Abstract:

In November 2002 a longer process of bilateral bargaining between the EU and Russia lead to the agreement on the issue of transit to the Russian enclave Kaliningrad via the territories of the future EU member states. The agreement entailed far-reaching compromises on the seemingly non-negotiable Schengen acquis. Applying two concepts of interdependence and two-level games the relatively limited bargaining power of the EU on this issue is examined. Especially the countervailing interests of some member states but also the impact of the issue on enlargement and the need to cooperate with Russia as a new neighbour undermined a hardline stand of the Commission.

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Content: p.

1.  Introduction  4

2.  The Framework of Analysis  6

3.  Assessing EU-Russia bargaining on Kaliningrad  7

3.1.  Joint gains, joint losses and the costs of a non-agreement  7

3.2.  Negotiation strategies, agenda-setting, issue linkages and  

side  -payments  10

3.3.  The role of individual member states  13

3.4.  The role of Poland and Lithuania  15

4.  Conclusion  16

5.  Bibliography  17

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1. Introduction

With the accession of Lithuania and Poland to the European Union envisaged for Mai 2004 the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad will be completely surrounded by EU-territory. This is going to have a number of consequences for Russian transit travelers between Kaliningrad and the Russian mainland. With the accession agreement Lithuania and Poland have agreed to the adoption of the Schengen acquis. Therefore, Russians traveling through these countries should be subjected to the Schengen regulations which would require them to obtain an international Russian passport and a transit visa from a Lithuanian or Polish consulate. These conditions were declared unacceptable by the Putin administration which demanded free and unrestricted travel from and to Kaliningrad which so far is possible with the old Soviet internal passport and without having to obtain a visa. If this was not possible, an international transit corridor should be established declared the Russian government. The EU made clear that the Schengen acquis was nonnegotiable and any infringement of the sovereignty of Poland or Lithuania unacceptable but agreed to start bilateral talks about the costs and duration of future visas for Russian travelers. 1

Mainly between June and November 2002 negotiations between the EU ² and the Russian government over the issue took place which resulted in the following agreement signed during the EU-Russia summit in Brussels on 11 November 2002: From 1 July 2003 transit to Kaliningrad via Lithuania will require either a) a so-called facilitating transit document (FTD), issued free of charge or at a low price by Lithuanian consulates which allows multi-entry travel in connection with the old internal passport, from 2005 only with an international one, or b) a facilitated return transit document (FRTD) for a single (return) trip by train only. The latter can be requested via the Russian railway authorities when buying a ticket and will be issued at border checkpoints. ³ Moreover, both sides agreed to carry out a feasibility study concerning a high-speed non-stop train link and the abandoning of the visa requirement for this kind of travel if Lithuania agrees, too. Furthermore, traveling via

¹ European Report No. 2693, 19 June 2002, p. V.6.

² Unless stated differently the term ‘EU’ as a negotiating partner of Russia refers to the EU Commission

which lead the negotiations.

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Poland or by private car will require a full Schengen visa. The agreement is connected with technical and financial aid to Russia for economic development and border management. A readmission agreement for illegal immigrants is envisaged for the near future. 4

This agreement presents a puzzle in so far as the EU was willing to accept farreaching compromises on the Schengen acquis which seemed to be non-negotiable. ⁵ Now, the most important transit route to Kaliningrad, i.e. the train link via Lithuania can be used without having to apply for a visa in advance and until 2005 even without an international passport. This regulation meets Russia’s original demand to a great extent. The outcome of the negotiations appears rather counterintuitive as one would assume a higher bargaining power of the EU. The economic strength of the European Union is seen as creating a relationship of asymmetric dependence for Russia and as giving the EU the power to determine outcomes in bilateral bargaining. ⁶ Also in applications of approaches such as Putnam’s two-level games the EU is often described as a tough negotiator on the international level due to its limited win-sets which are derived from the diverse member states’ interests which have to be balanced in the institutional framework. ⁷ This is especially relevant when the unanimous approval of the member states is required as in this case. ⁸ EU negotiators can use the ‘tied-hands’ strategy in order to obtain concessions from the other side. ⁹ Russia in turn, could be assumed as having bigger win-sets, i.e. more room for manoeuvre on the international level due to the more autonomous position of its presidential government in front of the legislature and societal actors. Moreover, the costs of a non-agreement outcome seem to lie with Russia which would have to cope with a visa regime for its citizens without any concessions in case of failed negotiations. Therefore the Russian side should have been more willing to accept far-

³ NeueZuercher Zeitung, 12 November 2002.

⁴ Bulletin Quotidien Europe, No. 8338, 13 November 2002, p. 9.

⁵ European Report No. 2693, 19 June 2002, p. V.7.

⁶ R Keohane / J Nye (1977), Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little

and Brown, pp. 10-11.

⁷ R Putnam (1988), Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games, International

Organization, 42:3, pp. 427-460.

⁸ S Meunier (2000), What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations,

International Organization, 54:1, pp. 103-135.

⁹ S Meunier (2000), What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-US Trade Negotiations,

International Organization, 54:1, pp. 106; R Putnam (1988), Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The

Logic of Two Level Games, International Organization, 42:3, pp. 448-449.

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