Record of EU-Negotiation in the Balkan Conflicts

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of Italy, Luxembourg and Belgium, to mediate in Yugoslavia only two days later. (Lucarelli 2000: 18-19).

The main reason for the diplomatic intervention can be found by looking at the status of the EC at this time: The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the Member States was about to come into existence after the Maastricht Summit in December 1991. Additionally, the EC wanted to show that it had learnt its lesson from the indecision and inaction during the Gulf War and felt its responsibility for the handling of this conflict (Gow 1997: 48).

Despite its rapid reaction the Community appeared to be taken by surprise of the events, which was criticised by the press at this time. Not without any justification. The gradual collapse of the federal state of Yugoslavia had been obvious for some time and did not happen over night. In this context, Lucarelli states that there was in general a lack of preventive diplomacy and that “the management of the crisis was nearly entirely reactive-punitive” (2000: 225). The immediate actions now were favoured by the fact that the EC Summit coincided with the outbreak of the war. James Gow believes that a later summit would still have decided to become involved, but without such a lack of preparation (1997: 47). Indeed, preparation is certainly a crucial factor in international negotiations and there was not enough time to do that properly.

By looking at statements of leading politicians at that time the Member States appeared to be confident that they could handle the crisis by diplomatic mediation, using as leverage the economic aid and financial help programmes and various trade agreements (Soetendorp 1999: 128;140).

A main negotiation objective of the EC was to preserve the country’s federal constitution. A variety of reasons has been identified for that: The Member States were preoccupied with the unification of Germany and the integration of the countries of central and eastern Europe; their views were very different from each other, which complicated the decision-making process in a process based on consensus; and, to a lesser extent, they feared the effect a possible disintegration might have on their own separatist movements (Nuttall 1994: 13). Simon Nuttall identifies two additional factors: Firstly, there were concerns in the Community that Yugoslavia’s geographical position could cause problems in terms of transit traffic with Greece. Therefore, the EC wanted to preserve the status quo; secondly, there was no institutionalized

Volker Hollenstein (A113817)

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responsibility in terms of common foreign policy, which could have been able to correct the negotiation agenda. (1994: 14-5). In this context, it is important to notice that the 12 Member States and the Commission were well aware of what was likely to happen in Yugoslavia’s future, but did not discuss that adequately on the Community level.

The Community had two more objectives: a political dialogue between all parties to implement democratic reforms, and a ban on the use of force (Wood 1993: 233). First, it viewed the conflict as a civil war and treated all parties equally. This interpretation shifted in December 1991 towards seeing the Serbian leadership as bearing prime responsibility (Lucarelli 2000: 27).

2.2 The Brioni Accords

The first troika came with a three-point plan to Yugoslavia that was actually just borrowed from Ante Markovic, the last Prime Minister of the SFRY: It called for a resolution of the presidential crisis; a ceasefire and the army’s return to its barracks; and a suspension of implementation of the declarations of independence for a period of three months (Gow 1997: 50-51).

Initially, the main strategy of the troika was to bully the Yugoslavs into a ceasefire. The delegation was supported by Community action imposing an embargo on armaments and military equipment to the whole of Yugoslavia and threatening to block aid worth £7-8000m (Gow: 1997: 52).

On 7 July, the troika could convince the Serb, Slovenian and Croatian central governments to agree to its plan on the island of Brioni. A result was that on 18 July, the JNA withdrew from Slovenia and in doing that had effectively recognized the independence of the country. A further achievement of the troika was that all parties agreed to the introduction of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), although happening within the framework of the then CSCE. (Lucarelli 2000: 20). The ECMM’s ‘contribution’ to negotiations was crucial when, for example, it was necessary to improve the chances of ceasefires holding or to identify the party that offended a certain agreement.

Volker Hollenstein (A113817)

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On the face of it, the negotiation outcome was a success. The fighting in Slovenia had been brought to an end and time for further negotiations had been secured. However, as Nuttall points out, none of the underlying problems had been addressed by the agreement (1994: 15). Furthermore, the Community still adhered on its objective to maintain the federal structures of Yugoslavia and on the imposition of an embargo on supplies of arms. This decision was later criticised as having worked to the advantage of the federal and Serbian forces because a side-effect of such an embargo is always that it maintains the existing balance of power. They, and not the Croat forces, were the ones with access to large quantities of arms (Nuttall 1994: 19). However, these two main negotiation objectives gave the other participants in the talks at least for a certain period of time the impression that the EC was favouring the Serbian cause. The Community also had the general problem of deciding between taking sides in the conflict on moral grounds, or staying neutral to enhance its credibility as negotiator (Nuttall 1994: 20-1). Nevertheless, the Brioni accords were regarded as successful and created a great deal of euphoria about the possible future role of the EC.

2.3 The EC Conference on Yugoslavia

A further conference sponsored entirely by the EC was arranged in The Hague. The so-called European Community Conference on Yugoslavia opened on the 7 ^th September under the direction of Lord Peter Carrington and hosted the representatives of the six former Yugoslav republics as well as the European mediators. Lord Carrington had generally a very good reputation and was certainly qualified for this position, considering his experience as former NATO Secretary-General.

The negotiations were supposed to take place on the basis of three principles: no unilateral changes of borders, protection of the rights of all minorities, and full respect for all legitimate interests and aspirations (Gow 1997: 53).

A problem deeply affecting the negotiations from the beginning was that the fighting did not stop in Yugoslavia. As an experienced negotiator Lord Carrington was aware of that problem but in contrast to his pre-negotiation statements he continued with the talks (Gow 1997: 53-4).

Volker Hollenstein (A113817)