Social reality changes as a consequence of the communication and understanding of information. It involves perception and attention, communication and act, strategizing and feedback, much as how a living cell communicates with its environment . The organism perceives changes in the environment and responds, thus adapting to the new situation. It uses no strategy. It reacts instinctively and changes only as much as necessary, no more, no less. It does not use more or less energy than needed. It observes its environment, protects itself, and strives to develop.
“Combined armed warfare” involves the coordination of various tools, resources, and technologies. It also necessitates the processing of large amounts of information inferred from its environment to use a sufficient amount of energy, no more, no less. It aims to achieve the goal set within a given timeframe. Owing to the versatility of new technologies, having satisfied the need for an increased amount of information, the effectiveness of defensive and offensive acts has improved significantly (among those who already have such knowledge and technology.)
The present study is also a response to the methodological toolkit used by some widely recognized “knowledge transfer” centers, such as the “US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences: A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,” a technical review by George W. Lawton and Douglas Macpherson.
Based on intensive secondary research, the study provides a communication theory description of “combined armed warfare” and the basic principles of its training. After the global defense capabilities within an organization have been identified, their development and coordination at the local level are justified and timely. The above text by the US Army Research Institute reveals that defensive potential can be developed after the knowledge system organized at a high level has been interpreted and in-depth research has been done on national forces.
Abstract...5
1. Knowledge patterns...5
2. Closed-order combined tactical acts...5
2.1 Combined tactical acts...5
2.1.2 Tactical acts and everyday patterns...7
2.1.3 The Increasing Importance of the Battlespace Operating System in...7
Closed-Order Acts
2.2 Introducing the notion of so-called closed-order tactical acts...8
3. The concept of a knowledge model and the linking of knowledge centers...8
3.1 The importance of research-training in basic skills...9
4. The communication theory of problem-solving...9
4.1 The appreciation of inherent (inherited) knowledge...9
5. Standardized knowledge...10
5.1 The hidden power of knowledge patterns...10
5.2 Knowledge patterns and the recognition of patterns in the environment, application techniques...11
Conclusion...12
Bibliography...13
Abstract
Social reality changes as a consequence of the communication and understanding of information (to borrow from the sociological theory of Niklas Luhmann, 1996.) [1] It involves perception and attention, communication and act, strategizing and feedback, much as how a living cell communicates with its environment (Maturana-Varela, 1979). [2] The organism perceives changes in the environment and responds, thus adapting to the new situation. It uses no strategy. It reacts instinctively and changes only as much as necessary, no more, no less. It does not use more or less energy than needed. It observes its environment, protects itself, and strives to develop.
“Combined armed warfare” involves the coordination of various tools, resources, and technologies. It also necessitates the processing of large amounts of information inferred from its environment to use a sufficient amount of energy, no more, no less. It aims to achieve the goal set within a given timeframe. Owing to the versatility of new technologies, having satisfied the need for an increased amount of information, the effectiveness of defensive and offensive acts has improved significantly (among those who already have such knowledge and technology.)
The present study is also a response to the methodological toolkit used by some widely recognized “knowledge transfer” centers, such as the “US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences: A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,” a technical review by George W. Lawton and Douglas Macpherson. [3]
Based on intensive secondary research, the study provides a communication theory description of “combined armed warfare” and the basic principles of its training. After the global defense capabilities within an organization have been identified, their development and coordination at the local level are justified and timely. The above text by the US Army Research Institute reveals that defensive potential can be developed after the knowledge system organized at a high level has been interpreted and in-depth research has been done on national forces.
Keywords
Knowledge patterns, combined armed warfare, closed-order tactical acts, self-referential systems, training methodology, Battlefield Operating System (BOS) [4]
1. Knowledge patterns
Man observed how a flaming tree branch gave him physical safety. He did so to stay alive, to be capable of recreating the flames under any circumstance, and to be able to make fire himself, which then brought about profound changes in civilization. In the modern era, this question has been the focus of scientific debate: could Homo sapiens neanderthalensis make fire, or did he merely guard a fire that had already been lit? The archaic human named after the valley of the River Düssel may already have had the knowledge that Homo sapiens, with its fine jawline and pushing north, undoubtedly possessed (discovering this subspecies marks the beginning of paleontology).
This example furthers a nuanced grasp of the practical benefits of knowledge replication. As the knowledge of making fire spread, it helped man’s prospects for life at a deeper level.
