The European Union, Negotiation and the New Europe

Is the Record of EU Negotiation in the Balkan Conflicts 
of the 1990s Simply a Record of Failure?

von

Volker Hollenstein

1. Introduction  1

2. EC negotiation efforts in the Balkan conflicts  1
2.1 The beginning of the EC’s involvement in Yugoslavia  1
2.2 The Brioni Accords  3
2.3 The EC Conference on Yugoslavia  4

3. Conclusion  7

4. Bibliography  8

1. Introduction

The Balkan conflicts in the 1990s presented the post-Cold War world, and Europe in particular, with a critical challenge. The European Community (EC), and later the EU, was closely involved and it was often extensively criticised and condemned for its part. Its response to the post-1991 break-up of Yugoslavia and the subsequent hostilities in the Balkans has been seen as being, in several respects, inadequately prepared, developed and mobilised. Nevertheless, it is not so clear-cut if its negotiation record is simply one of failure which will be analysed in this essay. European involvement in the Balkan conflict was most apparent in the period from the beginning of the war, when both the United States and the UN kept a low profile, to the recognition of independence of the former Yugoslav Republics. Therefore this part will be covered in great detail.

2. EC negotiation efforts in the Balkan conflicts

2.1 The beginning of the EC’s involvement in Yugoslavia

On June 26 1991, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) intervened in Slovenia which signalled the actual beginning of the Yugoslav wars. The European Council meeting in Luxembourg decided to send the so-called ‘Troika’, formed of the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Luxembourg and Belgium, to mediate in Yugoslavia only two days later. (Lucarelli 2000: 18-19).

The main reason for the diplomatic intervention can be found by looking at the status of the EC at this time: The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Member States was about to come into existence after the Maastricht Summit in December 1991. Additionally, the EC wanted to show that it had learnt its lesson from the indecision and inaction during the Gulf War and felt its responsibility for the handling of this conflict (Gow 1997: 48).

Despite its rapid reaction the Community appeared to be taken by surprise of the events, which was criticised by the press at this time. Not without any justification. The gradual collapse of the federal state of Yugoslavia had been obvious for some time and did not happen over night. In this context, Lucarelli states that there was in general a lack of preventive diplomacy and that “the management of the crisis was nearly entirely reactive-punitive” (2000: 225). The immediate actions now were favoured by the fact that the EC Summit coincided with the outbreak of the war. James Gow believes that a later summit would still have decided to become involved, but without such a lack of preparation (1997: 47). Indeed, preparation is certainly a crucial factor in international negotiations and there was not enough time to do that properly. By looking at statements of leading politicians at that time the Member States appeared to be confident that they could handle the crisis by diplomatic mediation, using as leverage the economic aid and financial help programmes and various trade agreements (Soetendorp 1999: 128;140).

A main negotiation objective of the EC was to preserve the country’s federal constitution. A variety of reasons has been identified for that: The Member States were preoccupied with the unification of Germany and the integration of the countries of central and eastern Europe; their views were very different from each other, which complicated the decision-making process in a process based on consensus; and, to a lesser extent, they feared the effect a possible disintegration might have on their own separatist movements (Nuttall 1994: 13). Simon Nuttall identifies two additional factors: Firstly, there were concerns in the Community that Yugoslavia’s geographical position could cause problems in terms of transit traffic with Greece.

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