Table of Contents:

1.  THE CONCEPT OF THE CARTEL PARTY’  4

THE  EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH.  4

A  )  

FEATURES  OF THE CARTEL PARTY  5

B  )  

2.  CRITICISM AND REJOINDER.  6

STATE  AND SOCIETY  6

  )C  

THE  PARTY SYSTEM  7

D  )  

THE  INDIVIDUAL PARTY  8

E  )  

THE  EVOLUTIONARY ASPECT.  9

F  )  

3.  COMMENTS AND ASSESSMENT.  9

4.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  11

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a) The concept of the ‘cartel party’

The ‘cartel party’ concept proposed by Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair in Party Politics 1 provoked a debate between the authors and Ruud Koole. ² In this paper I will redraw and assess this debate concluding with some own remarks. In their piece Katz & Mair challenge the predominance of the ‘mass party’ or ‘catch-all party’-models in the literature on political parties. The contemporary problems in applying these models are usually being interpreted as a ‘decline of party’. In contrast to that, Katz & Mair propose a new model, the so-called cartel party as an ideal type towards party organization is developing. To illustrate this, the authors draw evolutionary stages of party development underlining in particular the relative position of parties in front of state and civil society and the reflection of that relationship in the inner-party organization, their finances, and the underlying concept of democracy.

b) The evolutionary approach

The earliest parties in the mid/late 19 ^th century, the so-called elite or cadre parties were characterized by very limited network structures sustained by individuals’ initiatives. Electoral competition under limited suffrage was aimed at local constituencies with the elected being viewed as trustees who were part of both civil society and the state in pursuing the national interest. With increasing suffrage mass parties started challenging the established cadre parties. They represented a clearly demarcated sectoral interest of societal groups who were so far not connected to the state and for whom mass parties provided this link in the fight for social reforms. They were characterized by large numbers of members who supported the party with their contributions and decided about policy issues with elected deputes being accountable representatives of the party.

Soon the traditional parties of the right reacted in trying to broaden the base of voters by establishing the so-called ‘catch-all parties’ These parties kept up the claim

¹ R Katz / P Mair (1995), ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy - The

Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics 1:5-27.

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to represent the national interest but emulated the recruitment of mass party membership. Yet, the membership was not based on social status but on policy agreement and was meant to support parliamentary deputes. With the emergence of the modern welfare state and the dissolution of traditional social cleavages also the late mass parties became undermined and endeavoured to broaden their base.

c) Features of the cartel party

The development of parties in the last decades increasingly matches the Schumpeterian or Downsian model of democracy with parties being driven by a selfinterest of enjoying the premium of staying or getting into power. ³ These political entrepreneurs gain their mandate from an electorate whose task is not to choose policies but leaders as brokers of pluralist interests of society. Governing became possible in shifting coalitions. Not mobilization but skillful campaigning determined electoral outcomes also with the spread of the mass media. Consequently the parties increasingly intermingled with the state and tried to manipulate it in their self-interest. Democracy becomes a service provided by the state and the incorporated parties to civil society which loses its controlling and balancing function while party programs increasingly converge. With the parties moving away from civil society and into the state participation no longer plays a decisive role. Mass civil engagement shifts towards single-issue groups. For their costly campaigns the parties need to tap new financial sources which they easily find in the state. Also privileged access to the media is secured this way. Losing elections is no longer decisive with regards to policies (which were converging anyway) but for the survival of a party and its access to crucial state financing on which it increasingly depends for the lack of a large external base. In awareness of their dependence on the state the major contemporary established parties increasingly collude in sharing the resources for their collective survival which at the same time in a cartel-like manner bars newcomers from entering the system. Competition is rather limited and the costs of defeat are being lowered by the state, which provides for all parties.

² R Koole (1996), ‘Cadre, Catch-all or Cartel ? - A comment on the notion of the cartel party’, Party

Politics 2:507-527; R Katz / P Mair (1996), ‘Cadre, Catch-all or Cartel? - A Rejoinder’, Party Politics

2:525-534.

³ JA Schumpeter (1992), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, L: Routledge;

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