Abbot et al divide the term of legalization into three criteria to create a model with which
Political Scientists and International Lawyers could be able to measure and differentiate
different legal statuses of international agreements. The division into the variables obligation,
precision and delegation shall provide the ability to score international institutions on the
different characteristics according to whether the characteristic may or may not be possessed.
Through the scoring of “High” or “Low” in each of the three categories, a possible outcome
of eight different forms of international institution legalization is given. Starting from Row I,
in which all three categories are scored with “High” and which is referred to with the term
“Hard law”, Table 1 (p.406) shows all the possible combinations, ending with row VIII which
presents the softest form of commitments. The authors identify the edges of the graphic as
ideal types, on one side the hard law and its full legislation, on the other side an anarchical
state, still organized by institutions as sovereignty and diplomacy, but operated by principles
as the balance of power or spheres of influence. For each stage Abbot et al state examples that
might fit into the actual category. [...]
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Methodology and Model Analysis
2.1 Evaluation of Institutional Examples
2.2 The Role of Time in Legalization
3. Critical Review of the Model
3.1 Limitations of the Scoring System
3.2 Hierarchies and Interdependence of Dimensions
4. Conclusion
Objectives and Research Focus
The primary objective of this essay is to analyze the model of legalization proposed by Abbot et al. by determining at which point on the spectrum of international legal rules these institutions begin to exert a significant, measurable impact on state decision-making processes.
- Examination of the three core variables: obligation, precision, and delegation.
- Assessment of the "High" versus "Low" scoring system for institutional categorization.
- Critique of the model's static nature regarding the factor of time.
- Investigation into the potential hierarchy and interdependence between the three dimensions.
- Evaluation of empirical examples such as the Helsinki Accords and the World Bank.
Excerpt from the Book
When states use legal forms – Essay on Abbot et al’s model of The Concept of Legalization
Abbot et al divide the term of legalization into three criteria to create a model with which Political Scientists and International Lawyers could be able to measure and differentiate different legal statuses of international agreements. The division into the variables obligation, precision and delegation shall provide the ability to score international institutions on the different characteristics according to whether the characteristic may or may not be possessed. Through the scoring of “High” or “Low” in each of the three categories, a possible outcome of eight different forms of international institution legalization is given. Starting from Row I, in which all three categories are scored with “High” and which is referred to with the term “Hard law”, Table 1 (p.406) shows all the possible combinations, ending with row VIII which presents the softest form of commitments. The authors identify the edges of the graphic as ideal types, on one side the hard law and its full legislation, on the other side an anarchical state, still organized by institutions as sovereignty and diplomacy, but operated by principles as the balance of power or spheres of influence. For each stage Abbot et al state examples that might fit into the actual category.
The authors state that, “to come from a commitment to a rule, discourse is needed” (402). Legal discourse is understood as discourse on text, purpose, history, interpretation admissible exceptions, applicability to situations and facts. It changes the way in how to argue a topic. The following shall provide a discourse which determines in which row of the model one can start to speak of a significant impact on state choices. “Significant” in this context shall be understood as shaping a decision situation in such a way, that the actual outcome is different than it would be without the existing institution. In other words, how legal must a legal rule be to shape state decisions?
Chapter Summaries
1. Introduction: This chapter introduces the theoretical model of legalization developed by Abbot et al., focusing on the variables of obligation, precision, and delegation.
2. Methodology and Model Analysis: This section tests the model against various international institutions to determine the threshold at which legal frameworks influence state behavior.
3. Critical Review of the Model: The final section evaluates the structural weaknesses of the model, specifically the vagueness of the scoring system and the neglect of time-based institutional evolution.
4. Conclusion: The summary provides final insights into how the model could be improved by integrating more nuanced scoring and acknowledging the hierarchy between legalization dimensions.
Keywords
Legalization, International Law, Obligation, Precision, Delegation, Hard Law, Soft Law, State Choices, Institutionalism, Helsinki Accords, World Bank, International Agreements, Governance, Sovereignty, Policy Impact
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this essay?
The essay explores the model of legalization by Abbot et al. and investigates at what point international legal rules transition from non-binding frameworks to instruments that significantly impact state decision-making.
What are the central dimensions used to measure legalization?
The model evaluates institutions based on three key dimensions: the level of obligation, the precision of the rules, and the degree of delegation to third parties.
What is the primary research question?
The paper asks where, along the spectrum from "high legalization" to "low legalization," legal rules begin to demonstrably shape and alter the choices states make.
Which scientific methodology is applied here?
The author uses a qualitative discourse analysis approach, testing the model's theoretical categories against real-world examples such as the G7, the Helsinki Accords, and the World Bank.
What topics are covered in the main body?
The main body examines the validity of the authors' "High/Low" scoring, analyzes the Helsinki Accords as a case study for time-dependent institutional influence, and offers a critique of the model's static structure.
How is the model defined by the author?
The author identifies the key attributes of the model as its ability to score international institutions and categorize them into a typology ranging from "Hard Law" to anarchical states.
How does the author characterize the Helsinki Accords?
The author argues that while the Accords lacked immediate binding status, their long-term influence on human rights and the development of the OSCE suggests that the model fails to capture the "factor of time."
Why does the author critique the "High/Low" scoring system?
The author finds the binary scoring too vague and proposes that a more detailed, multi-stage scoring system would be necessary to avoid complexity while increasing accuracy.
Does the author believe the three dimensions are independent?
No, the author argues that the dimensions are likely interdependent and that a hierarchy exists, where obligation may dominate the impact of the other categories.
- Quote paper
- Timo Dersch (Author), 2012, When states use legal forms – Essay on Abbot et al’s model of The Concept of Legalization, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/206095
