The Essay discusses the relevance of Wittgensteinian arguments to the contemporary externalism-internalism debate on mental states as argued by William Child in his 2006 essay "Wittgenstein’s externalism: Context, self-knowledge and the past."
Child's central claim considered in the essay at hand is that certain types of abilites (such as mastery of a language and calculating) require self-knowledge of same sort, while others (such as swimming) do not - a point that has also been made by Michael Dummett.
Drawing on case studies provided by Hans J. Markowitsch (including the famous patient E.D.), it is argued that this claim does not hold against the indication of empirical evidenve and the dissociation of memory systems and therefore the impact of Wittgenstein's thoughts on the debate remains unproven.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction and Structure
2 The Philosophical Debate on States of Mind
2.1 The Wide Context: Externalism vs Internalism
2.2 The Narrow Context: William Child and Wittgenstein’s Externalism
3 Introducing a Neuro-Psychological Evidence
3.1 Patient E.D.: A Case Study
3.2 The Dissociation of Memory Systems in Neuro-Psychology
3.3 The Translation of Terminologies
4 Discussion
4.1 Relevance of the Evidence
4.2 Impact on the Debate
5 Summary
Research Objectives and Themes
This essay explores whether the ability to perform complex tasks, such as speaking a language, necessarily requires self-knowledge of that ability. By challenging the externalist argument—which suggests that self-knowledge is a prerequisite for such skills—the author uses neuro-psychological evidence from amnesia patients to demonstrate that linguistic capability can persist independently of conscious self-awareness.
- The relationship between self-knowledge and specific cognitive abilities.
- Externalism versus Internalism in the philosophy of mind.
- Neuro-psychological dissociation between episodic and semantic memory.
- Critical analysis of William Child’s interpretation of Wittgenstein.
- The role of empirical evidence in philosophical debates.
Excerpt from the Book
3.1 Patient E.D.: A Case Study
In 1987, at the age of 45, E.D. suffered a traumatic brain injury after falling off the back of a horse. He was diagnosed with a severe retrograde and a mild anterograde amnesia. Four years later, MRI scans showed “damage of both temporal poles and the lateral portion on the right prefrontal cortex” (Markowitsch et al., 1993, P. 1). Remarkably, the memory loss affected primarily the episodic or autobiographical domain of the memory and only slightly the semantic memory. He was tested in various behavioral branches (among others attention, concentration, and IQ) an proved to be average or slightly below compared to five healthy subjects of similar age and educational background (ibid.). The further investigations concentrated on the possible dissociation between semantic and episodic memory: “As an example...our patient when questioned about the location of Mount Kilimanjaro answered that it was situated in Tanzania. He did not remember that he had climbed its peak shortly before his accident.” (ibid.) The most relevant part to the subject at hand is expressed in the following quote.
“Another example [for the dissociation] is that he had been able to understand and to speak Italian on an advanced level before the trauma, but denied having any significant knowledge of the Italian language. As the principal examiner (PC) is a native Italian speaker, it was possible to test this statement by requesting the patient to follow some instructions given in Italian. The patient executed all verbal instructions correctly so that at least he understood this foreign language and could therefore respond to it at the level of priming.” (Markowitsch et al., 1993, p. 4)
Although this case study is relatively brief, it shows two findings that are relevant to the externalist claim that “special” abilities require some sort of self-knowledge in order to be applied. First, a general dissociation between semantic knowledge and episodic knowledge that can be considered self-knowledge (for a proper discussion of the consistence of psychological terms with the concepts applied in the philosophical debate, see section 3.3). Secondly and most importantly, the quoted passage of the 1993 paper suggests that this dissociation also holds for linguistic knowledge, as E.D. was apparently able to respond correctly to instructions given in Italian although he did not have any self-knowledge of his ability!
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction and Structure: This chapter defines the research goal of examining the intersection between internalist philosophy and empirical neuro-psychology regarding the necessity of self-knowledge for ability.
2 The Philosophical Debate on States of Mind: The author reconstructs the externalist position, focusing on William Child’s interpretation of Wittgenstein and the requirement of a "right" context for abilities.
3 Introducing a Neuro-Psychological Evidence: This section presents the case study of patient E.D. and the scientific background of memory systems to challenge previous philosophical assumptions.
4 Discussion: The author evaluates the impact of the empirical findings on the externalist argument, concluding that self-knowledge is not a strict necessity for all "special" abilities.
5 Summary: The final chapter recapitulates the findings and suggests that empirical research provides a robust counter-argument to the discussed philosophical premises.
Keywords
Externalism, Internalism, Self-knowledge, Wittgenstein, Philosophy of mind, Memory systems, Semantic memory, Episodic memory, Patient E.D., Cognitive ability, Linguistic ability, Neuro-psychology, William Child, Mental states, Logical argument.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the primary focus of this work?
This essay investigates the philosophical claim that possessing a "special" ability, such as speaking a language or calculating, necessitates having self-knowledge of that ability.
What are the core thematic fields covered?
The work bridges the gap between modern philosophy of mind—specifically the debate between externalism and internalism—and neuro-psychological research regarding memory dissociation.
What is the central research question?
The core question is whether the empirical fact that one can exercise an ability without conscious awareness of having learned it invalidates the philosophical requirement of self-knowledge for that ability.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The author employs a philosophical analysis combined with an evaluation of empirical case studies, specifically leveraging clinical neuro-psychological evidence from patients with amnesia.
What topics are discussed in the main body?
The main body reconstructs externalist arguments from authors like William Child, introduces the case of patient E.D. to show memory dissociation, and discusses the implications of this evidence for philosophical definitions of ability.
Which keywords best characterize the research?
The research is best characterized by terms such as externalism, self-knowledge, memory systems, philosophy of mind, and linguistic ability.
How does the case of patient E.D. specifically challenge externalism?
E.D. was able to follow instructions in Italian despite having no conscious memory of having learned the language. This suggests that the "special" ability to use language can be independent of the self-knowledge that externalists argue is required.
What distinction is made between "practical" and "special" abilities?
Externalists distinguish between "practical" abilities (like swimming, which might not require self-knowledge) and "special" abilities (like calculating or language mastery, which they claim require conscious self-knowledge and rule-following).
What is the author's final conclusion regarding this debate?
The author concludes that empirical evidence refutes the necessity of self-knowledge for "special" abilities, thereby undermining the specific externalist claim that a subject must know they possess an ability to exercise it.
- Quote paper
- Jan Dirk Capelle (Author), 2011, The Relation of Ability and Self-Knowledge, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/195197
