential dangers involved in stolidly adhering to the idea that the non-infringement of states' national sovereignty will by default always and without fail form the most reliable guarantor of long-term international peace and stability.
Prospects for Intervention
In the final analysis, the war in Syria and the attending difficulties for implementing R2P in that conflict are less about the possibility of military operations per se than about the problematic of reconciling the supposedly incompatible norms of state sovereignty and non-interference on the one hand and the promotion of human rights on the other. In that regard, advocates of non-intervention typically refer to the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction that sought to reduce inter-state conflicts by not only prohibiting any outside interference in states' domestic affairs,31 but by moreover assuming a primacy of the state over the rights of individual citizens and thus, as Robert Jackson notes, ultimately also of the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention over human rights.32 As a result, strict compliance with these norms is seen as a fundamental prerequisite for preserving the peace and stability of the international order, in particular as interference in states' internal activities is believed to produce disruptive and destabilizing effects on the international community as a whole.33 Since non-intervention thus basically serves the dual purpose of protecting state autonomy and preventing the resurgence of inter-state conflict, it is held as a cornerstone of international stability that must be given absolute priority over any secondary concerns arising from the imperfect nature of world politics,34 including domestic human rights violations by a sovereign government.35 By permitting even only sporadic interventions on behalf of humanitarian exigencies, such practices are presumed to invariably result in a long-term erosion of the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention and, before long, thus also of the general well-being of the international community as well.36
However, it is questionable whether a blind attachment to these principles still represents the most viable approach to the multi-faceted realities of contemporary world politics. For one, the concept of states allegedly possessing some form of absolute sovereignty not only appears increasingly outmoded in light of economic globalization and the establishment of supra-national bodies, but it is also widely agreed that states have at least some minimal obligation to respect the rights of their citizens.37 Accordingly, critics above all take issue with the inherent rigidness of the principle of non-interference which ultimately does not even allow for exceptions in cases where it literally affronts the moral conscience of humanity itself.38 39
Importantly, however, it are not only moral considerations which call for greater flexibility in the application of the norm of non-intervention in international affairs. Just as its proponents routinely cite geo-political arguments for upholding that standard, notably to maintain international stability, so too may the latter, however, likewise be endangered by at times not sufficiently taking into account the necessity to protect civilian populations from state oppression. More specifically, humanitarian interventions may well have a direct bearing on the very peace and security of the international system itself, notably since by offering at least some type of redress to the pernicious long-term effects of intra-state confrontations on regional stabilities, they essentially seek to preserve the fragile structures of that system as well.40 Especially the fact that human rights abuses and civil wars are no longer only of relevance to local authorities, but may instead also affect the security and well-being of other nations ultimately adds further substance and legitimacy to the argument of not a priori excluding humanitarian intervention as a means for resolving such crises.41 Consequently, it is that fundamental interdependence between defending basic human rights and common strategic interests by way of ensuring continued international peace and stability which altogether reinforces the need for occasional interference in states' domestic activities for the sake of protecting innocent civilian populations.42
Since humanitarian interventions are, however, likewise subject to the constraints of the existing world order, their application may arguably never take on a universal form, but will have to remain selective to some degree.43 After all, they must also consider "the scale of likely outcomes of a military intervention" as Coady remarks, given that "a response proportionate to one situation may be disproportionate to another."44 Thus humanitarian interventions may not always be conducive to international peace and security, notably in places where intervening on behalf of suffering populations would almost certainly involve too grave a risk to over-all world peace and stability.45 Consequently, supporters of humanitarian interventions must clearly identify such incidences where ignoring the plight of civilian populations could also yield negative consequences for the wider international community. Serious human rights violations like genocide arguably comprise one such case, yet even greater threats to international peace and security issue in particular from such societies where civil unrest and social chaos are likely to foster threats to regional or even international stability as well.46 Accordingly, it is only by more systematically linking humanitarian intervention to such geo-political considerations that calls for actively protecting local populations may eventually reach a greater number of nations.
To that end, however, western countries first need to provide other nations with plausible justifications as to why exactly the responsibility to protect civilian populations is of such seminal significance to the proper functioning of the international system. Likewise, it must be made clear that an armed involvement in Syria would indeed only be undertaken if all other means of coercive diplomacy have wholly failed.47 Above all, they must persuade decision-makers that a regime change in Syria is not being pursued primarily for increasing western influence in the region,48 but that it would over the long run inure to the benefit of the entire international community instead.