How do we organize the information that we base our decisions on, and how does routine help us make this information readily accessible? We can make our decisions on an emotional or rational basis, or with reference to something transcendent. [5]
2. Closed-order combined tactical acts
2.1 Combined tactical acts
Bearing social, political circumstances, and technological infrastructure in mind, military organizations try to use the most effective tactics under changing conditions, while making optimal use of the resources available. Combined warfare involves the strengthening combination of effects. An adversary faces such intense effects that his usual decision-making processes are no longer applicable. The simultaneous employment of combined arms in real time is similar to a compensatory strategy. The more impact a military force has in time and space, the more likely it is that the enemy system will collapse. From the age of combined warfare onwards, qualitative military advantage triumphs over the traditional mass of military force (or in other words, quantitative advantages). This can be neatly summarized in the phrase, “the better defeats the more numerous.” [6]
The core values of combined armed warfare are leadership, information management, training and practicing, planning, execution, and successful improvisation. Combined warfare, albeit complex, is characterized by unity: optimally, it is a coordinated tactic (offensive, defensive, involving security and assistance) executed in a well-defined order with advanced tools and based on knowledge patterns. [7] Combined armed warfare is a general theory that synchronizes several skills in order to achieve the desired success. [8] The diversified and coordinated application of different arms dates back to World War I. “We can see this today in Ukraine, where the Russian Armed Forces have failed to implement CAW.” (Combined Arms Warfare, which is no different from Combined Arms Tactics.) [9]
In the ever-changing environment of combined arms warfare, a main dividing line was drawn by Bernard Brodie, [10] one of the most influential strategic thinkers of the twentieth century. “Brodie in his subsequent writings proposed that the USA put a greater reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons, as ‘a second line of insurance’ between absolute deterrence and all-out thermonuclear war.” The stability of the bipolar world order then depended on innovations in information warfare. Information society and the consequences of digitalization made the so-called “military-technical revolution” (a term coined by Soviet theorists in the 1980s) [11] possible, and this in turn upset the seemingly unassailable position and power, in the Cold War constellation, of the states that had nuclear arms.
Compensatory strategies propose the use of technological superiority (qualitative advantages) to overcome the traditional military mass (i.e. quantitative advantage). As noted above, the better defeats the more numerous. The new configuration of the force, previously described by indicators regarding quantity, has become knowledge-based. The tools, with recognition of the value of capital invested in innovation, have become exceptional defensive and adaptive destructive weapons through the use of knowledge patterns and their adaptation into complex strategies.
In combined tactical warfare, communication and information allocation are preconditions for command and control. When coordinating several simultaneous sequences of events, a leader’s room for maneuver is limited. In addition to ensuring the synchronic outplay of multiple events (i.e. the coordination of different assets), the spectrum of command decision making is narrowed (in time and space), with each event building on the others and bringing the surrounding space into operation. Naturally, the leader in charge of the group continues to bear the greatest burden. There are fewer opportunities for improvisation, and the costs of the operation are multiplied while the speed of execution is accelerated. The cost of operations, furthermore, is multiplied several times over due to the combined forces deployed.
2.1.2 Tactical acts and everyday patterns
We have born witness to an epochal and paradigmatic change in information technologies, mobile devices, and data collection processing infrastructure. With this shift, combined warfare has been able to combine more and divergent capabilities, tools, and behaviors.
Due to the unpredictable upheavals of environmental change (which can mean rapid, complex, and therefore unpredictable changes), long-term planning is hardly possible. Yet in spite of the turbulence created by environmental factors, tactical elements (for near-term events) can still be accurately arranged. (In the course of implementing tactics, unexpected events may arise, which, in our experience, the confident problem solver is able to resolve using his or her individual knowledge or knowledge patterns in an improvised way.
At the same time, the more predictable a certain situation is, the more advantageous one’s acts based on corrected knowledge patterns can be as opposed to those who have no plans based on valid information.
Tactical acts differ strikingly from everyday situations. “Self- efficacy,” to use the term coined by Albert Bandura (1977), is a personal belief that one is capable of solving a given task with which one has been presented. It cannot be measured, nor can it be equated with anything analogous. It consists of social acts that are grounded in socialization.
2.1.3 The Increasing Importance of the Battlespace Operating System in Closed-Order Acts
The goal of the Battlespace Operating System (BOS) is to coordinate processes through information-data communication, support synchronized deployment of different combat tools, and ensure deployment in a scheduled manner. The seven BOS (Battlespace Operating System) systems listed in the literature increase in value and thus importance in “combined warfare” because of their usefulness in the synthesis of information. They function as a “self-referential system” (Social System, Luhmann, Niklas, 1996). The system and its environment react to each other, and the system changes its structure only in response to information that could potentially influence its operations. Through a continuous connection (with the BOS communication center), the efficiency of its reactions, its preparation, and its reaction time are influenced by the size of the observable field, the predictive potentials of its instruments, its calculations, and its data processing procedures.
