War as an Instrument of Policy examines the principles of war and how they may apply to the method of decision making in the higher realms of government when military and civilian leaders meet. It begins with an exploration of the emergence of a new kind of limited war beginning with the Vietnam conflict and discusses the principles of war along with typical military theory and strategy to clearly provide an understanding of the thought processes and actions behind the conducting of a war. Two contemporary examples, the Gulf War in 1990 and the South African invasion of Angola in 1987, provide the opportunity to examine the process of military decision-making on every level in these conflicts. Finally, methods of successfully and carefully employing a military methodology of decision making to capitalize on the success of war are suggested.
Abstract
War as an Instrument of Policy examines the principles of war and how they may apply to the method of decision making in the higher realms of government when military and civilian leaders meet. It begins with an exploration of the emergence of a new kind of limited war beginning with the Vietnam conflict and discusses the principles of war along with typical military theory and strategy to clearly provide an understanding of the thought processes and actions behind the conducting of a war. Two contemporary examples, the Gulf War in 1990 and the South African invasion of Angola in 1987, provide the opportunity to examine the process of military decision-making on every level in these conflicts. Finally, methods of successfully and carefully employing a military methodology of decision making to capitalize on the success of war are suggested.
Introduction
War is the continuation of policy by other means and it has been replaced by its opposite: policy, which is the continuation of war by other means. But these two formulas are, formally, equivalent. They both express the continuity of competition and the use of alternately violent and non-violent means towards ends which do not differ in essence. (Aron, 1966).
War is a means of achieving an end, a weapon which can be used for good or for bad purposes. Some of these purposes for which war has been used have been accepted by humanity as worthwhile ends: indeed, war performs functions which are essential in any human society. It has been used to settle disputes, to uphold rights, to remedy wrongs: and these are surely functions which must be served... One may say, without exaggeration, that no more stupid, brutal, wasteful or unfair method could ever have been imagined for such purposes, but this does not alter the situation. (Eagleton, 1948).
Many political realists point out that the common basis of policy in both peace and war, namely the quest for power, makes them two inseparable parts of the same social activity. Blainey (1973) contends that the causes of war and peace dovetail into one another: “War and peace are not separate compartments. Peace depends on threats and force; often peace is the crystallization of past force.” Or formulated most succinctly: “In a system of power politics, there is no difference in kind between peace and war”. (Schwartzenberger, 1950).
Conceptual Clarification
War is a “political act by means of which States, unable to adjust a dispute regarding their obligations, rights or interests, resort to armed force to decide which is the stronger and may therefore impose its will on the other” Sorel (1912).
According to Von Clausewitz (1911) war as “an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will”, and elsewhere he emphasized the continuity of violence with other political methods: “War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means.”
Johnson (1935) defines war as “armed conflict between population groups conceived of as organic unities, such as races or tribes, states or lesser geographic units, religious or political parties, economic classes”. According to Bernard (1944), war is regarded as approximately sociological because it does not limit the armed conflict to political units but includes any type of population units which is capable of resorting to arms as a method of settling disputes. Perhaps the definition is too general, since it does not specify the duration of the conflict or the magnitude of the conflicting parties. As it stands this definition could be made to include riots.
Policy is a deliberate system of principles to guide decisions and achieve rational outcomes. A policy is a statement of intent, and is implemented as a procedure or protocol. Policies are generally adopted by a governance body within an organization.
A policy is a set of ideas or plans that is used as a basis for making decisions, especially in politics, economics, or business.
Policy is a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions.
War as an Instrument of Policy
War as an instrument of policy has become something of a truism, regardless of how well the complexities of the idea are understood. The ubiquity of the idea is often mistakenly presented as representing the totality of his theorizing on war. Its most common modern usage is as a prescriptive device—one especially suited to modern liberal democracies in which the subordination of the military to civilian control is deemed a vital component of a properly constituted state, especially in the nuclear age. The complexities of the concept are often diluted in the interest of doctrinal precision and pedagogical clarity.
War contains an “element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.” It is perhaps ironic that what appears to be a morally repugnant statement, because the suggested view resorting to force as an “entirely routine extension of unilateral state policy”. War, in a practical and moral sense, ought to be subject to policy; otherwise, it becomes “something pointless and devoid of sense.”
The concept of war as an instrument of policy is straightforward. The use of military force is a means to a higher end—the political object. War is a tool that policy uses to achieve its objectives and, as such, has a measure of rational utility. So, the purpose for which the use of force is intended will be the major determinant of the course and character of a war. As Clausewitz explains, war “is controlled by its political object,” which “will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and makes its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.” This idea is clearly reflected in his work where he discusses distinctly rational chains of action that establish a purpose to be achieved, a military aim that serves the purpose, and the selection of means appropriate to attain the aim.
War is a tool that policy uses to achieve its objectives and, as such, has a measure of rational utility. This perspective does not necessarily minimize the importance of military considerations; war “is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means.” Policy should understand the capabilities and limits of the instrument it employs. The crucial point is that military actions are ultimately geared towards political objectives; military concerns “will never do more than modify them.”I bid, 1999.
According to Clausewitz war’s subordination to policy by no means entails complete control. Subordination, “does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant.” Just as subordinate commanders can disobey orders and follow their own inclinations, so too can war in relation to policy. Policy, he states, “will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them.” Clausewitz was clear in his assertion that, even though the political aim will remain the first consideration, because the “prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it,” war can often escape the control of its user. Ibid, 98-99.
War involves living forces rather than static elements; thus, it can change quickly and significantly in ways the logic of policy may not expect.” Echevarria,1994.
The concept of war’s subordination to policy causes us to focus on an important aspect of war relating to the extent to which, from the perspective of individual groups involved, there is a constant, albeit messy, interaction between the ends and means at every level. This weaves a thread of reason throughout the whole, even if it may appear to be absent in some conflicts. Ceasing the analysis here would ignore a central idea. Indeed, mistaken interpretations often stem from a failure to explore beyond policy into the more complex realm of politics.
War, therefore, is an act of policy.” Policy is presented as an intrinsic element of the political situation, essentially arising out of it. War as an instrument of policy is presented almost nowhere as independent from the idea of war as a continuation of political intercourse. From an objective viewpoint, war, as a whole, emerges from a political situation between belligerents and propels the central conflict without suspending the initial intercourse. It is natural to switch abruptly to the policy perspective, because the political situation is the interaction between the belligerents’ individual policies. War is a continuation of the political situation and an instrument employed by the groups that comprise the situation.
Politics as a process is irrational; thus, if war is a continuation of that process, it too is irrational. Although belligerents in war generally act according to their objectives, they do so in a complex, multilateral, and interactive environment pervaded by uncontrollable external political dynamics and chance occurrences. War is shaped by not only the reasoned objectives and decisions of each actor, but also the complex nature of the political dynamics that their interaction produces, which are inherently unpredictable and irrational.
The Political Logic of War
To state that war is a continuation of politics is to make a point beyond war’s instrumentality. Continuation powerfully conveys the idea that war is itself a form of political behavior, and thus, even if subjective policy loses control of its instrument, the lines that run through war remain fundamentally political in nature. This idea cannot be overstated because, the concept of subordination may encourage the belief that war is something entirely different from politics because:
It is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own . . . . [But] war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. Ibid,731.
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