Starting from that premise, subsequent debates must centre in particular on the modern definition of state sovereignty and on whether the Assad regime actually still has a legitimate claim to that pivotal institution. In the context of R2P, views on and respect for national sovereignty will therefore assume an indeed preeminent significance, notably as that concept is after all central to the main tenets and suppositions underlying it.49 This is especially true for the third pillar of R2P according to which foreign powers have a responsibility to interfere if local governments are themselves the primary source of violence and aggression.50 In that event, the latter's excessive use of force is basically held to nullify their arrogated right of exercising absolute sovereignty, so that an external intervention would consequently no longer constitute an assault on national sovereignty itself, but rather form part of an international attempt to return it to the very people currently suffering under those acting in its name.51
Accordingly, R2P is firmly grounded in the belief that a state's autonomy should not be construed as an end in itself, but rather "as a means for realizing the basic human rights of individuals living within the boundaries of sovereign states".52 It is that very rationale which also informs Kofi Annan's reasoning on the two concepts of sovereignty, meaning that instead of citizens being merely considered subjects of their states, it is the latter which ought to serve the needs of its people, so that any international norms first have to ensure the well-being of individual human beings as opposed to protecting those who abuse them.53 From this point of view, an outside interference would therefore only amount to an intrusion on states' internal sovereignty for failure to guarantee their citizens' basic human rights, and thus not necessarily to an infringement of their external sovereignty towards other nations as well.54 It is only when governing authorities are unfit to assure their people's safety and well-being that foreign interference becomes permissible according to R2P,55 given that it does after all not seek to weaken a state's over-all autonomy and territorial integrity, but only to rectify "the relationship between the government and the governed and the way the internal aspect of sovereignty is constructed."56 In such cases, a foreign intervention may therefore be the only way for not only providing vital goods and services to native populations,57 but for likewise restoring the internal aspect of their national sovereignty in the process.58
It is precisely such inability of the Syrian government to afford its people elementary freedoms and acceptable socioeconomic conditions which has virtually forfeited all by itself any pretensions of the Assad regime to further represent the interests of the Syrian state.59 Yet its blatant dereliction of the duties vis-à-vis its own citizens ultimately warrants foreign involvement not only for the sake of reinforcing Syria's internal sovereignty. For since the country's descent into civil war also stands to lastingly affect its relations with other political entities, there exists an even greater need to consider the erosion of its internal sovereignty also in light of the growing threats which that development could before long spell for the international community as well. More concretely, Syria is a supreme example of the fact that civil strife may not only be a danger to the peace and stability of the concerned states themselves, but ultimately also to those of other trans-regional actors and/or the international order on the whole.60 As Glennon observes, it is simply no longer in keeping with the realities of modern-day international relations to persistently hold on to the assumption "that the core threat to international security still comes from interstate violence."61 Hence it is critical that political leaders recognize that the forces which could severely undermine the viability and efficiency of the international order may nowadays just as easily originate from intra-state violence as they once did from cross-border confrontations.62
Above all where sovereign authorities are unwilling to peacefully resolve internal problems, foreign interventions may ultimately not only be required, but arguably even legitimate for eliminating any threats emanating from within that state to the peace and security of the wider international community.63 As Bull has remarked, the norm of non-interference may after all not always reflect the realities of the time, so that it should accordingly be subject to at least some degree of modification in order to better meet the requirements of the situation in question.64 Similarly, Hoffman further notes that there may well be "cases in which the effects of non-intervention might be worse than those of intervention",65 so that continued reluctance to act against those responsible for intra-state violence could ultimately rather harm than protect international peace and stability.
Since the Syrian crisis arguably constitutes such a threat to international peace and security, a more assertive role of foreign powers in that conflict may indeed be indispensable for keeping its inimical, trans-national implications at bay. Hence every effort must be made to persuade other countries that an intervention would accordingly not only serve western self-interest, but that failure to do so could eventually entail even greater risks to the over-all peace and stability of the international community.66 By re-shifting attention from chemical weapons and moral imperatives to such dangers, western countries in particular need to convince other nations that an intervention would thus ultimately protect common strategic interests as well, notably through avoiding a potentially disastrous state failure, stifling the spread of transnational terrorism and, arguably just as importantly, discrediting the perversive notion of unpunished state aggression in the 21st century.
[...]
1 Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 35-65.
2 See in particular Philip Cunliffe (ed.), Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (New York: Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2011).
3 Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty", The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 6:1 (2002), p. 92.