It is a system that is capable of observing itself from the outside, responding in principle to external factors much as a living cell, organism, or social subsystem would respond (Niklas Luhmann, “Self-Organization and Autopoiesis”). [12] The complexity of the system and the utilization of its components depend on the need for current information. For example, capability of Manoeuvre BOS, Ground Based Air Defence BOS, Command and Control BOS, etc. to synthesize information can be combined, and even the full capabilities of all seven components can be utilized. [13]
2.2 Introducing the notion of so-called closed-order tactical acts
During “closed-order tactical acts,” the order and nature of (relevant) events do not change much in the environment surrounding the acts – there are no surprises. Once certain signs of the environment have been recognized, the sequence of movements previously rehearsed can be easily performed and the knowledge planned to be used can be mobilized, thereby reducing the potential for error. This is because after several failures, the systematization of this knowledge and the renewal of its system led to reinterpreting knowledge in cycles, and thus acts can be close to optimal (which is, in fact, not interpretable).
A planned series of acts comes to an end when the resources allocated for the task are withdrawn. We will refer to these as “closed-order tactical acts.” One must define what is meant by the end of a given tactical sequence because this is the only way in which to measure and analyze the success or failure of a completed sequence, as well as the effectiveness of the use of the resources allocated.
The efficacy of information as tiny elements of reality providing the basis for knowledge patterns is inevitable as soon as we realize that the reason for someone falling behind or making a mistake is having had to improvise, given the his or her lack of the necessary knowledge when facing such a problem for the first time.
3. The concept of a knowledge model and the linking of knowledge centers
Knowledge patterns are versions of learned knowledge made unique through practice. They are linked to a lot of other knowledge. They are organic, and so that can also have emotional contents. One is faster and more confident in a critical situation if this knowledge is immediately available. Its uniqueness does not diminish its professional value, it does not lose its precision. It is also integrated with many existing skills, and it can enable one to identify and resolve critical situations more quickly and effectively. These models are flexible, change constantly, can be improved, and provide confidence, which is a prerequisite for adaptation and leadership. Capabilities and training are described in Training and Analysis Center Exceptional Training Documentation of the US Army Combined Arms Centers (CAC). [14]
After identifying a problematic situation, the actor instantly recalls and utilizes this set of knowledge that provides the basis for professional act. An environment that is changeable to a tolerable level should not pose a problem either, because the actor needs to have alternative knowledge patterns for the entire series of acts and – having reached the end of one phase of an operation – choose the one most suitable for continuing and successfully completing the mission.
Therefore, strategic precautions and self-defense are central to knowledge patterns. Other functions include building trust and creating cohesion in the group (CAC – Steward the Profession – TCP OBJ 1 – People).
This yields overall benefit: reduced loss of manpower and less need for retraining. The effectiveness of deployment increases as a consequence of the circularity of experience.
3.1 The importance of research-training in basic skills
Another institutional system, the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (or DEVCOM), [15] attempts to shed light on what lies behind the visible phases of knowledge, thereby predicting future trends. The U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command, or DEVCOM, not only raises the interest of the scientific community but involves this community in its work, invites its members to share knowledge, and integrates this into its objectives. Essential research programs like the initiatives carried out by DEVCOM show that communication plays a vital role in the accurate determination of navigation, position, and timing, which becomes particularly in combat situations. [16]
4. The communication theory of problem-solving
Observation is a type of operation (with a predetermined goal), and the observer, in the words of the aforementioned Niklas Luhmann, is a “system.” [17] In Luhmann’s view, the smallest analyzable unit through which social reality is changed is “communication.” In the process of communication, the observer functions as a “system” and is separated from other actors in its environment by his purpose, adjusting his skills to specific tasks. Luhmann’s theory is holistic, its scope has no limits and is expanded by its creativity. [18] In our present-day, modern society competition, constant contest, and adaptation are mostly accepted as challenges of daily life.
Observers monitor their environment for what may influence their acts and functioning. Self-referential systems maintain an ongoing relationship with their environment (via communication, despite their operational closedness), interpreting and responding to any change. It is through knowledge, the traditional application of knowledge, that communication gains its power to change social reality.
