Jagiellonian University Kraków
The Centre for European Studies

The Future of European Integration
Joschka Fischer’s European Federation

by
Heiko Bubholz

Prepared for:
History and Theory of European Integration

Kraków, 06 February 2002

Table of Content

Table of Content ... III

Abbreviations ... IV

1. Introduction ... 1

2. State of Affairs ... 2

3. The European State ... 3
    3.1 The European Federation ... 4
        3.1.1 The Theory ... 4
        3.1.2 The Application ... 5
    3.2 The European Government and Parliament ... 6
        3.2.1 The Legislative Branch ... 7
        3.2.2 The Executive Branch ... 8
    3.3 The European Constitution ... 9
        3.3.1 The Theory ... 9
        3.3.2 The Application ... 10
        3.3.3 The Principle of Subsidiarity ... 11

4. From Staatenverbund to European Federation ... 12

5. Constraints of the Federalisation of Europe ... 13

6. Conclusion ... 14

Bibliography ... V

Abbreviations
[...]

1. Introduction
Now, in January 2002, a visible step in European integration has been accomplished. With the introduction of the European €-currency about 296,8 millions citizen¹ of the European Union will hold the new symbols of the unity of Europe’s peoples in their hands. What began with an attempt of reconciliation and co-operation via the ECSC in 1952 has now developed towards a so far unprecedented transfer of sovereign rights and competencies from nation-states to a supranational/intergovernmental organisation.

Helmut Kohl, former chancellor of Germany and one of the initiators of the European currency, ascertains that the process of integration thus became irreversible. Though currently limited to a number of Member States of the EU, the “European experiment” attained a new dimension. Spectators, – in the words of Kohl – passing the streets and places of Kraków, Prague or Budapest, may notice and experience there the European spirit as well. Hence, Europe shall not be limited in its today’s proportions. The historical and moral – as well as rational – obligation of the EU therefor has to be the accession of the Candidate Countries in the earliest possible occasion².

This, however, implies the Union’s ability – and will – to cope with its own process of deepening and widening. During the IGC of Nice, European statesmen tried to negotiate a somehow reformed structure able to adopt an enlarged Union. Though not ratified yet, the Treaty of Nice will provide the future EU with means in the spirit of Maastricht and Amsterdam. Yet, Jacques Delors himself declared that the treaty establishing the European Union would for sure not become a part of fine literature. Drafted by lawyers it is, according to Delors, hard to understand without a manual³. This makes the problems evident, which the European idea is faced today. Though proclaimed to be a revolutionary step forward, the amendments of the Nice Treaty in effect do only barely “continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”⁴.

During the discussion regarding the ratification in the French Parliament Giscard d’Estaing contested his government’s efforts to defend the results of the French Presidency while simultaneously seeking refuge in a future IGC, when the ability to reform the enlarged Union will have shrank to a minimum⁵.

The German foreign minister Joschka Fischer privately delivered a far more revolutionising and probably provocative approach of the future of the European integration in a speech at the Humboldt University in Berlin, as a – in his words – European citizen⁶. In accordance to that, the aim of this paper shall be the discussion of a somehow distinct and distant future of the process of the European integration. Concerning rather decades than only few years, the following chapters shall present, illustrate and critically evaluate some of Fischer’s visions of a conceivable future structure of the European Union, and its restrains. The devoted reader might be aware of the fact, that not only Fischer’s remarks may suffer from national bias. However, the following theses may provide some elementary proposals to the discussion on the future of Europe’s unity.

2. State of Affairs
Quo vadis Europe? The European integration proved to be successful so far. A new principle of the European state system allowed for an unprecedented period of prosperity, stability and peace. Yet, an indispensable part of the European peoples was historically forced to stay outside this process. Fischer argues that a divided system of Europe’s states would shift the continent’s evolution towards more insecurity. Old conflicts may brought into the Union in a mid term perspective. Especially Germany would probably suffer most from disruption. Thus, the today’s Union faces at least three major challenges in mid and long term perspective. A more or less likely factual redoubling of the number of Member States, the sincere integration of the new members, while remaining capable to operate, implies the necessity of the full political integration⁷.

Indeed, the EU members accomplished first to reconcile, then adapt, and later to integrate their economic spheres. Hence, Article 2 TEC provides for an “economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States”. Since many books had been written about the history and theory of integration, the European process, after half a century, is still predominately an economic exercise. Though, easier to establish and obviously directly beneficial, the Member States constituting the today’s EU transferred only with the Treaty of Maastricht three essential characteristics of their national sovereignty upon the Community. After the introduction of the €-currency and the adoption of the Schengen amendments, the “average” European citizen may only rudimentarily experience the existence of the nation state in wide areas of the EU. However, these fundamental attributes of national sovereignty are only conferred in the intergovernmental and somehow national biased component of the Community.

[...]

1 Bundesverband deutscher Banken (2001), p. 12-13.
2 Kohl (2001).
3 Delors (1993), p. 4: „Zweifellos wird dieser Vertrag [Vertrag von Maastricht] nicht in die Literaturgeschichte eingehen. Ohne genaue Gebrauchsanweisung ist er schwer zu verstehen. Er ist das Ergebnis vielfacher Kompromisse und von Juristen geschrieben“.
4 Preamble of the Treaty on the European Union.
5 Giscard d’Estaing (2001).
6 Fischer (2000).
7 Idem.