4 Alex de Waal, "No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention: Why We Need to Rethink How to Realize the 'Responsibility to Protect'", Harvard International Review, December 2007. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26062.html [accessed 23 May 2014]; Aidan Hehir, Humanitarian Intervention: an Introduction (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 121; "An idea whose time has come¾and gone?", The Economist, 23 July 2009. http://www.economist.com/node/14087788 [accessed 23 May 2014].
5 David Petrasek, "R2P¾hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", Open Democracy, 13 September 2013. http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/david-petrasek/r2p-%E2%80%93-hindrance-not-help-in-syrian-crisis [accessed 21 May 2014].
6 Humanitarian intervention shall be defined as the involvement of foreign powers in the internal affairs of sovereign nation-states that need, however, not necessarily signify the use of military force, but may instead primarily comprise other coercive and non-forcible means such as international sanctions or material/financial assistance for ending human suffering within their territorial boundaries. See David J. Scheffer, "Towards a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention", University of Toledo Law Review, Vol. 23. (1992), pp. 253-274.
7 ICISS, "The Responsibility to Protect", Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (New York: ICISS, December 2001). Document available at: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [accessed 21 May 2014]; United Nations World Summit Outcome Document 2005 (New York: United Nations, 2005). http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf [accessed 23 May 2014].
8 Cristina G. Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and Human Rights (New York: Taylor and Francis e-library, 2010), p. 110; Aidan Hehir and Philip Cunliffe, "The responsibility to protect and international law", in: Philip Cunliffe (ed.), Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (New York: Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2011), pp. 84–100; Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677) (New York: United Nations, 2009). http://www.unrol.org/files/SG_reportA_63_677_en.pdf [accessed 22 May 2014].
9 6 Şaban Kardaş, "Humanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach", A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace, Vol. 2:1 (January 2013), pp. 27-29.
10 David Petrasek, "R2P¾hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", op.cit.
11 Hedley Bull, Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 195.
12 C.A.J. Coady, "The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention", THE USIP Peaceworks No. 45 (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2002), p. 26.
13 Kardaş, p. 28.
14. Coady, p. 26
15 Kardaş, p. 28.
16 Justin Morris, "Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum", International Affairs, Vol. 89:5 (September 2013), p. 1272.
17 Petrasek, "R2P¾hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", op.cit.
18 Ibid.
19 Christopher Holland, "Chinese Attitudes to International Law: China, the Security Council, Sovereignty and Intervention", NYU Journal of International Law and Politics Online Forum (2012), pp. 1-44.http://nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Christopher-Holland-China-the-Security-Council-and-Intervention.pdf [accessed 23 May 2014]; Vladimir Baranovsky, "Humanitarian Intervention: Russian Perspectives", Pugwash Occasional Papers, Vol. 2:1 (January 2001). http://www.pugwash.org/reports/rc/como_russia.htm [accessed 23 May 2014].
20 15 See minutes of 6627th UN Security Council Meeting. "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto by Russian Federation, China", United Nations Security Council 6627th Meeting (New York: United Nations, 4 October 2011). http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10403.doc.htm [accessed 21 May 2014].
21 Alan J. Kuperman, "A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reassessing NATO's Libya Campaign", International Security, Vol. 38:1 (Summer 2013), pp. 113-115.
22 On the Human Rights situation in Libya under Muammar Gaddafi, see in particular: Morayef Heba, Truth and Justice Can't Wait: Human Rights Development in Libya and Institutional Obstacles (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).
23 Chris McGreal, Harriet Sherwood, Nicholas Watt and Ian Traynor, "Libyan revolutionary council rejects African Union's peace initiative", The Guardian, 11 April 2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/libyan-rebels-reject-peace-initiative [accessed 26 May 2014].
24 "Ban Ki-moon alarmed over rising civilian toll in Libya", The Telegraph, 12 August 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8696961/Ban-Ki-moon-alarmed-over-rising-civilian-toll-in-Libya.html [accessed 21 May 2014].
25 Petrasek, "R2P¾hindrance not a help in the Syrian crisis", op.cit.
26 "Russia, China block second draft of resolution on Syria", The Voice of Russia, 10 June 2011. http://voiceofrussia.com/2011/06/10/51517343/ [accessed 7 April 2014]; "China and Russia veto UN resolution condemning Syria", BBC News, 5 October 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15177114 [accessed 7 April 2014]; Steve Gutterman, "Russia won't back U.N. call for Syria's Assad to go", Reuters, 27 January 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/27/us-syria-russia-idUSTRE80Q0I620120127 [accessed 7 April 2014]; Neil MacFarquhar and Anthony Shadid, "Russia and China Block UN Action on Crisis in Syria, The New York Times, 4 February 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/world/middleeast/syria-homs-death-toll-said-to-rise.html?pagewanted=1&hp&_r=0 [accessed 7 April 2014].
