2 plus 4 equals one - Was diplomacy vital for achieving German reunification?

  Florian M. Heyden  

Index

  Introduction  3

I.  May 1989 March 1990  4

II.  March-September 1990  7

III.  The diplomatic process 1989 1990  11

  Conclusion:  14

  Abbreviations  15

  Bibliography and References  16

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Florian M. Heyden

Until not long before the events of 1989, political union between the two German states appeared far off. In fact, in early 1989, articles appeared in the International Herald Tribune proposing the German politicians give up the idea of German reunification 1 .

Yet within little more than a year, Germany had acceded to full political union and sovereignty, without allies or neighbours objecting. We will ask ourselves how this seeming contradiction came to happen and what role diplomacy played in making it possible.

To do this, we will separate the course of events in two sections, the first one -less formalised- focusing more on the question if reunification would happen, followed by the second -more formalised- focusing on the terms of reunification. In the third part we will face the question what role the shape of consultations, notably the 2+4 (two German states plus four allied powers), played in the successful outcome of German moves towards reunification.

1 Zapf, 2000

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Florian M. Heyden

Ι.May 1989-March 1990

After 40 years in political stalemate and fading hope for changes to the status quo, the ‘German Question’ was revived in early 1989 when increasing civil unrest and the demand for reforms began to shake East Germany. In May 1989 George Bush became the first leader to plead to “bring glasnost to East Berlin”, emphasizing the right of self-determination for the whole of Germany 2 . Even though the US had in

fact already decided to push for a reunification within the Western system, it nevertheless found itself largely isolated with its position, while almost everyone else

- Western Germany apart - appeared to oppose the idea of a unified Germany 3 . In the USSR “the conviction was deeply rooted that the existence of two German states provided a reliable security guarantee” 4 and while the Soviet Union had made it clear that it would no longer interfere in Eastern Europe, it was still by no means certain that it would accept a united Germany. During much of 1989 the USSR maintained that East Germany should be maintained as a stabilising factor in Eastern Europe.

Britain equally maintained that German unity was not on the agenda for a long time to come 5 and once it realized that the GDR was destined to disappear, it tried to

“hinder German reunification at all costs” 6 , while President Mitterand made an

official visit in East Berlin in December 1989 in a bid to support the GDR and put a brake on calls for reunification and maybe to prevent it. Nevertheless, while the US maintained its outspoken position for German unity, neither London nor Paris proved strong enough to oppose Washington on their own. However, both France and Britain Paris tried to slow down the process by different means. Even as Mitterand began to outwardly speak out in favour of reunification, he maintained that such a process would have to be democratically, in consultation with all parties concerned. Paris insisted on including the USSR as an equal partner, as it remained persuaded that Moscow would never tolerate the

2 Haftendorn, 2000

3 Kroh, 2005

4 Newnham, 1999

5 Pond, 1993

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Florian M. Heyden

disappearance of the GDR 7 - thereby deemed to make open French opposition

unnecessary.

Moscow however moved increasingly away from its initial position, towards the idea that a unified but neutral Germany would be more favourable for the USSR than a divided one 8 . Moscow in fact had already in principle adopted this position when

Mitterand visited Gorbatchev in December 1989 9 to encourage Soviet opposition

towards reunification.

Realising that Moscow would not oppose reunification as such, Paris began to pursue a more multi-layered policy by combining the problem of West-East-European integration and Western European unification with German reunification. Mitterrand proposed to complete European integration, followed by German unification, which it hoped would weaken American influence in Europe while drawing out the process of unification.

At the same time, East Germany’s socialist government was equally by no means favourable towards what it perceived as annexation 10 , while Moscow refused to exert

direct pressure on the Eastern leadership to change their relations to West Germany. To encourage Eastern rapprochement, Chancellor Kohl engaged both in public diplomacy, acted discreetly through various channels to favour change in the GDR 11

and made it clear that the FRG would help the Eastern economy and absorb the costs and economic risks of unification, while at the same time making this support dependent on political reform.

In light of the increasing speed of events and encouraged by the fall of the Berlin Wall, trying to take control of the diplomatic momentum in November 1989, Chancellor Kohl unilaterally presented a ten-point plan suggesting a gradual process resulting in a confederation and eventually reunification. In fact, Kohl had good reasons to engage in his own independent Deutschlandpolitik, as he was domestically expected to loose the impending elections and perceived reunification as a means to retaining power. An overtly slow and gradual process as wished by many European

6 Haftendorn, 2000

7 Jessel, 2000

8 Soulet, 2004

9 Jessel, 2000

10 Bush, 1998

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