In the year 2011 piracy is omnipresent in the Somali Basin and it has begun to spread all over the Indian Ocean. According to figures from 21 October 2011 provided by the International Maritime Bureau´s Piracy Reporting Center, 13 vessels and 249 hostages are currently held by Somali pirates. A total of 208 incidents were reported, 24 of which were hijackings .
In fact, Somali piracy is nothing new. It only appears to be new because Somalia´s geostrategic position happens to be along one of the major Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). Had that not been the case and had western shipping not been affected, the world had taken little notice of the problem.
Until 2008 the pirates almost refrained from killing hostages and were exclusively after ransom. Younger incidents, starting with the Le Penant in 2008 show a change in attitude. Pirates have become more brutal, starting to torture and kill, and there have been demands to release fellow pirates from prisons rather than to deliver ransom, such as 2010 in the Asphalt Venture case. Although such can still be considered piracy, this element brings back memories of hijackings by extremist groups such as the 1977 Landshut case or the 1985 Achille Lauro incident.
The essay explains the general Somali piracy problem and why it is so contrary. Piracy is always a regional phenomenon and never a global threat, which goes back to the condition that it is – and has to be – always linked to the political situation on land. That said, selective investments as suggested by some cannot work in the Somali environment as a solution because the understanding of business in this part of the world differs from ours.
Others say that the only viable way is to treat all entities in Somalia equally. The current essay supports his view, although that seems the more difficult way. Much if not all depends on the overall stability of Somalia but the maritime threats should be addressed more effectively today, which is why the essay also discusses possible naval approaches. May it be capacity building on land or fighting pirates at sea – if the coalition does not act quickly, the initiative will most certainly be taken over by private security companies, which is partly already the case today.
In any way, with the right methods and means in place it should be able to eradicate Somali piracy. But it will take time, which most of the affected individuals do not have.
Table of Contents
I. Somalia Today
II. Pirate Modus Operandi
Target Selection
Attack and hijacking
Negotiations
III. International Initiatives
IV. Looking at Solutions
V. Conclusion: Eradication Is Possible With The Right Methods And Means
Objectives and Topics
This essay explores the persistent problem of Somali piracy, examining the interplay between political instability on land and security threats at sea, while evaluating the effectiveness of current international naval and capacity-building responses.
- The causal link between Somalia's "Failed State" status and piracy.
- Detailed breakdown of the pirate modus operandi: selection, attack, and negotiation.
- Evaluation of international counter-piracy initiatives like Operation ATALANTA and the Djibouti Code of Conduct.
- Analysis of proposed solutions, including naval blockades and capacity building.
- The debate regarding the nexus between piracy and organized crime or terrorism.
Excerpt from the Book
II. Pirate Modus Operandi
Onshore, the pirates typically live in camps or small villages. Somalia does not offer rich forested hinterland and inlets like other piracy hot-spots, which might be one of the reasons why the Somali pirates are more interested in ransom than in stealing and storing cargo (UNODC 2010). Supply and logistics are arranged in sufficient ways, and traditional social structures help maintaining a resilient network. Weapons, radios, mobile phones, GPS technology and other equipment find their way across the Kenyan border or through the Red Sea and also through the Indian Ocean to the mostly unpatrolled Somali coast (UNODC 2010). From there, the goods are transported to the markets or directly to the pirate camps.
Most pirates are between 20 and 40 years old (Eichstaedt 2010, UNODC 2010) and come from different backgrounds. Some used to be fishermen, some used to belong to the militia or still do, and others even claim to have ties with Somali politicians. Most participate voluntarily, others are forced to. In 2010/2011 there is a trend to be observed that pirate crews consisted not only of Somalis but allegedly individuals from Yemen and elsewhere in the Arabian Sea. Since quite some time now, the attack radius reaches from Seychelles to the island of Minicoy, situated towards southwestern India.
Regardless of location, the modus operandi can be divided into three phases: target selection; attack and hijacking; and negotiations.
Summary of Chapters
I. Somalia Today: Analyzes the socio-political context of Somalia as a "Failed State" and how this collapse creates the foundation for pirate activities.
II. Pirate Modus Operandi: Details the operational techniques of pirates, ranging from their logistical networks on land to their tactical approaches at sea and negotiation processes.
III. International Initiatives: Provides an overview of the various international efforts, including naval missions and legal frameworks like the Djibouti Code of Conduct, to combat the threat.
IV. Looking at Solutions: Critically evaluates different strategic approaches, such as naval blockades and targeted regional support, while addressing the limitations of existing interventions.
V. Conclusion: Eradication Is Possible With The Right Methods And Means: Synthesizes the findings, arguing that while eradication is feasible, it requires long-term commitment on land rather than just temporary military fixes at sea.
Keywords
Somalia, Piracy, Failed State, Maritime Security, Ransom, Operation ATALANTA, Djibouti Code of Conduct, Naval Strategy, Counter-piracy, Organized Crime, SLOC, Maritime Surveillance, Capacity Building, Regional Stability, Indian Ocean
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the fundamental focus of this publication?
The work examines the phenomenon of piracy in the Somali Basin, analyzing its origins, current operational methods, and the efficacy of international attempts to mitigate the threat.
What are the primary thematic areas covered?
The themes include the relationship between state failure and maritime crime, the tactical evolution of pirate attacks, and the geopolitical challenges of international naval cooperation.
What is the central research question?
The core inquiry is whether the eradication of piracy is possible, and specifically, what methods and means are required to achieve this goal effectively.
Which scientific methods are employed in the text?
The author utilizes a combination of qualitative geopolitical analysis, review of international legal frameworks, and evaluation of security strategies used by naval coalitions.
What topics are discussed in the main body?
The main body covers the political instability in Somalia, the phases of pirate operations (target selection, attack, negotiation), and the various international counter-piracy initiatives like NATO and EU missions.
Which keywords best describe this research?
Key terms include Somali piracy, maritime security, regional stability, counter-piracy strategy, and international maritime law.
How does the author view the "piracy-terrorism" connection?
The author suggests this connection should be viewed with caution, noting that while there are indicators of financial overlap, pirates generally avoid terrorism as it would threaten their primary business model.
Why are traditional "western armada" approaches considered insufficient?
The text argues that military presence alone is a reactive measure that does not address the root causes of instability on land, likening it to a "bottomless pit" if not combined with broader long-term structural support.
- Quote paper
- Frederic Ischebeck-Baum (Author), 2010, Is it ever possible to eradicate Piracy?, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/180675