27 Minutes of 6627th UN Security Council Meeting, op.cit.
28 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1975 on Côte d'Ivoire (New York: United Nations, 2011). http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1975%282011%29 [accessed 21 May 2014]; United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 on Mali (New York: United Nations, 2012). http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085%20%282012%29 [accessed 21 May 2014].
29 Saibal Dasgupta, "China opposed to UN resolution on Libya", The Times of India, 18 March 2011. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/China-opposed-UN-resolution-on-Libya/articleshow/7736989.cms?referral=PM [accessed 7 April 2014].
30 Azuolas Bagdonas, "Russia's Interests in the Syrian Conflict: Power, Prestige, Profit", European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, Vol. 5:2 (December 2012), pp. 55-77.
31 R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 113-114.
32 Robert H. Jackson, "Armed Humanitarianism", International Journal, Vol. 48:4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 582-583.
33 Kardaş, p. 25, 27; Hedley Bull, Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 85.
34 Stanley Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", in: Stanley Hoffmann (ed.), The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), p. 12; Lori F. Damrosch, "Introduction", in: Lori. F. Damrosch, Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflict (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p. 8.
35 Kardaş, p. 27.
36 Nicholas Wheeler and Justin Morris, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the End of the Cold War", in: Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (eds.), International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 166.
37 Coady, pp. 21-22.
38 Adam Roberts, "Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection and Impartiality in a Policy Vacuum", Adelphi Paper 305 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 20.
39 Kardaş, p. 29; Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", p. 22.
40 Kardaş, p. 25.
41 Francis Koi Abiew, "Assessing Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Period: Sources of Consensus", International Relations, Vol. 14:2 (August 1998), p. 62.
42 Albrecht Schnabel, "Humanitarian Intervention: A Conceptual Analysis", in: S. Neil MacFarlane and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (eds.), Peacekeeping at a Crossroads (Clementsport: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p. 27.
43 Ayoob, pp. 85-86.
44 Coady, p. 27.
45 For instance in Chechnya or Tibet. Coady, p. 25., 27.
46 See Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post–Cold War Era (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 161–164.
47 Withdrawal of existing diplomatic support, termination of trade relationships, economic sanctions, etc.. See Coady, pp. 28-29, and in particular Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).
48 Holly Yan, "Syria allies: Why Russia, Iran and China are standing by the regime", CNN, 30 August 2013. http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iran-china-russia-supporters/ [accessed 22 May 2014].
49 Bellamy, pp. 19-66.
50 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and For All (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), p. 105.
51 Kardaş, p.35; Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (A/63/677) (New York: United Nations, 2009), pp. 7-8. http://www.unrol.org/files/SG_reportA_63_677_en.pdf [accessed 22 May 2014].
52 Kardaş, p. 31.
53 Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty", The Economist, 16 September 1999. http://www.economist.com/node/324795 [accessed 27 May 2014].
54 Kardaş, pp. 31-32.
55 Paragraph 139 of United Nations World Summit Outcome Document 2005, op. cit.
56 Kardaş, p. 32.
57 Ayoob, p. 97.
58 Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, pp. 7-8.
59 See Human Rights Watch World Report 2010 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), p. 555. http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2010 [accessed 2 June 2014]; Amnesty International Report 2009: Syria. http://report2009.amnesty.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/syria [accessed 23 May 2014]; Suzanne Saleeby, "Sowing the Seeds of Dissent: Economic Grievances and the Syrian Social Contract's Unravelling", Jadaliyya, 16 February 2012. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4383/sowing-the-seeds-of-dissent_economic-grievances-an [accessed 23 May 2014].
60 See Stanley Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", in: The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), pp. 28–29.
61 Michael J. Glennon, "The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78:3 (May/June 1999), p.2.
62 Glennon, pp. 3-5.
63 Schnabel, "Humanitarian Intervention", p. 27; Abiew, "Assessing Humanitarian Intervention", p. 62.
64 Hedley Bull, Intervention in World Politics, p. 187.
65 Hoffmann, "Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention", p. 20.
66 Glennon, pp. 4-5.