This paper explores Wittgenstein’s concept of silence as articulated in his statement "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.", and examines how silence functions as a communicative act and a boundary of language. It also investigates the role of inner dialogue as a distinctive form of language that encompasses more than spoken words. The aim is not to prove a specific hypothesis, but to reflect on the philosophical implications and potential meanings surrounding these ideas.
Contents:
Introduction
Silence
Mentalese
Dialectics
Silence and Meaning in Social Context
Counterpoints
Conclusion
Bibliography
Introduction
This paper explores Wittgenstein’s concept of silence as articulated in his statement "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”, and examines how silence functions as a communicative act and a boundary of language. It also investigates the role of inner dialogue as a distinctive form of language that encompasses more than spoken words. The aim is not to prove a specific hypothesis but to reflect on the philosophical implications and potential meanings surrounding these ideas.
I am keenly aware that silence is not a substitute for spoken language. To elucidate the reasons behind my chosen topic, let me share some personal insights. My introverted nature during my early years made communication within an extroverted Middle Eastern society particularly challenging. I had to adopt commonly used words, often compromising my understanding of them, to engage effectively with others. Reading Wittgenstein, I recognize my own challenges in translating internal images into the smaller signs of the alphabet.
Relocating to Germany, I relearned the true meaning of words, which enhanced my ability to articulate thoughts clearly and be understood. German grammar, being relatively algorithmic and analytical, aligns with a cultural norm of directness, contrasting with the Middle Eastern custom of word choice aimed at maintaining respect. In the Middle Eastern context, one learns to read the spaces between words, reconstructing broader narratives from single utterances. This practice sharpens the ability to discern intentions behind spoken words, making languages like Azerbaijani and Russian intuitive, where the actual words hold less importance.
This lifelong recognition of the phenomena of silence and unspoken context has driven me to delve deeper into my surroundings and question them. Consequently, I focus on the often-overlooked spaces between words.
These reflections stem from my personal experiences and insights gained in various countries, complemented by my psychological background and professional work.
Silence
7. "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.
This profound statement from Wittgenstein’s philosophy, rather than merely concluding the “Tractatus” in its seventh proposition, suggests much more. It signals the point where silence begins to operate within our inner reflections on what has been said, fostering an inner dialogue as we strive to comprehend this profound position. Wittgenstein’s choice to place this statement on the last page, surrounded by a vast expanse of white space, elevates it to an artistic act. The starkness of the word “silence” (schweigen) invites us to “see” the workings of Wittgenstein’s thought processes, urging us to look inward and explore the roots of a deeper, more expansive form of language—the inner language. This echoes his proposition 5.6, where he suggests, "The limits of language show themselves in the impossibility of describing the facts which correspond to the words."
Throughout the Tractatus, Wittgenstein explores the limits of language and what can be meaningfully expressed. In proposition 4.115, he asserts,
"The limits of my language mean the limits of my world."
This idea culminates in proposition 6.54, where he states,
"My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them."
This process of recognizing the limits of language prepares the ground for the ultimate silence he prescribes. Of particular interest is proposition 6.41, which I wish to emphasize:
“The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value and if there were, it would be of no value. If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental. It must lie outside the world.”
The recognition of realms beyond our grasp presents a profoundly intriguing concept.
Quine, while not directly echoing Wittgenstein's metaphysical concerns, presents an aligned perspective in his critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction and the notion that meaning can be completely captured by linguistic or empirical means. Quine's skepticism underscores that the distinctions we make in language and knowledge are not inherent in the world but are products of our conceptual schemes. This suggests that our pursuit of meaning, much like Wittgenstein’s search for value, cannot be fully anchored in empirical reality alone.
Both philosophers highlight the limitations of empirical descriptions in capturing deeper truths:
1. Quine asserts that our conceptual frameworks shape our understanding of the world, indicating that meaning involves a deeper, ineffable process.
In Wittgenstein’s view, silence respects the limits of language by acknowledging what cannot be said, paralleling Quine’s notion that our conceptual schemes limit what we can meaningfully discuss. This exploration reveals how Wittgenstein and Quine challenge us to recognize the profound limitations of language, urging us to look beyond spoken words to grasp the essence of value and meaning.
In this endeavor, I aim to delve into the origins of spoken language as rooted in inner dialogue.