4.1 The appreciation of inherent (inherited) knowledge
In the wake of the rapid development of information technologies in a “risk society,” selecting group members is becoming an increasingly complex process, while “inherent” capabilities and experience (the knowledge of previously used knowledge patterns) are more and more appreciated, and the complexity and duration of training courses are increasing. In a “turbulent environment", new or constantly changing emergency situations require different capabilities (knowledge that adapts). As a result, training now focuses on the acquisition of new, constantly changing versions of the knowledge patterns analyzed above. Institutions specializing in research on educational strategies, such as ARI (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Project Number 2O363007A793), [19] are forced to monitor emerging threats in real-time and propose modifications to training. [20]
5. Standardized knowledge
The ability to acquire the skill of comprehending complex acts is now an expectation. The first and foremost task of commanding is to create synergy among the four main activities of operations [21] and to optimize the quantity and duration of using both human resources and infrastructure. This involves four key functions, eight warfighting functions, and twenty-four components, within which the task of “operation” is subdivided into ten subsystems. So far, no research has been carried out on this and experts do not refer to it as a knowledge pattern, despite the fact that the cohesion of a group is ensured by the members’ mutual knowledge and thereby their synchronized acts, and ten of the twenty-four components termed “in Operation” do name the knowledge patterns utilized. As mentioned earlier, the knowledge linked to these patterns is shared knowledge: coordinated Maneuver, Action on Perception and Operational Environment, Combat support, and Contact (Close contact), which have been developed and perfected for a long time and both accelerate events and reduce chances of error.
5.1 The hidden power of knowledge patterns
“Combined armed warfare” is at its most complex in the decision-making and preparatory phase. The leader of the group is the “client” ordering information, while the group is responsible for the execution, which is a complex task even after diverse information has been simplified into instructions. (The functional sub-systems of command are Command, Command Support, and Intelligence, which are further broken down into Command, Headquarters and Staff techniques, Communication and Information System, Support to HQs, Intelligence, Geography, and Meteorology.) The leader carries out the task of the final selection and interpretation of this complex set of information on the spot, in the context of the problem situation. Based on the nature of the information received, he instantly knows whether events proceed as normal or exceptional occurrences are to be expected. The latter happens when the information received from one of the BOS subsystems [22] does not fit into the (usual) knowledge pattern predicting a positive outcome (Possible source: Action on Perception and Operational Environment, or Intelligence). The leader then immediately starts preparations for an expected event. This well illustrates how knowledge of the rehearsed forms leads to a high level of effectiveness during deployment. Any new information that does not fit into the usual pattern is rightly interpreted as a threat. As Albert Szent-Györgyi famously said, “Research is to see what everybody else has seen, and think what nobody has thought.” This is the hidden power of knowledge patterns.
Knowledge patterns (both practical and emotional) undoubtedly ensure stability, but their implementation comes with great responsibility: the turning points of a sequence of acts require quick and adaptive response from the participant in charge, under the pressure of time and responsibility.
5.2 Knowledge patterns and the recognition of patterns in the environment, application techniques
The hidden power of knowledge patterns is the capability to recognize incongruous elements during the observation phase of operations. This does not come directly from knowledge patterns but from the recognition of unusual elements. (Naturally, patterns and the features of the environment are closely related, so in a certain situation, it is one single sequence of acts that is likely to be nearly optimal.) Recognition is immediately followed by preparations for defense or counter-attack. The end of each phase of an operation is frequently marked by new information, and the action sequence is then continued based on other knowledge patterns. In this case, as well, the operations unit uses all the available resources to counter the destructive force of the attack expected. This marks the end of another phase. After recognition and analysis, communication is used for controlling, mobilizing resources, and then giving instructions in the form of simplified commands, followed by the placement, organization, and coordination of resources, up until meeting the stated objective (which may be anything, as long as the leadership can keep to the plans).
Conclusion
Knowledge patterns, which impact our objectives through communication, are utilized as a set of problem-solving tools in an environment that can be both observed and recognized through patterns. “Closed-order combined tactical acts” are a specific version of warfare that is foreseeable and happens at a predetermined time. The fact that these tactical acts are of a closed-order needs to be stressed because this is how the capital invested in the planned execution of a series of acts can be measured: they start at the beginning of a maneuver and finish at the end, upon the withdrawal of the resources allocated to the task. It is at this endpoint that the cost of success or failure can be determined, and whether the combined use of arms, human resources, and information technologies – coordinated in time, movement, and force – were in proportion to the objectives that have been set. Knowledge patterns also minimize the speed of acts and the possibility of error. Standardized and “trade mark” knowledge, practiced until becoming unique knowledge, is used and utilized by a small group of participants who have managed to survive critical situations by relying on so-called “knowledge patterns” when assessing of situations and throughout their acts. The present study discussed the combined nature of the acts, the communicative infrastructure of tactical coordination, and the knowledge patterns providing the basis of the acts, and explained the processes with knowledge and its changing forms. Yet, history teaches us that though rich in tools, an army cannot be successful without the right knowledge, experience, and tactical skills.
