'European Integration since 1945 has contributed to saving rather than undermining the European nation state' - A discussion

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to Weimar Germany where the uncertain political circumstances (lack of belief in democracy) triggered World War II.

In 1945 the continent was split into two antagonist political, socio-economic and military blocks which led to the period of Cold War (1949-1981/91). The Western countries founded NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) in 1948 as an antagonist to the communist countries which aligned to the Warsaw Pact in 1955. At the same time an end of the European nation states’ power over their colonies could be observed. Another trend was the beginning of a first European movement (see website 2). Priority after the Second World War was given to the “creation of a viable frame work for international trade and finance” (Gillingham 2003, p. 73). For the same reason the treaty of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) was signed in 1951, to make sure that the European nation states profit as much as possible from coal and steel production which was one of the most important branches and put large parts of the unemployed post-war population back to work. Although the ECSC was founded for economic reasons it later became a basic element of the EEC (European Economic Community).

A bigger step towards European integration was the union of ECSC and EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community) to the EEC by signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957. A new body of European constitutional law with the power to override national courts was created. Symbolically the signing nation states transferred part of their sovereignty to the EEC. Only a few years after World War II the opposing nation states became equal partners and founded their own economic community. That the community did not only focus on economic matters but dealt increasingly with political and other affairs were proven when media and literature got rid of the adjective

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“economic” during the 1970s and the EEC linguistically became the EC (European Community). The 1950s and 1960s turned out to be decades of economic growth all over Europe. Therefore it was easier for the nation states to think in terms of European Community and to push the integration process forward instead of concentrating on national matters only.

The Nation states regained their power during the following recession in the 1970s, which was triggered by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. This period was also described as decade of Keynesian ascendancy (see Gillingham 2003, p. 81). The economist Keynes demanded a strong state. He advised governments to use its fiscal and monetary policy to help eliminate recessions and control economic booms. Concerned with the idea of a strong nation state the pace of European integration slowed down again.

Generally it can be said that in times of economic growth the integration process develops faster than in times of economic recessions. During recessions nation states become stronger since their citizens confront them directly by demanding a solution of the recession. European integration thus rather undermines the nation state but when it comes to situations in which a strong national focus is demanded nation states regain their power. It cannot be denied that those economic crises were even strengthened by the Europeanization (the assimilation into European culture, see website 5) and respectively the economic interdependence.

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The first enlargement of the EC took place in 1973 when Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland joined the EC. This enlargement was not threatening, was no economic burden, because those countries were economically almost as strong as the former six. The following enlargements of Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain joining the EU in 1986 meant a greater responsibility for all member states which committed themselves to help each other economically.

The basis of the “rescue of the nation state” (Milward 1994, p. 44) was an economic one, which suggests that the Europeanization of its rescue had also to be economic. Milward states that the “interdependence of European states was, however, by no means purely economic (ibid.)”. In his view Germany’s political future was the “greatest problem within that interdependence” (ibid.). After the Second World War the independent development of West Germany was seen as a motor and model for Europe. The result was a “different Germany in Europe” (Gillingham 2003, p. 76). The new progress of European integration was not dominated by anyone but was rather an example of interdependence. The German unification in 1990 meant a threat to this stability. The GDR automatically became a member of the EC. Other nation states feared a dominant role of Germany, which was stressed by the historical experience of the Second World War. Conservative M.P. John Redwood expressed his own anxieties on the issue in an article taken from The Times: “I will never feel loyalty to a government in which Germany has the most powerful voice. Nor will I feel sufficiently European to accept the authority of a European flag and government over my loyalty to my country, the U.K.”