Wittgenstein perceived the world in its entirety as an all-encompassing frame, embodying the truth or logical fact. The concept of pictureness in reality, to me, represents his form of inner dialogue, which extends beyond spoken words to include the mind’s eye’s visual constructs, particular melodies and voices, memories, emotions, and more, called forth by specific situations.
In proposition 2.063, he states,
“The total reality is the world,” and in 2.1,
“We make to ourselves pictures of facts.”
Here, Wittgenstein depicts experienced reality, which evokes a resemblance to Descartes' metaphor of the projector. This, in my interpretation, signifies an intentional focus directed toward the experienced scenery—a scenery that encompasses far more than mere words.
Wittgenstein also discusses the limits of representation, noting that a picture cannot represent its own form of representation.
Here we shift to the representational forms, where my attention was drawn to the term of “representing”, so I questioned a concept:
If
2. 174 "A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.”
Can these representational forms be seen as an image of a significantly more complex outside reality, parallel to the broader concept of inner dialogue, from which language emerges? Wittgenstein mentions the inexpressible. This means for me, that we cannot describe anything outside our microcosm, as long we cannot stand outside ourselves. We will reuse the same terms with other signs and symbols or make it more complicated and regressed. However, the "external reality" attains a mystical character due to its lack of terms, as articulated in proposition 6.41.
If we take the likelihood of human and God as an allegory to the role of language that designs the real structure of the world, can we depict a situation analytically with one or more examples? Would an example of “Superman is Clark Kent” or “a=b” be enough to understand the meaning or sense? Can only one or an amount of humans represent God? Thus, language does not serve as a perfect representative but rather as an endeavor to articulate larger compositions through words, sentences, and texts.
Mentalese
Jerry Fodor's seminal work, The Language of Thought (1975), presents a compelling theory that posits thinking occurs in a mental language, often referred to as "mentalese." Fodor argues that the mind operates using a system of internal representations that resemble a language, complete with its own syntax and semantics, independent of any natural language. This hypothetical internal code enables the brain to process information, solve problems, and generate thoughts.
Mental representations in the internal language are symbolic structures akin to sentences, consisting of components corresponding to parts of speech such as subjects and predicates. Just like natural languages, mentalese has rules governing the structure (syntax) and meaning (semantics) of these representations, facilitating intricate cognitive processes.
Fodor critiques behaviorism, which denies the existence of internal mental states, by underscoring the necessity of mental representations for explaining cognitive functions. He argues that behaviorism cannot account for the complexity of human thought and language use. Additionally, Fodor addresses connectionism, which models cognitive processes as networks of simple units without symbolic representations. He contends that while connectionist models explain certain aspects of learning and perception, they fall short in accounting for higher-level cognitive processes requiring symbolic manipulation, such as language and abstract reasoning.
The distinction between mentalese and natural spoken languages highlights the limits of linguistic expressibility, resonating with Wittgenstein's notion that some aspects of reality and experience lie beyond the reach of spoken language. Fodor's emphasis on mentalese suggests that many nuances of thought are inherently untranslatable into natural language, acknowledging the limitations of expressibility through spoken words.
Here, I am reminded of Wittgenstein’s concept of private language, where he suggests that each person's beetle in the box may appear differently. I wonder if we are focusing too much on the beetle itself and neglecting the significance of the boxes.
Dialectics
By connecting mental states to public language, Wittgenstein disputes the idea that we can have a purely introspective understanding of our own mental phenomena. Traditional psychology and philosophy often maintained that introspection offered direct access to one’s mental states. However, Wittgenstein contends that such states derive their meaning only through their expression in public, rule-governed language games. This marks a substantial departure from the introspective approaches advocated by earlier thinkers like Descartes and William James.
William James’s notion of the "stream of consciousness" supports the idea that introspective silence is fundamental to our understanding and formation of language. James conceptualized consciousness as an ongoing flow of thoughts, with introspection enabling us to uncover the origins of our linguistic expressions. This uninterrupted flow encompasses not only verbal thoughts but also non-verbal elements like images, emotions, and sensory experiences, which can subsequently be translated into spoken language.
Quine rejects the notion of ineffable truths, arguing that all meaning and knowledge are empirically grounded and subject to scrutiny and revision. He emphasizes a holistic, empirical approach, dismissing a separate domain for the transcendental. Quine asserts that our conceptual schemes shape our understanding, suggesting that meaning is not intrinsic but constructed through our interactions with the world and language. This perspective implies that meaning is flexible and context-dependent, rooted in empirical reality rather than an abstract realm.
