The following report is dedicated to platform openness as a strategic parameter using the example of Google Chrome and Apple Safari.
Even in the early days of the Internet and the use of browsers to access the Internet, there was a competition in the market. This competition between the browsers of Netscape (Netscape Navigator) and Microsoft (Internet Explorer) became known under the synonym " first browser war ". In December 1994, the market share of Netscape Navigator 1.0 was about 80%, while the share of Internet Explorer was 3%.
In November 1997, Microsoft's share was already 39%, while Netscaper's share dropped to 53%. Microsoft emerged from the war as the clear winner. For Shapiro and Varian (1999), the victory was due on the one hand to the financial advantage that Microsoft had over Netscape, and on the other hand to the Microsoft operating system, through which Internet Explorer reached many potential customers. As a result of the browser war, Netscape made the source code for all its products publicly available in 1998. This was not only the birth of today's browser "Firefox", but also the birth of today's well-known open source projects in the browser market.
The first browser war shows that in the early days of browsers, factors such as "open source" or "extensions" and the associated platform openness played only a minor role in the market environment.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Two-sides markets, platform and platform openness
2.2 Ecosystem in a platform environment
2.3 Platform governance
2.4 Platform competition
3 Platform openness as a strategic parameter in practice
3.1 Classification of internet browsers as a platform
3.2 Extensions as drivers for platform openness and their disadvantages
3.3 Limitation of platform openness and their solutions
4 Conclusion
Objectives and Topics
This work aims to analyze platform openness as a strategic parameter in the context of the internet browser market, using Google Chrome and Apple Safari as primary case studies to evaluate how strategies regarding third-party extensions influence market success and competitive positioning.
- Theoretical foundations of two-sided markets and platform ecosystems.
- The role of platform governance in managing complex digital environments.
- Mechanisms of platform competition and the "winner-take-all" principle.
- The impact of extensions on platform openness, security, and performance.
- Strategies for overcoming the chicken-and-egg problem in platform development.
Excerpt from the Book
3.2 Extensions as drivers for platform openness and their disadvantages
As explained in the previous chapter, extensions (in this paper both add-ons and plug-ins are meant) for internet browsers are a way of inter-sharing between end-users and developers. From the Extensions thus a platform openness results which can be seen again as strategic parameter in the browser competition.
To understand the power of extensions in terms of platform openness, it is important to look back to the year 2008, when Google Chrome was released. Hiten Shah (2019) shows in his article that a lot was changing around the Internet at that time. For example, more and more apps were developed in the wake of the IPhone release. The browsers at that time were not prepared for such a rapid development and were only used for classic internet "surfing". Google recognized this and developed the Chrome browser from the beginning with a platform idea. Thus, in the same year, the project "Chromium" was launched, where external developers could participate in the development of Chrome and could already provide extensions in 2009 (Shah 2019) According to Shah (2019), this platform openness resulted in a rapid increase in users for Chrome and a rapid decrease in users for competing browsers (see figure 2).
Summary of Chapters
1 Introduction: Provides a historical overview of the "first browser war" and sets the stage for discussing platform openness as a strategic parameter in modern browsers.
2 Theoretical background: Establishes the fundamental concepts of two-sided markets, platform ecosystems, platform governance, and the dynamics of platform competition.
3 Platform openness as a strategic parameter in practice: Examines browser classification, the impact of extensions on competition, and solutions for addressing the chicken-and-egg problem.
4 Conclusion: Synthesizes the findings, highlighting the success of Google Chrome and the evolving strategy of Apple Safari in managing platform openness.
Keywords
Platform Openness, Two-sided Markets, Internet Browser, Google Chrome, Apple Safari, Platform Governance, Extensions, Ecosystem, Network Externalities, Platform Competition, Browser War, Chromium, Digital Strategy, Third-party Developers, Market Share.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the core focus of this publication?
This work explores the strategic importance of platform openness within the internet browser industry, focusing on how browsers function as two-sided markets.
Which entities are the primary subjects of analysis?
The study primarily focuses on Google Chrome and Apple Safari as practical examples of how platforms manage openness through third-party extensions.
What is the primary research question?
The research examines how platform openness acts as a strategic parameter and how it influences the competitive success of internet browsers.
Which scientific methodology is employed?
The work utilizes a literature-based analysis of economic theories concerning two-sided markets combined with a comparative case study of browser development strategies.
What topics are covered in the main section?
The main section details the classification of browsers as platforms, the role of extensions, the limitations of platform openness, and the "chicken-and-egg" problem.
How would you summarize the work with keywords?
The work is best characterized by terms such as Platform Openness, Two-sided Markets, Platform Governance, Extensions, and Ecosystem.
How does Google Chrome differ from Apple Safari in its approach to extensions?
Google Chrome is classified as a "marketplace with a loose control," facilitating easier third-party participation, whereas Apple Safari is a "marketplace with a tight control" with higher barriers to entry.
What are the identified disadvantages of platform openness for end users?
The author highlights risks such as the potential for unauthorized data collection, security threats, and a decrease in browser performance due to an excessive number of installed extensions.
How do companies solve the "chicken-and-egg" problem in this context?
Strategies include subsidizing developers, integrating them into the development process, or using venture capital to ensure a base of extensions is available to attract initial users.
- Quote paper
- Anonym (Author), 2021, Platform Openness as a Strategic Parameter. Google Chrome vs. Apple Safari, Munich, GRIN Verlag, https://www.hausarbeiten.de/document/1004685