Wittgenstein’s use of the word “hinge” for intrinsic certainties, which are forming an unconscious, unjustified foundation of our acting, has spurred an intense discussion in contemporary epistemology. In the build-up of secondary literature about Wittgenstein’s late collection of reflections that his literary executors published under the title On Certainty, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock plays an important role with her book “Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty” (2005) and a number of other publications.
In her book, she has placed particular weight on the concept of hinges, ascribing to them eight particular properties and vigorously denying them the status of being propositions. Other epistemologists have responded and articulated deviating views.
The debate is still going on and this paper attempts to explain, first and foremost, what Wittgenstein wrote about hinges and the concepts interrelated to them, such as doubt, certainty, foundation, and acting. Then I’ll summarize, and partly criticize Moyal-Sharrock’s position. I shall argue that her accentuation of the nonpropositionality of hinges is a bit exaggerated, a point of view that is also confirmed by some counter-arguments by Annalisa Coliva, who suggests a conciliatory resolution of the conflict. Finally, Moyal-Sharrock gets the last word, though not entirely convincing.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Wittgenstein’s Hinges in On Certainty
Wittgenstein on Hinges
Wittgenstein on Doubt
Wittgenstein on Certainty
Wittgenstein on Foundation
Wittgenstein on Acting
3. Moyal-Sharrock’s Interpretation of Hinges
4. Annalisa Coliva on Hinges
5. Conclusion
6. References
Objectives & Research Topics
This paper explores Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of "hinge certainties" as presented in his late work, On Certainty. It aims to clarify the relationship between these foundational beliefs and human action, while critically examining the competing interpretations of this concept by philosophers Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Annalisa Coliva, particularly regarding the propositional nature of these hinges.
- Analysis of Wittgenstein’s aphorisms on doubt, certainty, and foundation.
- Examination of the "hinge" as an unconscious, unjustified basis for human action.
- Critique of Moyal-Sharrock’s "non-propositional" interpretation of hinges.
- Comparison with Annalisa Coliva’s perspective on the rule-like, normative character of hinges.
Extract from the Book
Wittgenstein on Hinges
The term “hinge” is explicitly used in only three of the 676 paragraphs of On Certainty: OC 341: That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. OC 343: But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. OC 655: The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I. e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn."
When I try to formulate in my own words what Wittgenstein is saying in these three paragraphs, it boils down to the following: We are using some propositions that are exempt from doubt. They can be metaphorically compared to the hinges of a door, because they provide a firmly established basis upon which metaphorically “the door can turn”, and from which we can search for answers to our questions and our doubts. Those propositions are not at all to be mistaken for mere assumptions, which we use because we cannot thoroughly investigate everything. They are in fact necessary foundations of our reasoning. Mathematical propositions are generally seen as being incontestable and immovable. Other things can be disputed, but we can firmly rely on mathematical propositions to settle the dispute (if the dispute can at all be settled by means of mathematics).
If that were all Wittgenstein has to say about hinges, one could hardly consider that concept to have heavily influenced epistemology. But is that really all he says about hinges? Yes and no – he does not use the word hinge any further, but in his use of the concepts of doubt, certainty, foundation, and action we find the same basic ideas reiterated, and deepened, several times.
Summary of Chapters
1. Introduction: Presents the relevance of Wittgenstein’s "hinge" concept in contemporary epistemology and outlines the argumentative structure regarding Moyal-Sharrock’s and Coliva’s interpretations.
2. Wittgenstein’s Hinges in On Certainty: Provides a thematic reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s aphorisms, organized by the concepts of hinges, doubt, certainty, foundation, and action.
3. Moyal-Sharrock’s Interpretation of Hinges: Examines Moyal-Sharrock’s claim that hinges are non-propositional, nonepistemic, and enacted animal certainties.
4. Annalisa Coliva on Hinges: Discusses Coliva’s critique of Moyal-Sharrock, arguing that hinges possess a propositional content while playing a normative, rule-like role.
5. Conclusion: Summarizes the ongoing debate between the scholars and acknowledges the enduring significance of Wittgenstein's work for the philosophy of knowledge.
6. References: Lists the academic literature and primary sources utilized in the paper.
Keywords
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Hinge Propositions, Epistemology, Doubt, Foundation, Acting, Moyal-Sharrock, Annalisa Coliva, Nonepistemic Certainty, World-Picture, Propositional Attitude, Skepticism, Rules of Grammar, Doppelgänger.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core subject of this paper?
The paper examines the philosophical concept of "hinge certainties" found in Ludwig Wittgenstein's final work, On Certainty, focusing on how these foundational beliefs underpin human action and knowledge.
What are the central themes discussed?
The central themes include the nature of doubt, the definition of certainty, the foundation of belief systems, and the non-propositional versus propositional status of foundational "hinges."
What is the primary research goal?
The goal is to analyze Wittgenstein’s own thoughts on hinges and to critically evaluate the debate between Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and Annalisa Coliva regarding whether these hinges should be classified as propositions.
Which methodology is employed?
The author uses a reconstructive and comparative method, analyzing original aphorisms from On Certainty and contrasting the secondary interpretations provided by Moyal-Sharrock and Coliva.
What does the main body of the paper cover?
The main body covers the systematic categorization of Wittgenstein's views on hinges, followed by a detailed critical review of Moyal-Sharrock’s "non-propositional" account and Coliva’s response regarding their normative, rule-like function.
Which keywords define this work?
Key terms include Wittgenstein, Hinge Propositions, Epistemology, Foundation, Doubt, Certainty, and World-Picture.
How does the author view Moyal-Sharrock's position?
The author finds Moyal-Sharrock’s account well-supported but argues that her strict insistence on the non-propositionality of hinges may be exaggerated, as Wittgenstein himself frequently refers to them as propositions.
What is the significance of the "Doppelgänger" argument?
The "Doppelgänger" argument is a term introduced by Moyal-Sharrock to address identical sentences that function as both empirical propositions and normative rules, intended to deflect criticisms that hinges look too much like propositions.
- Quote paper
- Dkfm., BA Karl-Heinz Mayer (Author), 2014, Wittgenstein and Moyal-Sharrock on Hinge Certainties, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/273347