Wittgenstein emphasizes the necessity of acknowledging the limits of language and the role of silence when language falters. Contrarily, Fodor's theory of mentalese posits that our internal cognitive language can articulate and process concepts beyond the capacity of natural language. This internal language transcends the limitations of spoken language, capturing the intricate nuances of thoughts and experiences that Wittgenstein might suggest are best left to silence.
I seek to agnostically integrate all perspectives into a broader understanding of language and silence.
Silence and Meaning in Social Context
In my exploration of linguistic theory and philosophy, I've come to recognize the profound significance of silence as an underlying element that often holds the actual truth behind spoken words. In diverse cultural backgrounds, silence assumes an even greater role, functioning both as a space where words are not taken too seriously and, conversely, as a realm where words must be used with extreme precision and economy.
Silence, often perceived as the mere absence of sound, emerges as a profound communicator, transcending the capabilities of spoken language. It possesses the mysterious ability to convey meanings and truths independent of gestures or other bodily signs. In moments of silence, we sometimes achieve a deep understanding of one another, relying on intuition and contextual awareness rather than words.
Consider the silence observed in mourning rituals. This silence speaks volumes about collective grief and respect, allowing participants to share a deep emotional connection that words would dilute. Similarly, in meditation, silence facilitates an intimate dialogue with the self, revealing inner truths and fostering profound personal insights that spoken language could not encapsulate. In interpersonal relationships, silence can convey complex emotions. A shared silence between friends or lovers can signify a deep, mutual understanding, where words are unnecessary. This silent communion often transcends verbal communication, highlighting the depth of their bond. In artistic contexts, silence or deliberate pauses in literature, music, and visual arts can evoke powerful emotions and provoke contemplation. These silent spaces invite audiences to engage more deeply, allowing for a richer, more nuanced experience that words alone might fail to deliver.
Silence, therefore, becomes a medium through which the ineffable is communicated, a space where intuition and context replace the obstacle of words, allowing for a deeper, more profound understanding between individuals.
Silence, though often seen as respectful, can have negative social and cultural impacts. The "silent treatment" is a form of emotional manipulation that leads to feelings of rejection and diminished self-esteem in relationships. In hierarchical societies, enforced silence can suppress dissent and inhibit innovation, as seen in traditional Japanese workplaces.
Silence in the face of injustice perpetuates harmful systems and marginalizes vulnerable populations, with historical and contemporary examples illustrating this complicity. In mental health, cultural stigmas encourage silence, preventing individuals from seeking help and exacerbating their conditions.
In education, cultural norms that discourage questioning authority can hinder critical thinking and intellectual growth, as seen in certain Asian contexts.
These examples show how silence can lead to suppression, complicity, and a lack of communication, revealing its complex role within social and cultural frameworks.
Counterpoints
While silence is significant in communication and introspection, several counterpoints challenge its prominence. Silence, though powerful, is limited in conveying detailed information and complex ideas, essential in fields like law and medicine. Silence can lead to ambiguity and misinterpretation, lacking the clarity of verbal cues. It can also increase anxiety and be perceived as exclusion. The meaning of silence is context-dependent and may fail to express certain emotions effectively. Thus, balancing silence with verbal communication is necessary for clarity and understanding.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the interplay between silence and spoken language offers a richer, more nuanced comprehension of value and meaning. By recognizing the limits of language and the significant role of silence, we gain a deeper appreciation for the unspoken truths that reside beneath our words. Silence, as both an end and a means, bridges the gap between the expressible and the inexpressible, enhancing our inner dialogue and our understanding of the world. This reflection on silence highlights its indispensable role in effective communication and the pursuit of knowledge, urging us to look beyond the spoken word to uncover the deeper layers of meaning that shape our experiences and interactions.
Bibliography
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Basil Blackwell, 1953.
Quine, W.V.O. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960.
Quine, W.V.O. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Philosophical Review, 1951.
Fodor, Jerry A. The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press, 1975.
Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy. Hackett Publishing Company 1993
James, William. The Principles of Psychology. Henry Holt and Company, 1890.
Grice, H.P. Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press, 1989.
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- Quote paper
- Narmin Khalilova (Author), 2024, The Ineffable Truth. Exploring Silence, Inner Dialogue, and the Foundations of Language, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/1490823