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[1] Niklas Luhmann, Social System. Stanford University Press, 1996, p 345. ISBN: 9780804726252
[2] Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living With Francisco Varela . Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1979. ISBN 90-277-1015-5
[3] George W. Lawton and Douglas Macpherson, “U.S. Army Research Institute For The Behavioral And Social Sciences: A Field Operating Agency Under the Jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,” 1997. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA328076.pdf
[4] The division commander coordinates the mission and synchronizes activities in time, space, and purpose. See Angelo Mirabella, “Analysis of Battlefield Operating System (BOS) Statements for Developing Performance Measurement,” Technical Report 1062.
[5] Sociologists of systems theory divide modern society into professional subsystems, based on their communicative character. The attention of the system is devoted entirely to the environment, thus approximating the highest “still realistic” operational efficiency. See Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, Stanford UP, 1996, p 301. ISBN: 9780804726252.
[6] National Security. For insiders. By insiders. Benjamin Jensen and Matthew Strohmeyer : The Changing Character Oo Combined Arms. May 23, 2022.
[7] https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/impact-non-kinetic-effects-modern-warfare-decisive-factor-texeira-q5yfc
[8] The differentiated subtasks include Offensive Support BOS , Ground Based Air Defence BO S, Mobility & Survivability BOS , Command & Control BOS , Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance BOS , Combat Service Support BOS , and Manoeuvre BOS ) in Angelo Mirabella, “Analysis of Battlefield Operating System (BOS) Statements for Developing Performance-Measurement,” U.S. Army Research Institute, Army Project Number 2O363007A793. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA328076.pdf
[9] Tom Simoens, “Combined Arms Warfare as the Key to Success on the Contemporary Battlefield?” 2022. https://tdhj.org/blog/post/combined-arms-warfare-success-battlefield/ . Accessed: 20 May 2024.
[10] Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton UP, 2007.
[11] “Andrew Marshall said this assessment would explore whether a major shift in the character of military competitions was under way – what Soviet writers had referred to as a ‘military-technical revolution.’ It was not clear to him, however, that such an assessment was possible. The consensus of the group was that the issue was too important not to address, despite the prospective difficulties” – 8 January 1991. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.,The Military-Technical Revolution. A Preliminary Assessment , Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002.
[12] Niklas Luhmann, “Self-Organization and Autopoiesis,” Emergence and Embodiment: New Essays on Second-Order Systems Theory , edited by Bruce Clark et al., translated by Hans-Georg Moeller and Bruce Clarke, Duke University Press, 2021, pp. 143-156.
[13] “Introduction to the Battlespace Operating System,” The Cove , 7 July 2017. https://cove.army.gov.au/article/introduction-battlespace-operating-systems-bos Accessed: 4 May 2024.
[14] “Mission and Vision,” United States Army – Combined Arms Centers (CAC). (Centers of Excellence, Branch Schools, Non-Branch Schools. The system has the function of training and knowledge transfer on an international level as well.) The leading training and research organization of the US Army develops well-functioning tactical and strategic elements, and works on the leadership development program of the army as well. https://usacac.army.mil/ Accessed 12 October 2023.
[15] https://arl.devcom.army.mil/who-we-are/
(The U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command, DEVCOM)
[16] https://arl.devcom.army.mil/what-we-do/qis-pnt/
[17] Niklas Luhmann, Einführung in die Systemtheorie, Heidelberg, Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag, Zweite Auflage, 2004, p. 132.
[18]
[19] https://ari.altess.army.mil
[20] Angelo Mirabella, “Analysis of Battlefield Operating System (BOS) Statements for Developing Performance Measurement,” Technical Report 1062, U.S. Army Research Institute.
[21] The four joint functions are Command, Achive information Superiority, Operate, and Sustain.
[22] Angelo Mirabella, “Battlefield Operating System (BOS) Statements for Developing Performance-Measurement,” U.S. Army Research Institute, Army Project Number 2O363007A793. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA328076.pdf
- Quote paper
- Krisztian Dombradi (Author), 2024, The Communication Theory of Combined Arms Warfare, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/1488108